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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter is before the court on judicial review brought by the several 
petitioners listed above (collectively "Friends"), who seek review of a decision made by 
the Jerome County Board of County Commissioners ("Board") concerning the issuance 
of a permit for a livestock confinement operation ("LCO") to Don McFarland, dba Big 
Sky Farms Limited Partnership ("Big Sky"), now represented by South View Dairy. This 
is the second time the matter has been brought on for judicial review; the first review 
ending in remand to the Board with this current action following that. 
FACTUAL OVERVIEW 
A quick and accurate overview of the facts in this matter can be found in the 
written decision of the Honorable, Judge G. Richard Bevan (Phase II, Agency Record p. 
25), after the initial judicial review of the matter. A more detailed rendition of the facts, 
both before and after Judge Bevan's decision, is found in the record. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON REVIEW 
Is Jerome County entitled to attorney's fees, pursuant to 12-117, incurred 111 
having to respond to Friends' petition. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Friends Has Failed To Demonstrate That Petitioner Organizations Have 
Standing. 
Friends claims that Petitioner Organizations have standing to participate in this law suit 
and support such claim not so much with facts or even argument, but rather with naked 
assertions only. The proper standard to establish such standing has been stated: 
[A]n association may have standing solely as the representative of its 
members. The association must allege that its members, or anyone of 
them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the 
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the 
members themselves brought suit. So long as this can be established, and 
so long as the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does not make 
the individual participation of each injured party indispensable to proper 
resolution of the case, the association may be an appropriate representative 
of its members, entitled to invoke the court's jurisdiction. 
Selkirk-Priest Basin Assn., Inc. v. State, 127 Idaho 239 (1995) (SPBA I); (citations 
omitted). The SP BA matter went back before the court in SP BA II, where the standard 
was further developed with the court holding that in "order to possess standing, either the 
organization or its members must face 'injury'. SPBA L 127 Idaho at 242, 899 P.2d at 
952. The injury must be distinct and palpable and not be one suffered alike by all citizens 
in the jurisdiction." Selkirk-Priest Basin Assn., Inc. v. State, 128 Idaho 831 (1996) (SPBA 
II); (citations in original). 
Friends attempts to satisfy this standard by stating: 
[T]he petitioner organizations have standing because the interests 
implicated by this case are germane to the purposes of the organizations, 
at least one of their individual members has standing in her own right, and 
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation 
of individual members in the lawsuit. Where one petitioner is found to 
have standing, the remainder of the petitioners are presumed to have 
standing. 
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(Petitioners' Memo, at 22). This is it. This is the only thing Friends offers, asserts or 
points to in its claim of organizational standing. Friends does cite various cases (the 
holdings of which do pertain to organizational standing), but never applies the facts of 
this case to the cited law. Merely citing case after case (as Friends does in much of its 
brief) without ever applying such to the facts being asserted (as Friends also does in 
much of its brief), does not provide support for Friends' assertions of organizational 
standing. Instead, it leaves them bare and conc1usory. As a result, the unsupported 
assertions of Friends does not even come close to satisfying the elements of 
organizational standing. 
In fact, instead of satisfying these elements, Friends' assertions only raise more 
unanswered questions. For example, Friends assert that this case is germane to the 
purposes of the organizations. Really? How? Friends assert that at least one of the 
organizations individual members have standing in their own right. Really? Who? And 
how, because aren't the perceived injuries ofFOM, ACL and National Trust members of 
the nature suffered alike by all citizens? 
Friends does attach several affidavits to its memorandum and states in a footnote 
that these affidavits are from Petitioner Organizations and "establish their respective 
standing to challenge the Board's action." (Petitioners'Memo, at 23). The very next 
sentence of this footnote states, "Some Petitioners have members who live within one 
mile of the proposed LCO ... while others' organizational members visit, and will 
continue to visit, the Minidoka Site regularly." (Id.). The organizations that Friends 
refers to as only having members that visit the Minidoka Site are FOM, JACL and 
National Trust. This acknowledgement by Friends becomes more of an admission that 
these three organizations do not have standing once it is analyzed whether any of such 
organizations had members who suffered an injury caused by the challenged action(s). 
SP BA I, supra. 
Such an analysis begins with recognizing that in land use matters, one must be an 
"affected person" to bring suit. I.C. § 67-6521(1)(a). To be an affected person, one must 
have "an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or 
denial of a permit authorizing the development." (Id.). The fact that Petitioner 
Organizations FOM, JACL and National Trust might have members that visit the 
Minidoka Site regularly, does not establish standing. Friends has failed to make a case 
that such "visitation" alone would allow these members to bring suit themselves; has 
failed to say anything in regard to any member having an interest in real property; and 
has failed to identify a distinct and palpable injury suffered by any member. 
Further, even if for the sake of argument it were accepted that "visitation" did 
somehow give FOM, JACL and National Trust standing, there is still no showing that the 
Minidoka site even might be adversely affected by the permit issued in this case. Friends 
does attempt an argument to the contrary. But instead of starting at the beginning (as is 
customary), Friends starts on top of the false premise that the Minidoka Site has actually 
been shown to be adversely affected. As will be shown, such a false premise will prove 
to be a reoccurring theme in each of the claims Friends asserts. Regardless, suffice it to 
say the premise offered here does not establish the Minidoka site as having been injured 
under LLUPA 
For all the above reasons, Friends has failed to satisfy the standard for 
organizational standing as to FOM, JACL and National Trust. Therefore, these Petitioner 
Terome Count-X:sMemorandum Oeci' 4 1(J.. ponse.,.4 
Organizations must be excluded from participating in any further proceedings in this 
matter. 
As to the two remaining Petitioner Organizations, IeARE and IRe, the relative 
affidavits attached to Friends' memorandum do identify certain members of these 
particular organizations, and which (at least in the case of IeARE) do indicate that such 
members are within one mile of the proposed LeO. However, merely being in "close 
proximity" of the proposed LeO, does not by itself establish individual standing. As 
indicated, section 67-6521(1)(a) holds: "As used herein, an affected person shall mean 
one having an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance 
or denial of a permit authorizing the development." (Id.; emphasis added). Therefore, 67-
6521(1)(a) sets forth two relevant requirements one must obtain to be an affected person 
and have standing to seek judicial review under the LLUP A. First, the person must have 
an interest in real property and second, the real property itself must be vulnerable to 
possible injury, the nature of which must be distinct and palpable. SPBA II, supra. 
Applying this standard to IeARE, the affidavit submitted on its behalf identifies 
four specific members that are presumably offered as the individual members who could 
seek judicial review on their own. These four IeARE members are Brenda Hermann, 
Jim Stewart, Dick Helsley, and Lee Halper. The affidavit indicates that all these 
individuals, except for Mr. Halper, l live within a mile of the proposed LeO or in close 
proximity thereto. Regardless to this stated "close proximity," and as Friends itself 
points out in its memorandum,2 "proximity" to the proposed LeO does not establish an 
I The affidavit is silent as to where Mr. Halper lives in relation to the proposed LCO. 
2 Friends cite Evans v. Teton County, l39 Idaho 71, 74 (2003), which holds that a court will not look to a 
predetennined distance in deciding whether a property owner has, or does not have, standing to seek 
judicial review of a LLUPA decision. 
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"affected person." This is the only information given in regard to the property that the 
identified ICARE members live on. The affidavit does not indicate that any of the 
individuals have an interest in the property of their respective residences, nor does it 
describe any potential injury that is distinct and palpable to the property (which only 
even becomes relevant if it is assumed that the individuals do have an interest in the 
property). As a result, organizational standing has not been established by ICARE and it 
too may not participate in this suit any further. 
IRC also attempts to establish organizational standing with an affidavit of its own, 
however it is only marginally better than that submitted by ICARE. In its affidavit, IRC 
states: 
IRC currently has in excess of 13 members in Jerome County, including 
several who own and farm real property adjacent to the proposed Big Sky 
CAFO and includes several who live on such real property. IRC members 
include Dean and Eden Dimond and Harold and Carolyn Dimond. 
Construction and operation of the Big Sky CAFO will likely cause a 
serious, immediate, and persistent decline in the air quality within at least 
a two mile radius of the proposed facility, with especially severe impacts 
to IRC members who farm and/or live adjacent tot eh facility. Surface 
and/or ground water quality impacts are also likely and will impair 
members' use and enjoyment of their properties. 
(AfJ. of Rich Carlson, dated December 16, 2009). As with ICARE, IRC discusses 
several "faceless" members, but only identifies four specific members: Dean, Eden, 
Harold, and Carolyn Dimond. Although the affidavit says several of it members "own 
and farm real property adjacent to the proposed" LCO, it does not state that any of the 
Dimonds are such members. For that matter, it is not even real clear that the Dimonds 
are in fact the individual members that IRC is seeking to gain standing through. Its 
affidavit simply states that the Dimonds are ICR members, but does not state whether 
Terome cQPpt}fsMemQf-imdum nf 4'j} - eSPQnse~ 6· 
they do in fact have an interest in real property, and if so, whether such property might be 
injured in a distinct and palpable manner. The affidavit does set forth several conclusory 
statements that property within a two-mile radius of the proposed facility is "likely" to be 
adversely affected, but again does not state whether any of such property belongs to the 
Dimonds. Therefore, organizational standing has also not been established by IRe either, 
and it must also refrain from further participating in this suit. 
In the event that a member of one or more of Petitioner Organizations is found to 
have an interest in real property that may suffer distinct and palpable injury, then clearly 
under applicable law, organizational standing would be established. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that a particular Petitioner Organization's standing would 
extend only as far as that organization's particular claim. Cowan v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of 
Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501 (2006) (a party who has an interest in real property has 
standing to pursue his or her claim). The petitioners of Friends must identify their 
individual claims, pointing to the specific action of the county that each is attacking, and 
then illustrate that the board erred in a manner specified therein and show that a 
substantial right of that particular petitioner has been prejudiced. Cowan, at 508. 
This point is stressed as a result of Friends' failures thought out its memorandum 
of identifying which specific petitioner(s) is attacking which specific action(s), and what 
specific petitioner(s) suffered what specific injury. This point will be explain in further 
detail and made clearer as it comes up below. 
II. (A)(l) Friends Has Failed To Show That Petitioner Slones' Constitutional 
Procedural Due Process Rights Were Violated. 
The main thrust of Friends' "procedural due process" claim is that Petitioner 
Slones' rights were violated as a result of not being sufficiently notified of the Big Sky 
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hearing on September 25 and 26, 2007. (Petitioners' Memo, at 24-28). In reply to this 
claim, it is first noted that Idaho Code Section 67-6529 is the provision of law that 
mandates a public hearing on LCO applications. Specifically, this section holds in 
applicable part that "a county's ordinance or resolution shall provide that the board of 
county commissioners shall hold at least one (1) public hearing affording the public an 
opportunity to comment on each proposed site before the siting of such facility." (I.e. § 
67-6529(2); emphasis added). Jerome County complied with this code section by 
providing for and requiring a public hearing in front of the Board on all applications for 
an LCO permit. (JCZO, Sec. 13-6.03). Short of this, both section 67-6529 and chapter 13 
are silent as to any notice requirements on LCO hearings. This is not to say that Jerome 
County is arguing that no notice of such hearings need be given, simply that it is difficult 
to understand Friends' argument of "improper notice" when there are no specific notice 
requirements controlling the county. 
Given the present circumstances (no mandated notice requirements), Friends' 
claim then is similar to that made in Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923 (1998). 
There, it was asserted by appellants that the respondent city violated the appellants' 
minimum due process requirements when it approved a subdivision plat application 
through a method that was quasi-judicial in nature, but where the applicable law was 
silent as to notice procedure. (Id., at 927). The court cited the controlling law in such a 
claim, and stated that the due process requirement of an opportunity to be heard is 
fulfilled when there is sufficient notice of an opportunity to be heard, and if the 
opportunity occurs at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. (Id.). The court 
found that the respondent city had given notice in three different ways: 1) it had posted 
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notice at the city hall twenty-four hours prior to the meeting approving the preliminary 
plat; 2) it had published notice in the newspaper; and 3) it had mailed individual notice to 
nearby property owners. (ld.). The court concluded that "sufficient notice was given and 
that the appellants were provided an opportunity to be heard at the most meaningful time, 
which was at the public hearing ... " (ld.). 
Here, the Slones were provided with the same three kinds of notice that the 
Castaneda appellants were: 1) the posting of notice at the county courthouse (Phase I, 
Vol. # 1, Staff, p. 30 and 37); 2) published notice in the newspaper (Phase I, Vol. # 1, 
Staff, p. 36); and 3) mailed individual notice (Phase I, Vol. # 1, Staff, p. 45). In addition, 
the Slones where provided a fourth type of notice that was not mentioned in Castaneda, 
which was the posting of notice on the subject property (Phase I, Vol. # 1, Staff, p. 35). 
This fourth type of notice is significant because the record shows the posting on the 
subject property occurred as early as July 19,2007; and as Friends admit, the Slones are a 
mere 300 yards away. (Petitioners' Memo, at 25). 
In addition to having been provided with more notice of the public hearing than 
the appellants in Castaneda, the Slones were also provided with more of an opportunity 
to be heard. In addition to the public hearing in this matter (taking place over the course 
of two days and being held open for a total of ten hours) that was held for the public to 
submit comment (Phase I, Vol. # 1, Staff, p. 30 and 37; Phase I, Trans.), the Slones were 
also provided with the secondary way of providing written comment. The county would 
have accepted this written comment prior to the hearing if the Slones would have so in 
fact offered (Phase I, Vol. # 1, Staff, p. 30 and 37). If, for some reason the Slones were 
unable to attend the two day, ten hour long opportunity to submit oral comment, they 
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could have taken advantage of the this secondary way of being heard through writing. It 
should be pointed out as well that the notice the Slones received through publication did 
inform them that the "written comment" avenue was available to them. (Phase I, Vol. # 1, 
Staff, p. 30 and 37). 
In any event, the record clearly shows the claim of Friends that the Slones did 
"not receive any notice at all of the proposed LCO facility" (Petitioners' Memo, at 27; 
emphasis added) is simply not true. The Slones received four varying kinds of notice; 
the same kinds that the appellants in Castaneda received and then some. In addition, a 
ten hour-long opportunity to be heard, held over the course of two days, was made 
available to them.3 Clearly, pursuant to the holding of Castaneda, sufficient notice of the 
Big Sky hearing had been provided to the Slones. The fact that they did not take 
advantage of these opportunities (for whatever reason) is beyond Jerome County's 
control. 
Friends does claim that the reason the Slones did not participate in the Big Sky 
hearing was because their attorney's schedule prevented them from doing so. Absolutely 
fascinating about this argument is Friends' arrogance in thinking that the schedule of the 
Slones' attorney somehow takes precedence over the Board's. Although the record is not 
clear as to exactly when the Board determined that the hearing would be held on the 25th 
and 26th of September 2007, it does show that such decision had been made by at least 
August 15, 2007. (Phase I, Vol. # 1, Staff, p. 33). The Slones did not hire their attorney, 
Patrick Brown, until September 12,2007 (Supp. Rec., Vol. II, pp. 303-05). This date of 
3 It is important to understand the significance of the amount of time allotted for this hearing. Two days 
were purposely scheduled and held open so that if certain members of the public could not attend one of the 
days, then perhaps their schedule would allow them to attend on the other scheduled day. Further along 
these lines, one of the hearing days was purposely held open until 10:00 p.m. so that any member of the 
public, who was not available during the day, might be able to make it late in the evening. 
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hire was almost a full month after the Board had already set the hearing date. In addition, 
the record makes it absolutely clear that at the time of his hire, Mr. Brown knew he had a 
scheduling conflict with the dates set for the Big Sky hearing and that this conflict would 
interfere with his ability to effectively represent the Slones. (Id.). Yet, instead of 
declining to represent the Slones based on the scheduling conflict, Mr. Brown went ahead 
and accepted their employment. (Id.). Apparently, Mr. Brown figured that the obvious 
solution to his dilemma was to simply accept the Slones as clients and then insist that the 
Board move its hearing, which had already been scheduled for some amount of time. 
The Slones are not free from responsibility on this issue either. Aware of the 
dates scheduled for the hearing (Id.), and presuming Mr. Brown informed them of his 
conflict, the Slones could have declined to hire Mr. Brown and sought out an attorney 
that had no conflict and that could in fact represent them zealously at the scheduled 
hearing. Whatever the case, the bottom line is that Jerome County should not be held in 
the wrong for Mr. Brown's and the Slones' mistaken belief that the county could or 
would adjust its schedule around them. 
As a further part of its claim regarding the Slones' notice, Friends also appears to 
take the position that the problem was not so much that the Slones did not receive notice, 
but rather that the Board failed to follow its own ordinance when providing such notice to 
the Slones. (Petitioners' Memo, at 24-28). In this argument, Friends asserts that "Jerome 
County violated the Slones' procedural due process rights by failing to provide them with 
individual notice of the Big Sky hearing as required by Jerome County ordinance" (Id., 
at pp. 24 and 25; emphasis added), and that "the Slones ... did not get any required notice 
until after the comment period for written testimony was already closed." (Id., at 26; 
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emphasis in original). Friends therefore seems to frame the issue as one of whether or 
not Jerome County presented the Slones with notice in accordance with some kind of 
specified procedures. However, as noted above, neither section 67-6529 of the Idaho 
Code, nor chapter 13 of the JCZO, set forth any such specific notice requirements in 
regard to a public hearing on a LCO application. It would thus be difficult for the Board 
to violate notice procedures when such procedures don't exist. 
The question then is how does Friends arrive at its claim? In support of its 
argument, Friends cites to section 13-6.01 of the Jerome County Zoning Ordinance, and it 
appears also that Friends finds additional support from section 13-6.02 (although it never 
directly cites to that section in its memorandum). It is important to note the claim 
Friends' makes and supports with these two sections is based on a premise that the 
"notice" mentioned in 13-6.01 and .02 does in fact pertain to hearing notice. Friends 
inserts this premise in the middle of the analysis and begins its argument from there (the 
middle). This opposed to starting at the beginning and determining the validity of the 
premise itself. The best way to understand how Friends arrived at its premise is to start 
with the premise itself and work backwards; ending then with what should have been the 
beginning of Friends argument. 
Friends not only claims that 13-6.01 "governed the County's notice requirements" 
(Petitioners' Memo, at 25), but goes on to cite the ordinance as holding: "[t]he 
administrator shall ... send the notice [oj hearing] by mail to all property owners within 
one mile of the boundaries ... " (Id.; emphasis added). Through the use of the brackets, 
Friends is obviously indicating that it is inserting the emphasized language into the cited 
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quote. Letting section 13-6.01 speak for itself may be the more appropriate course 
however, which in applicable part holds: 
13-6.01 PUBLIC NOTIFICATION. 
The Planning &Zoning [sic] Administrator shall cause Notice of the filing 
of an application for a LCO Permit to be published in a newspaper of 
general circulation in Jerome County, Idaho. The Administrator shall also 
send the notice by mail to all property owners within one mile of the 
boundaries of the contiguous property owned by the applicant of the 
proposed LCO pursuant to Idaho Code 67-6529. 
(Phase I, Vol. # 1, Staff, p. 31; Phase II, Vol. # 1, p. 20; emphasis added). The plain 
reading of 13-6.01 shows the notice requirement contained therein to apply to the receipt 
of LCO applications, and not to notice of LCO hearings. Therefore, Friends' statement to 
the court that the notice in 13-6.01 is in regards to hearings is erroneous and misleading. 
However, even if this notice were assumed for the sake of argument to apply to 
hearings as opposed to applications, this still does not establish any procedural violation 
as hoped by Friends. Under such a reading, the only procedural requirement would be 
that notice of a LCO hearing be sent by mail to certain individuals. The record clearly 
shows that this was in fact done by Jerome County in regard to the Slones (Rec., Vol. I, 
Staff, p. 45), and Friends admit that such notice was in fact sent and received by the 
Slones as well. (Supp. Rec., Vol. II, pp. 303-05). Therefore, Friends' assertion that 
"Jerome County violated the Slones' procedural due process rights by failing to provide 
them with individual notice of the Big Sky hearing as required by Jerome County 
ordinance" (ld., at pp. 24 and 25) is also erroneous and misleading. Individual notice 
was in fact given to the Slones and this would be al that was required of the county's 
ordinance (again, assuming this ordinance applies to hearings in the first place). 
With this said, Friends would most likely respond that the county didn't follow its 
ordinance because of a time period in which the 13-6.01 notice must have been sent. 
This response is assumed as a result of Friends' assertion that "the Slones ... did not get 
any required notice until after the comment period for written testimony was already 
closed" (Petitioners' Memo, at 26; italicized emphasis in original, underlined emphasis 
added). And its later assertion that "the defective notice could not be cured, however, 
because the written testimony period had closed on September 7, fifteen days after 
publication of notice in the newspaper. (Id., at 27; emphasis added). However, no 
"comment period" is mentioned or referred to in 13-6.01, and because Friends' does not 
explain where it is getting such a time period requirement. Thus, the origins of Friends' 
premise must be traced back even further. 
The several ordinances of chapter 13 of the JCZO obviously relate to the same 
subject matter (in pari material) and thus are to be construed together to effect legislative 
intent. (Grand Canyon Dories v. Tax Com 'n., 124 Idaho 1 (Idaho 1993). Clearly, section 
13-6.01 is in pari material with section 13-6.02, and it would appear that it is from 13-
6.02 that Friends finds its time period. Although appropriate to concurrently read 
sections 13-6.01 with .02, Friends' interpretation of the resulting effect is in error. 
Reading the two sections together, and using the clear and plain language of each, 
it is required of the planning & zoning administrator to publish notice of the filing of a 
LCO application, and allow and receive written comment from certain members during 
the fifteen days that follow such publication. Also required of the administrator is a 
mailing of notice of the filing of the LCO application to residents defined under 67-6529. 
Once again, it is plain that the notice requirements of 13-6.01 and prescribed time period 
of 13-6.02 are part of application filing procedure. Friends' premise to the contrary is 
thus erroneous, misleading and therefore must be abandoned. If this is done, Friends 
entire claim falls to the wayside since it is supported entirely by the false premise Friends 
creates. 
Even with this said, and once again assuming for the sake of argument that 
Friends interpretation is correct, there still would be no violation on the part of Jerome 
County. Essentially, under Friends' interpretation the concurrent reading of 13-6.01 and 
.02 produce three requirements: 1) notice of an LCO hearing must be published; 2) notice 
of the LCO hearing must be sent to "67-56529" members of the public; and 3) \vritten 
comment from these specific members may be submitted during the fifteen days that 
follow publication. Looking at the record in this case, these requirements were satisfied: 
notice of the LCO hearing was published CRec., Vol. I, Staff, p. 36); written comment 
was allowed and received by the county for fifteen days after publication from those 
members of the public defined by the ordinance CRec., Vol. II and III, R-1 through R-7); 
and individual notice was mailed to such defined members, which included the Slones. 
CRee., Vol. I, Staff, p. 45; Supp. Rec., Vol. II, pp. 303-05). 
Under an actual analysis of Friends' claim regarding the Slones, it is clear that 
neither the Idaho Code nor the JCZO contained specified procedural requirements for 
notice of a scheduled LCO hearing. It is therefore impossible for a violation of such 
"non-existent procedures to have occurred. This remains true even if such procedural 
requirements existed as claimed by Friends - the county still would have complied with 
them. 
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Therefore, in regard to Friends' sufficiency of notice claim, because there are no 
prescribed hearing notice requirements, one must look to the notice that was provided by 
the county to determine its sufficiency. The record shows that in this case there were 
multiple kinds of notice provided, the nature of which were held to be sufficient in 
applicable case law (Castaneda, supra). Because of all the above, Jerome County 
absolutely provided the Slones with sufficient notice of the Big Sky hearing and/or 
complied with all notice requirements; Friends has absolutely failed to show otherwise. 
Therefore, the Slones' procedural due process rights were not violated as claimed by 
Friends. 
II. (A)(2) Friends has failed to show that it was denied a meaningfully 
opportunity to participate in the Big Sky hearing. 
Contained within its procedural due process claims, Friends also asserts that 
"Jerome County violated petitioners' procedural due process rights by denying them the 
opportunity to meaningfully participate in public comments and written testimony prior 
to and during the September 25-26,2007 public hearing." (Petitioners' Memo, at 28). Of 
note is the fact that Friends speaks in terms of generalities; simply referring to all 
petitioners without identifying which specific one of them actually their rights violated in 
this manner. 
In any event, to find standing by anyone of the several petitioners that comprise 
Friends, it (Friends) is reduced to filling its argument with nothing more than numerous 
citations of various types of law (statutes and case law). In doing this, Friends is then 
able to slowly evolve and morph the law until it resembles something that fits its claim, 
yet subtle enough to go unnoticed. Point-in-fact: Friends begins its analysis by citing 
Ierom~CQ1mty's Memorandum r 122 Response - 16 
Idaho. Cede Sectien 67-6534 and states "the Idaho. Legislature mandates that, at a 
minimum, all hearing precedures established by a beard ef commissieners 'shall previde 
an eppertunity for all affected persons to. present and rebut evidence. '" (Petitioners' 
Memo, at 28; emphasis in eriginal). Of interest is that it is Friends that emphasizes the 
language ''for all affected persons;" this apparently being the language that Friends' 
deems cri tical in suppOli ef its claim. As impertant as it apparently was to. emphasize this 
language, Friends dees net mentien it again as it proceeds threugh its recitatien ef law. 
Eventually, after discussing the hearing procedures established by the Beard, Friends 
argues that, "These restrictiens did net grant interested persons an eppertunity to. present 
and rebut evidence in a meaningful way." (Petitioners' Memo, at 29; emphasis added). 
Semewhere between Friends' citatien ef sectien 67-6534 and where it applies it to. the 
facts ef the case, the language ef that statute, emphasized by Friends itself, merphs frem 
affected persens to. interested persons. 
Friends then proceeds to. argue the peint further, stating next: 
Altheugh the Beard allewed eral and written cemment frem individuals 
living eutside the ene mile radius during the public hearing, neither ene er 
two. pages ef written testimeny, ner feur minutes ef eral presentatien 
witheut the ability to. previde relevant written testimeny, were adequate 
fer meaningful participatien [by these individuals]. For instance, Alma 
Hasse ... 
(Id., at 30; emphasis added). This is the last step in Friends' transfermatien ef the law; 
ending here with the standard simply being "individuals" as eppesed to. affected persens. 
If Friends were to. impese its new standard in the language it previeusly cited in 
emphasized terms, it (sectien 67-6534) weuld new read, "The Idaho Legislature 
mandates that, at a minimum, all hearing procedures established by a board of 
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commissioners shall provide an opportunity for all individuals to present and rebut 
evidence. " 
Having lead the reader to this point, Friends then attempts to argue (or at least 
imply) that any and every individual that was allowed to submit only one or two pages of 
\vritten comment, and who was given only four minutes to present oral comment, was not 
given an adequate opportunity for meaningful participation. This is a far cry from the 
actual language of 67-6534 that guarantees only affected persons the right to present and 
rebut evidence. 
Nevertheless, Friends continues its argument, believing now that it is in a position 
to apply its newly created standard to certain facts of the case, all in an attempt to 
establish county error. Friends offers Alma Hasse as an example of an individual that 
participated in the Big Sky hearing and that was supposedly wronged under this claim. 
It is important to understand and distinguish here between the two "capacities" that Ms. 
Hasse holds in this case. Generally speaking, anywhere Ms. Hasse appears in the facts or 
record of this case (as opposed to as a petitioner of judicial review), she is in the capacity 
of either an individual or as ICARE on its own regard (collectively referenced, 
"individual capacity"). Generally speaking again, the only place Ms. Hasse appears in her 
"proxy" capacity - ICARE on behalf of its members - is as a petitioner in this review. 
Therefore, when Ms. Hasse appeared at the Big Sky hearing and provided 
comment, she was doing such in her individual capacity. She was not presenting 
comment to the Board on behalf of any ICARE member. In this regard, Ms. Hasse, 
cannot seek judicial review because she is not an affected person in her individual 
capacity (neither she as an individual or ICARE on its own behalf has an interest in 
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property that might be adversely affected). Therefore, Ms. Hasse In her individual 
capacity has no relevance to this suit. 
With this in mind, it then becomes hard to understand the reasoning behind 
Friends using Ms. Hasse in its example of an individual not given an appropriate chance 
to submit comment. Ms. Hasse, in her individual capacity is not a petitioner to this suit, 
so why point to her as the basis for the point being made? It doesn't even make sense for 
Friends to claim that it was pointing to Ms. Hasse in her "proxy" capacity because to say 
this, Friends would be essentially indicating that it was using Ms. Hasse in its example, 
who in tum was speaking as ICARE on behalf of ICARE member "X". To bring this 
claim, member "X" would have to be an "affected person," so the question becomes who 
is member "X" (it can't be Ms. Hasse as an individual, because although an ICARE 
member, she's not an affected person)? Member "X's" identity must be known to 
determine if a distict and palatable injury was actually suffered. Another reasonable 
question would be then, "Why doesn't Friends simply allow Petitioner ICARE (assuming 
it had organizational standing) to just simply bring this claim using member "X" in the 
above example instead of Ms. Hasse? 
The point being is that it doesn't make any sense, no matter what her capacity, for 
Friends to point to Ms. Hasse as the example that establishes the basis of its argument, as 
Ms. Hasse is simply irrelevant to this claim. The only explanation that makes any sense 
is if Friends' is applying its newly transformed standard as outlined above. If this is 
done, Ms. Hasse as an individual, all of a sudden becomes relevant because the standard 
is no longer "affected person," but simply, "individual". 
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It is clear by the very way Ms. Hasse is referenced in Friends' example that she is 
being viewed as a mere individual. Having evolved the standard and lowered the 
available guarantees under 67-6534, Friends is now capable of arguing (or at least 
implying) that Ms. Hasse the individual has standing. This because she is in fact an 
individual who did in fact participate in the hearing process (never mind that she's not an 
affected person - it's no longer the applicable standard). However, this argument or 
implication is as far as Friends goes. Friends simply creates the new standard, dangles 
Ms. Hasse from it, and then hopes such will be enough to cause something to bite. The 
court obviously should pass on doing so. 
In sum, although Friends claims that "Jerome County violated petitioners' 
procedural due process rights by denying them the opportunity to meaningfully 
participate in public comments and written testimony prior to and during the September 
25-26, 2007 public hearing" (Petitioners' Memo, at 28; emphasis added), it never 
identifies who specifically "them" are. Friends asserts that the county denied them an 
opportunity to be heard, but points to (let alone establishes) no specific petitioner who 
was so in fact denied to the point that such petitioner became an affected person 
specifically in regard to this issue. 
The only thing Friends correctly states is that which it emphasized at the very 
beginning: that only an affected person is guaranteed by section 67-6534 to be allowed an 
opportunity to present evidence. An affected person is one who has "an interest in real 
property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit 
authorizing the development." I.C. § 67-6521. Friends produces no specific petitioner 
whose 67-6534 guarantees were prejudiced and who is an affected person. The only one 
offered up is Ms. Hasse. Nowhere does the record show Ms. Hasse as a person who has 
an interest in real property that may be adversely affected by the issuance of Big Sky's 
permit. Because it does not, Friends cannot claim that Petitioner ICARE is representing 
Ms. Hasse's claim for her. 
Thus, there is absolutely no valid explanation as to why Friends would attempt to 
establish this claim by using Ms. Hasse as the example. The only invalid explanation 
(that which at least makes sense) is if Friends' fictional standard is being applied. If this 
is in fact the case, then Friends is attempting to commit fraud upon the court with its 
fictional standard and the fictional relevance that it gives Ms. Hasse. The claim made 
here by Friends should be denied. 
II. (A)(3) Friends Has Failed To Show That Its Attorneys Failure To Participate 
At The Big Sky Hearing Was County Error. 
Friends also sticks into its "procedural due process" claim the assertion that 
certain petitioners where not given a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the basis that 
these petitioners "were unable to have their attorneys present at the Big Sky hearing." 
(Petitioners'Memo, at 30). In its usual manner, this is all Friends offers in regard to this 
claim; the naked assertion that certain petitioners did not have their attorneys present. 
Interesting is the fact that this isn't even an assertion against Jerome County. Friends 
does not claim that the county somehow prevented the attorneys non-attendance, but 
instead, only that some petitioners were unable to have their attorneys present at the 
hearing. This says nothing, or at least certainly nothing against Jerome County. Instead 
saying anything, it only raises questions like, "Were these petitioners unable to have 
their attorneys present because they decided they did not want to pay their attorneys to sit 
through a ten hour hearing?" Or perhaps these petitioners couldn't afford their attorneys 
at all; or was it the strategy or advice of the attorneys themselves who felt their non-
attendance would allow for a better chance at creating issues for judicial review? Who 
knows - certainly not the reader of Friends memorandum because it utterly fails to set 
forth any support of this claim? Therefore, the reason for the attorney's non-attendance 
could be anything, including a totally made-up issue. Anything that is, except valid. If 
this claim were valid in any possible way, one could be assured that Friends most 
certainly would have then been absolutely clear in its memorandum of the magnitude of 
the error and the county's responsibility therein. 
Instead, Friends is only capable of creating the innuendo that Jerome County 
maliciously prevented the attendance of these attorneys, which it then sets adrift hoping 
that such innuendo finds some footing with the court before it sinks miserably into the 
abyss. This is exactly however, what the court should allow to happen to this claim -
allow it to sink. If Friends is only capable of producing an issue by way of innuendo, and 
thinks so little of such issue that it waste no further time attempting to prop it up, then the 
court should not waste its time with the issue either. See Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708 
(2005) (issues on appeal that are not supported by positions of law or authority are 
deemed waived and will not be considered by an appellate court); and Jorgensen v. 
Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528 (2008) (appellate court will not consider assignment of 
error not supported by argument and authority in the opening brief). 
II. (B) Friends Has Failed To Show Idaho Code Section 67-6529(2) And 
JCZO 13-6.02 To Be Unconstitutional 
Next, Friends claim that Idaho Code Section 67-6529(2) and JCZO 13-6.02 are 
unconstitutional because they violate Friends' substantive due process rights. 
(Petitioners'Memo, at 31-34). Friends doesn't even seem to be trying at this point. The 
first sentence Friend's presents on this claim is, "I.C. § 67-6529(2) and lCZa 13-6.02 are 
unconstitutional because they violate petitioners' substantive due process rights." 
(Petitioners' Memo, at 31; emphasis added). The very last line of this argument is that 
67-6529 and its embodiment in 13-6.02 "violates petitioners' substantive due process 
rights and should be found unconstitutional." (Petitioners' Memo, at 34; emphasis 
added). These two references to "petitioners" are the only ones Friends makes to anyone. 
No other general reference to the petitioners as a whole; no specific reference to any of 
the petitioners as individuals; and no specification as to how either of the two cited 
sections were applied (let alone applied unconstitutionally) to the non-identified 
petitioners. The entirety of the three pages of memorandum that occupy the space 
between the two above sentences consist of nothing more than recitation of case law, 
with a few words strung together here and there that might have some resemblance to 
argument. There is absolutely no application however of the litany of recited case law to 
the facts of this case. As a result, the court is prevented from addressing this claim. See 
Venters v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc. 141 Idaho 245 (2005) (the court will not address a 
due process claim where claimant simply makes a minimal, summary argument and 
presents no analysis justifying the challenge that a certain statute is not rational under the 
circumstances). This claim should also not be addressed on the basis that it is waived, 
since it has not been supported by propositions of law or authority in its opening brief. 
Suits, supra, 141 Idaho 708; Jorgensen, supra, 145 Idaho 528. 
Further, with the above said, it goes without saying that Friends has not 
demonstrated what action of the county is being attacked; what petitioner is attacking it; 
why such action is thought to be in error; and what substantial right of the specific party 
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doing the specific attacking has been prejudiced. Cowan, supra, 143 Idaho at 508. See 
also PofJenroth v. Culinary Workers Union Local, 71 Idaho 412, 414 (1951) (person not 
adversely or injuriously affected by a statute may not challenge its constitutionality). 
Finally, Friends is prevented from raising its "unconstitutional" claim as it has 
failed to show that such issue was raised before the Board. Idaho "case law makes it 
clear that constitutional issues not raised before a board of commissioners will not be 
considered on appeal." Cowan, supra, 143 Idaho at 510. 
III. Friends Has Failed To Show That The JCZO Was Not Followed. 
In section three of its memorandum Friends claims that "the approval of an LCO 
permit must not only comply fully with the specific requirements of Chapter 13, but must 
also comply with the County's zoning ordinances as a whole." (Petitioners' Memo, at 
35). There is no disagreement between Friends and Jerome County at this point; the 
county must comply with the requirements of the JCZO. Friends however, then cites to 
sections 1-3.01 and 1-6.01, supposedly for the purposes of showing those sections of the 
ordinance that the Board failed to comply with. (Jd.) However, Friends never fully 
explains what elements of these two ordinances were not complied with. The term 
"fully" is emphasized here because Friends does eventually get to somewhat of an 
argument, but only after it misstates and alters 1-3.01. 
Friends quote section 1-3.01 as follows: 4 
JCZO Chapter 1-3.01 states, in its entirety: 
This ordinance has been made in accordance with a comprehensive plan 
which has been designed to protect and promote the health, safety, morals, 
and general welfare of the community. It [meaning the comprehensive 
plan] is intended, therefore to provide: 
4 Friends quotes this section in its entirety. Jerome County quotes only that portion felt relevant. 
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(Petitioners' Memo, at 35; emphasis added). Because of Friends tendency to "insert" 
language into statutes that doesn't belongS (because it alters the statutes meaning), the 
bracketed language here should be closely scrutinized. 
In legal writing, the use of bracketed language is typically done to put quoted 
language into context, so as to prevent the need of having to quote large amounts of 
verbiage not otherwise needed for the point trying to be made. It is interesting then that 
Friends finds it necessary to insert additional language into 1-3.01, even though Friends 
informs the reader that the ordinance is being quoted "in its entirety." Of all things 
capable of speaking for themselves, ordinances are at the top given that their sole 
function is to sufficiently inform persons (both legal and lay) of the law. So, as before, 
one is left trying to understand why Friends feels it necessary to insert additional 
language into a fully cited ordinance. 
The language of section 1-3.01 seems plain and clear enough on its own, and 
doesn't appear to need assistance in explaining its intent. Friends either feels otherwise 
(the ordinance is not clear on it face) or because it is clear on its face, Friends needs to 
distort it so that it conforms to the point that it is attempting to make. If it were the prior, 
it would seem that Friends would want to at least argue that the ordinance is vague and 
why its interpretation is correct. Ifhowever, it is the latter that is Friends true intent, then 
it would make sense that Friends wants to quietly slip the added language in without 
much fanfare. 
A statutory interpretation analysis of 1-3.01 may help shed light on the motive of 
inserting the additional language. Such an analysis begins with the literal words of a 
5 See discussion starting on page twenty of this response concerning Friends' quoting of section 13-6.01 
and the insertion of bracketed language into that section. 
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statute, which are the best guide to determining legislative intent. Doe v. Boy Scouts of 
America, Idaho Supreme Court Opinion No. 152 (2009). Furthermore, the words of a 
statute should be given their plain meaning. (Id.) 
As stated, the language of section 1-3.01 seems plain and clear enough on its own. 
The section begins with the subject matter, "This ordinance," and then indicates what that 
subject matter pertains to, "has been made in accordance with a comprehensive plan." 
The meaning of this section could not be clearer. It is simply stating that the JCZO was 
derived from a comprehensive plan. The ordinance is not concerned with even 
identifying the exact comprehensive plan (as it does not do so), but rather only informing 
one that the JCZO is in conformance with Idaho law. 6 The very next sentence of 1-3.01 
reads, "It is intended, therefore to provide:" This sentence has the pro-noun, "It" which 
would reference back to the noun of the prior sentence, "This ordinance". The pro-noun 
"it" would not reference back to the prepositional phrase, "in accordance with the 
comprehensive plan". Even if the rules of English grammar are ignored, the only logical 
way to read, "It is intended ... " is as, "This ordinance is intended ... " 
If questions however still persist, then statutory interpretation calls for the whole 
act to be looked at for the purpose of ascertaining and giving effect to the questioned 
language. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Ada County, 123 Idaho 410 (Idaho 1993) (in 
construing a statute the Court will not deal in any subtle refinements of the legislation, 
but will ascertain and give effect to the purpose and intent of the legislature, based on the 
whole act and every word therein, lending substance and meaning to the provisions). 
6Idaho Code Section 67-6511 mandates that each "governing board shaH ... establish within its jurisdiction 
one (l) or more zones or zoning districts where appropriate. The zoning districts shall be in accordance 
with the policies set forth in the adopted comprehensive plan (emphasis added). This statute then allows 
for the amending of a zoning ordinance "[ a]fter considering the comprehensive plan." I.C. § 67-6511 (b). 
Being part of chapter one of the JCZO, section 1-3.01 is obviously in pari materia with 
the over-all provisions of that chapter. Law governing these circumstances has held: 
Statutes which are in pari materia are to be construed together to effect 
legislative intent . ... [This rule] means that each legislative act is to be 
interpreted with other acts relating to the same matter or subject. Statutes 
are in pari materia when they relate to the same subject. Such statutes are 
taken together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry into 
effect the intention. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to 
one subjects was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to 
be consistent and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. For the 
purpose of learning the intention, all statutes relating to the same subject 
are to be compared, and so far as still in force brought into harmony by 
interpretation. 
Grand Canyon Dories v. Tax Com 'n., 124 Idaho 1 (Idaho] 993). 
If all of chapter one is reviewed as whole, it is clear that all the provisions of that 
chapter pertain to the county's zoning ordinance: Section 1-1.01: "This ordinance is 
entitled ... "; Section 1-2.01: "This ordinance is adopted ... "; Section 1-3.01: "This 
ordinance has been ... "; Section 1-5.01: " ... the regulations and restrictions as set forth in 
this ordinance ... "; Section 1-6.01: "This ordinance shall be interpreted ... "; etc. Because 
all of chapter one's provisions pertain to the JCZO, the only way to read the "It" in the 
phrase, "It is intended, therefore to provide," is to understand it as referencing the JCZO, 
and not the comprehensive plan as claimed by Friends. 
All of this seems clear and elementary, so it would not appear the reason for 
Friends' insertion of the bracketed language was because it felt the meaning of 1-3.01 
was unclear. However, even if Friends were given the benefit of the doubt that it was 
legitimately questioning the intent of 1-3.01, then it does not make sense for Friends not 
to argue as much. Instead of raising such an issue, Friends just covertly inserts the 
bracketed language into 1-3.01 with nothing more. Almost as if it were trying to 
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purposely cause the meaning of section to not be focused upon; to simply make the 
insertion as if it were no big deal and only common sense to read it in this manner. 
Because Friends does not appear to question the "clarity" of 1-3.01, then the only 
other explanation for the bracketed language is that Friends is purposely trying to "bend" 
or conform the ordinance so that it supports the claim being made. One should therefore 
decline Friends' invitation to go down this rabbit hole, and rather simply choose to read 
1-3.06 as it plainly was meant - as nothing more than an "explanation" that the JCZO is 
appropriately based upon a comprehensive plan as is required per Idaho code.7 
What Friends is missing or not understanding when it asserts that the Board was 
required to consider the comprehensive plan by giving "due consideration to the 
enumerated factors listed in 1-3.01. .. [and] 1-6.01 before approving an LCO permit" 
(Petitioners' Memo, at 37), is that when the JCZO is applied, the comprehensive plan is 
also applied. This is because the ordinance took into consideration the comprehensive 
plan at the time it was written, and section 1-3.01 tells us that this is so. The "proof' that 
Friends offers as showing that the Board did not consider the plan, is in the fact that 
"[n]owhere in the memorandum ... are there references to JCZO Chapter I." (Petitioners' 
Memo, at 37). But one who understands 1-3.01 correctly, would not expect to see such 
references. Such a person would comprehend that because chapter thirteen was written in 
accordance with the plan, references to chapter thirteen are indirectly references to the 
plan. 
Because 1-3.01 is explanatory or "assurance giving" in nature only, there are not 
any procedural requirements that stem from it and that must be followed. There is 
nothing to "comply with" as argued by Friends. This remains true even if Friends' 
7 See footnote 4, supra. 
interpretation is pursued. Friends reads 1-3.01 as stating, "the comprehensive plan is 
intended, therefore to provide: a) Support of property values by preserving ... b) 
Protection from the menace to the public ... " and so forth all the way through "m". Even 
read this way, no procedural requirements pop-up or are magically created. The response 
to such a reading is simply, "Great. Good to know that's what the plan intends. Now what 
can I do under the ordinance?" 
Likewise, section 1-6.01 is only guidance as to how the provisions of the JeZO 
are to be interpreted in the event a question arises. It has already been pointed out that 
under a statutory interpretation analysis, ordinances are to be given their clear and plain 
meaning. And thus, it wouldn't make sense to constantly alter the meaning of the various 
provision of the Jezo by always importing the 1-6.01 principles into the language of 
these provisions as Friends argues. 8 Instead, 1-3.01 tells us that all the provisions of the 
Jezo were written in accordance with the comprehensive plan, and thus already written 
in accordance with the 1-6.01 principles. Therefore, no such "constant" 1-6.01 
interpretation is needed. However, when a legitimate question does arise as to the 
meaning of a particular ordinance, then such should be answered by interpreting it under 
the principles of 1-6.01 (e.g. If, sayan ordinance simply requires all junkyards to be 
fenced, but does not define "fenced". If a question arises as to whether a solid fence is 
required or not, then 1-6.01 would control and require a solid fence so as to error on the 
side of protecting the property of the junkyard' s neighbors.). 
Therefore, Friends is not correct when it claims the Board did not consider 1-6.01, 
because the ordinances that the Board did consider where written in accordance with the 
8 If this is what the legislator intended, they would have simply wrote all the 1-6.01 principles into all the 
other provisions of the JCZO. 
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1-6.01 principles. The Board did not have to directly consider and cite to section 1-6.01 
because the provisions of chapter thirteen were clear and unambiguous and no "1-6.01 
interpretation" was needed. 
Friends is also in error when it claims that section 1-6.01 "guarantees that. .. "each 
citizen shall have the maximum use of his property without placing an undue burden 
upon that of his neighbor. '" (Petitioners' Memo, at 39; citing JeZO 1-6.01; emphasis 
added). Remaining consistent, Friends does not explain how it was capable of inserting 
the word "guarantee" into 1-6.01, but regardless, such an interpretation can be abruptly 
discarded because of the absurd result that it leads to. The terms "undue" and "burden" 
are subjective enough on their own, but placed together and the meaning of such is 
limited only to the number of people interpreting it. What might be an "undue burden" to 
one person may not be to another. If "undue" is defined as not normal or excessive (e.g. 
an undue response), then again what is normal or excessive to one person may not be to 
someone else. Under Friends' interpretation, no one could do anything with their 
property because it could always be argued that any use of land places an "undue burden" 
on neighboring property. 
IV. Friends Fails To Establish That The Board "Vas Required To Reopen The 
Record After Remand. 
Friends next claims that the Board's "failure to even consider the motion [to 
reopen the record] constitutes unlawful procedure on the Board's part, or alternatively, 
constitutes and [sic] arbitraty [sic] and capricious decision." (Petitioners' Memo, at 40). 
Friends spends little time on this claim, and even less (as in none) supporting it. Nor 
does Friends cite any legal authority, instead basing this claim entirely on the conjured 
premise that proper procedure required the Board to reopen the record. It is from this 
false premise that Friends jumps over any argument or support, simply choosing to land 
directly on its conclusion - that because the Board did not reopen the record when asked, 
error arose proof positive. 
As before, if Friends is willing to put forth so little effort into this claim, then 
court should not waste its time with the issue either. Both Jerome County and the court 
should not have to research the matter for applicable authority in attempting to determine 
if this is even a valid claim or not. The claim should simply be waived on the basis of not 
being supported by propositions of law or authority in its opening brief. Suits, supra, 141 
Idaho 708; Jorgensen, supra, 145 Idaho 528. 
V. Friends Has Failed To Demonstrate That The Application Was Incomplete. 
Friends next attacks a finding of fact made by the Board, claiming that contrary to 
such finding, the Big Sky application was incomplete. (Petitioners' Jvlemo, at 40). 
Although Friends typical "assertion without support" (which is present here) is enough on 
its own to deny this claim, it should be pointed out that an even higher hurdle exists here 
for Friends, in which it must clear to have success on this claim; such being the 
governing standard over reviewing courts. Such has been held in relevant part as hold: 
The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence presented. The Court instead defers to the Board's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. In other words, the 
agency's [the Board's] factual determinations are binding on the 
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the 
agency, so long as the determinations are supported by substantial 
competent evidence in the record. 
Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357 (2000). The innuendos and false premises 
offered by Friends in this matter fail at any level, but by definition do not establish clear 
error that would allow this court to substitutes its judgment for that of the Board's. 
Friends claim the application was incomplete first of all, because "all agencies 
had not completed their review." (Petitioners' Memo, at 41). Specifically, Friends points 
to "[t]he Hillsdale Highway letter citing the need for a traffic impact study prior to 
application consideration." (Id.; emphasis added). It should first of all be noted that this 
specific issue was not raised before the Board. Idaho case law makes it clear that issues 
not raised before a board of commissioners will not be considered on appeal. Cowan, 
supra, 143 Idaho at 510. With that said, Friends does not cite the ordinance that requires 
an agency to submit all of its comments prior to the application being submitted, which is 
unfortunate because if it had, Friends would have saw that there is no such requirement. 
The relevant section of the JCZO is 13-5.01(1), which states in applicable part: 
Site assessment comments are required from the appropriate Highway 
District, Irrigation Delivery Department, South Central Health District, 
Department of Agriculture, Department of Water Resources, and/or other 
agencies designated by the Planning & Zoning Administrator. The 
Applicant is required to submit these comments with his application. 
Id. Clearly, this section only requires certain agency "comments" be submitted along 
with the application. As Friends points out, the Hillsdale Highway district did submit a 
comment letter as required by this ordinance (the letter was submitted with the 
application). (Phase I, Vol. I, Application Exhibit 12, p. 230). This letter does cite the 
need for a traffic impact study, but does not make it a requirement that the study itself be 
filed along with the application. Rather, the comments of the highway district that were 
submitted with the application simply ask the Board to not hear the application until after 
Hillsdale had an opportunity to review the traffic study. (Id.) Not that it's relevant, but 
districts request was allowed. Hillsdale submitted comments based on the traffic study in 
a three-page letter on May 15, 2007. (Phase I, Vol. I, Agency, p.6). These comments 
were therefore in the hands of the Board prior to its consideration of the Big Sky 
application. Regardless, the fact remains that the Board found that the application 
contained comments from Hillsdale Highway District and that any 13-5.01(1) requirement 
in regard to this agency was fulfilled. Friends has not established this finding to be 
clearly erroneous. 
The next claim Friends makes in regard to an "incomplete" application is that 
there was a "lack of a letter from the Valley School District until July 28, over two 
months after the application was file." (Petitioners' Memo, at 41). Per its history, this is 
all Friends offers. It does not mention the ordinance that shows this to be in error, nor 
does Friends mention the lengthy discussion the Board had in its two written decisions 
that were issued in this case (before and after remand). (Phase I, Vol. III, Memorandum 
Dec. Minutes, p.49; Phase II, Agency Record, pp.112-113). At any point, the Board 
found that school districts are not mentioned as one of the agencies listed under 13-
5.01(1), and that the application did not therefore need to contain comments from the 
school districts. Friends fails to show this finding to be clearly erroneous. 
Friends also claims the application to be incomplete on the bare assertion that the 
applicant did not show a certain water well on its map as required by the JCZO. Here 
again, Friends simply tries to "slip-in" its premise that such a well does in fact exist in the 
first place, without offering support or even argument that did. This matter as was also 
discussed in both of the Board's memorandums, where the Board found that there was no 
evidence of a "missing" water well that was not shown on the applicant's map. (Phase I, 
Vol. III, Memorandum Dec. Minutes, pp. 49 and 50; Phase II, Agency Record, pp.l12-
113). Friends states nothing that shows this finding to be clearly erroneous. 
The final argument Friends offers in its incomplete application claim concerns a 
third party agreement (or lack thereof) to take waste from the proposed LCO. 
(Petitioners' Memo, at 41). As with the issues above, this too was addressed by the 
Board in its written decision after remand. (Phase II, Agency Record, pp.l14-117). 
There, the Board found an "agreement" had been made that did satisfy any requirement 
that such be made prior to submission of the application.9 (Jd.) Friends has failed to show 
the Board's finding to be clearly erroneous. 
These are the several areas Friends points to as why it thinks Big Sky's 
application was incomplete. Throughout this claim, Friends continues its shameless 
conduct of alluding error only, creating false premises, and never bothering to explain or 
support either. Friends seems to make a mockery out of the high standard that the law 
requires of it to be successful in its "factual findings" claim (apparently, just getting to 
watch the parties in opposition and court partake in its wild goose chase is enough, as 
nothing else explains the act of seeking judicial review with only mere innuendos and 
false premises of error). Needless to say, Friends entire claim of an incomplete 
application should be waived on the basis of not being supported by propositions of law 
or authority in its opening brief. Suits, supra, 141 Idaho 708; Jorgensen, supra, 145 
Idaho 528. 
VI. Friends Fails To Show The Board's Written Decision Not To Constitute A 
Reasoned Statement. 
9 The Board actually found that such a third party agreement was not even a requirement that had to be 
satisfied prior to a permit being issued, let alone before an LCO application is submitted. Instead, the 
Board found that such an agreement just had to be made sometime prior to the waste actually being 
removed from the LCO site. Further, the Board did make the specific finding that if for the sake of 
argument the agreement was found to be needed prior to the application's submission, that the applicant 
would have satisfied this interpretation as well. (Phase II, Agency Record, pp.114-117). 
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Friends next claim the Board erred by not considering Dean and Eden Dimond's 
written comments. This claim is obviously being brought by Petitioners Dean and Eden 
Dimond, which already attempted this argument in front of Judge Bevan on this matters 
initial judicial review. (Phase II, Agency Record, p.1S). There, Judge Bevan found: 
The Dimonds contend that the Board erred by not addressing, in its written 
opinion, a large amount of evidence submitted by the Dimonds. This 
court disagrees. 
The language of section 67-6535(b) does not require the Board to address 
every argument made or every fact presented ... The statute does not 
require a board to explain that it does not find a particular fact relevant and 
why. Although, as explained above, the Board erroneously relied on the 
Comprehensive Plan, the Board's written decision provides a sufficient 
"reasoned statement" explaining its conclusions." 
ld., at 19. Although Judge Bevan's decision is not controlling on this point, it obviously 
provides guidance. Judge Bevan's interpretation that section 67-6535(b) does not require 
the Board to address every argument made or every fact presented is correct. To hold 
otherwise would lead to an absurd result. This is because most claims in opposition to 
any LCO permit amounts to nothing more than, "Not in my backyard, even though it's an 
allowed use in an allowed zone." The reasons provided in support of such a claim are 
typically not relevant to the criteria for issuing an LCO permit. It therefore would be 
absurd, let alone impossible, to find 67-6535(b) to require the Board to address 
everything that was mentioned or touched upon at the ten-hour hearing held in this 
matter. 
Several times in its written decision the Board did make certain findings that it 
deemed relevant, and stated that nothing to the contrary to such findings had been 
presented. Thus, in this sense the Dimonds' comments, as well as all other comments 
from all other members of the public, were considered and found to offer nothing on 
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point and relevant to the particular issues being discussed. If, where the Board stated 
this, the Dimonds' information did in fact contradict the finding being made, then one 
would assume that Friends would be sure to point this out; that Board did not consider 
contradicting evidence that was presented by the Dimonds. Although it does in fact 
appear from the record that the Dimonds put a lot of effort into their submissions to the 
Board, the county should not be faulted if such effort was spent on irrelevant matters 
(assuming that this is why the Board failed to mention the Dimonds' submissions). 
In any event, as Judge Bevan found, after citing Cowan, supra, the Board's 
decision here was in compliance with "67-6535(b) because it included the criteria and 
standards it considered relevant, provided detailed facts, and explained its rationale for 
its decision." (Phase II, Agency Record, p.l8; emphasis in original). Friends claim to the 
contrary of Judge Bevan should be denied. 
VII. Friends Has Failed To Show It Is Entitled To Attorney Fees. 
Friends request attorney fees in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-
117, simply "because Jerome County acted without a reasonable basis in fact and law on 
numerous fronts." (Petitioners' Memo, at 43). This is all that is offered. 
Clearly, Jerome County disagrees that any of its actions were taken without a 
reasonable basis of fact. Even more pointedly, the county truly believes that Friends does 
not even raise anyone's curiosity as to whether county error even existed given the total 
lack of attention and support it gives the claims it raises (let alone raising its claims to the 
level needed to legally establish the county to have acted without a reasonable basis of 
fact). 
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Regardless, there are a few points that should be kept in mind in this request is 
considered. First, in regard to its actions after remand, the Board was acting within the 
confines of Judge Bevan's decision. Although this decision did not instruct the Board on 
how it should ultimately decide the matter, it did limit the areas of the JeZO that the 
Board could look at in making its decision. (Phase II, Agency Record, p. 31). If the 
Board did deviate from these areas and the matter then taken on judicial review, the 
Board would be hard pressed to argue under such circumstances that it did have a 
reasonable basis in fact for deviating from a court's findings. Instead, the Board followed 
the findings of the court's decision, providing an in-depth analysis as to how the specified 
sections were to be interpreted, and then weighed the evidence submitted as to the 
various criteria found in each. 
Further, as pointed out above, many of the issues Friends brings now were never 
raised before the Board. Thus, even if considered here and agreed with by the court, it 
still could not find that the Board acted without a reasonable basis of fact since the Board 
was never asked to consider such issues. 
As to all of Friends claims, the "reasonableness" of the Board's action is never 
even reached as a result of Friends never turning its mere assertions into valid issues by 
establishing some kind of basis for them. Thus, the court should not even reach the point 
of judging the county's actions given Friends not having met its burden of supporting its 
various claims. 
For all these reasons, Friends request for attorney fees should be denied. 
VIII. Jerome County Is Entitled To Attorney Fees. 
Jerome County requests attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code Section 12-117, 
which allows such fees in certain instances and defines Jerome County as a party who is 
entitled to such fees upon a finding that Friends acted without a reasonable basis of fact. 
Such a finding is found where an appeal presents no meaningful issue on a question of 
law and does nothing more than invite an appellate court to second-guess the Board. T-
Craft Aero Club, Inc. v. Blough, 102 Idaho 833 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The actions of Friends falls precisely within the standard of Blough. The Friends 
brought its appeal with no reasonable basis of fact, and it was nothing more than an 
invitation for the court to second-guess the Board. In support of this, the court need only 
look to Friends memorandum to see that it - although forty-five pages in length - says 
nothing. Not only does it not raise legitimate issues, it does not even raise one's 
curiosity as to whether the innuendos that it creates are even true. 
Another factor the court should consider is the amount of time taken to get to the 
case's merits. This large amount of time stems primarily from Friends repeated motions 
to augment the record. Essentially, Friends was given three chances to get its motion to 
augment the record right. The first being the original motion, the second found in the 
court's order of June 3, 2009 (stating that Friends needs to start over with the process of 
seeking augmentation of the record) (Phase II, Vol. I, p. 6); and then the third came at 
the hearing on September 29, 2009 where Friends was practically lead by the hand in its 
attempt to get the record augmented. This process took close to a year and was 
continually objected to by Jerome County and the Intervenor. 
The real significance of this "preparatory time" is III the final product, Friends' 
memorandum. The significance is not what is in the memo, but what isn't. With the amount of 
time and energy Friends spent preliminary with the record, one would expect all of Friends 
claims to at the very least be well supported. Further, after reading its memorandum, one would 
not only expect to clearly understand Friends' claims, but to also understand why all the 
augmented documents were requested and how all of them relate to the claims being made. 
Instead, not only does Friends' claims remain entirely unsupported (this even though 
almost every document Friends requested to be augmented into the record was granted), but very 
little, if any, of the augmented documents are even mentioned or used in a meaningful way. Its 
almost as if the goal of the time spent trying to augment the record was not to strengthen the 
record so as to in turn strengthen claims, but rather for delaying purposes only. 
In any event, for this, and all the reasons stated above, Jerome County is due attorney 
fees in this matter and such should be awarded. 
CONCLUSION 
All claims brought by Friends should be deemed waived on the basis of not being 
supported by propositions of law or authority in its opening brief. Suits, supra, 141 Idaho 
708; Jorgensen, supra, 145 Idaho 528. Several of Friends' don't even cite any legal 
authority and thus would clearly fall with in this rule. The remaining issues might 
contain numerous citations to various cases and/or statutes, but a close examination of 
these show only a mere recitation of the law, with no applicability established to 
whatever point is being claimed. Therefore, these claims too should be waived. 
For these reasons and those stated above, Jerome County respectfully requests 
that Friends petition be denied; that the Board's decision of September 23, 2008 be 
affirmed; and the court award Jerome County applicable attorney's fees. 
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COMES NOW, South View Dairy, an Idaho General Partnership, Tony Visser, William 
Dejong and Ryan Visser, general partners, successors in interest to Don McFarland, dba Big Sky 
Farms, (hereinafter "Big Sky"), the Intervenor in this matter by and through its attorney, John B. 
Lothspeich, of the law firm Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP, and submits its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Petition for Judicial Review as follows: 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises from a petition for judicial review filed by Petitioners from a Decision ofthe 
Jerome County Board of Commissioners approving Intervenors' application for a new LCO permit 
under Chapter 13 of the Jerome County Zoning Ordinance. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY. 
On May 3, 2007, Big Sky filed an application for an LCO permit with the Jerome County 
Planning & Zoning Administrator. (Phase I, Volume I, Pages 4-8). 
The exhibits in support of the application are vast. Within the application, Exhibit 5 
indicated a description of the zoning and present use ofthe LCO property being located within an A-
I zone. Big Sky owned 1,204.61 acres contained within the proposed LCO site. 
The application also contained the facility description and management plans. The 
application indicated that the new heifer raising facility would be designed to house 8,000 Jerome 
County animal units. The facility would be operated as a dry lot system. All the corral allies would 
be scraped. Storage of waste would be composted at a designated composting area. Waste utilized 
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and generated at the facility would be pursuant to the Idaho State Department of Agriculture's 
approval of a Nutrient Management Plan. Best management practices were identified for 
implementation in the design and operation of the facility. (Phase 1, Volume I, Pages 39-44). 
The plan also included an odor management component. (Phase I, Volume I, Pages 44-48). 
Additionally, water utilization, traffic and facility access and a road debris maintenance plan 
was outlined. (Phase I, Volume I, Pages 48-50). Fly abatement, dust control and dead animal 
management was outlined. (Phase I, Volume I, Pages 51-54). 
The Idaho Department of Transportation, in a March 7, 2007 letter to Planning & Zoning 
Administration Officials, indicated that the access from State Highway 25 for Big Sky Farms is 
approved. The Idaho Department of Transportation further indicated specific requirements and listed 
same. (Phase I, Volume I, Pages 57-58). 
On February 27,2007, the Idaho Department of Transportation sent a letter to Art Brown, 
Planning & Zoning Administrator, indicating that a traffic impact study is not required regarding the 
proposed Big Sky Farms development. (Phase I, Volume I, Page 59). 
The application also included a soils evaluation prepared by Associated Earth Sciences, Inc. 
and dated March 17,2007. Harley R. Noe, Professional Soils Scientist, concluded that there would 
be no significant soil related problems with construction of the heifer operation on the property. 
(Phase I, Volume I, Pages 78-79). 
The application included a Vicinity Map, topographical maps and visual impact of the facility 
map. Same was prepared by Rex Harding with JUB Engineers, Inc. (Phase I, Volume I, Page 93, 
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Exhibit 7). 
The application contained the flood zone for the relevant Eden area, prepared by the National 
Flood Insurance Program, Federal Emergency Management Agency. (Phase I, Volume I, Pages 105-
108, Exhibit 9). 
In a letter dated May 2, 2007 to Matt Thompson, Professional Engineer, Ag Tec, Marv 
Patton, Chief, Dairy Bureau, State ofldaho Department of Agriculture, indicated that the Department 
of Agriculture has reviewed and approved the Big Sky Heifer Ranch Plan at issue. In addition, the 
Idaho State Department of Agriculture will continually monitor the construction and operation for 
compliance with applicable state and federal requirements. (Phase I, Volume I, Exhibit 10-1). 
Within the application, the Department of Agriculture approval of the waste system and 
Nutrient Management Plan was contained. Hillary Simpson, Nutrient Management Specialist, Idaho 
State Department of Agriculture Technical Services, by way ofletter dated April 18,2007, indicated 
that the Nutrient Management Plan for Big Sky written by Dustin Olsen on April 18, 2007 is 
approved. 
The approved Nutrient Management Plan is a comprehensive document including, in part: 
> facility summary; 
> resource concerns; 
> waste storage and handling; 
> hydraulic balance; 
> Nutrient Management Plan requirements; 
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> facility testing requirements; 
> annual soil testing; 
> recordkeeping; 
> farm resource concerns; 
> field resource concerns; 
> ISDA Regulations and the Idaho Nutrient Management Standard; 
> aru1Ual nutrient budget inclusive of nutrient budget summary; 
> analysis of animal system inclusive of waste storage and handling; 
> containment of housing facility waste and corral run-off; 
> bio-nutrient export information; 
> analysis of cropping system; 
> analysis of soil characteristics inclusive of soil plan; 
> soil drainage class; 
> soil hydrologic group; 
> soil permeability class; 
> soil texture modifiers; and 
> texture class and terms used in lieu oftexture. (Phase I, Volume I, Pages 112-
227). 
The Nutrient Management Plan is complex and detailed, as approved by the Idaho 
Department of Agriculture, and will additionally require all ponds being approved by ISDA 
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engineers regarding construction requirements prior to allowing animals to enter the facility. (Phase 
I, Volume I, Pages 110-227). 
The application also included a sketch showing run-off flow directions and drainage. (Phase 
I, Volume I, Page 229, Exhibit 11). 
In its memorandum in support of petition for judicial review, Petitioners' discuss concerns 
regarding surface and ground water and odors at length, but wholly ignore the contents of the 
application and Nutrient Management Plan that specifically addresses many of their concerns. In 
addition to the comprehensive requirements of the Jerome County Zoning Ordinance set forth in 
Chapter 13, establishing the elements for a new LCO facility, the legislature addressed these 
concerns within the Beef Cattle Environmental Control Act, Idaho Code §22-4902, et. seq. regarding 
the global environmental issues for confined animal feeding operations. The Beef Cattle 
Environmental Control Act was enacted with the following purpose: 
"The legislature recognizes the importance of protecting state natural 
resources including, surface water and ground water. It is the intent of the 
legislature to protect the quality of these natural resources while maintaining 
an ecologically sound, economically viable, and socially responsible beef 
cattle industry in the state. The beef cattle industry produces manure and 
processed waste water, which when properly used, supplies valuable nutrients 
and organic matter to soils and is protective of the environment, but may, 
when improperly stored and managed, create adverse impacts on natural 
resources, including waters of the state. This chapter is intended to ensure 
that manure and processed waste water associated with beef cattle operations 
are handled in a manner which protects the natural resources of the state." 
(Idaho Code §22-4902(1». 
To further the purposes ofthe legislative declaration, the act provides that "each beef cattle 
animal feeding operation shall submit a Nutrient Management Plan to the director of ISDA for 
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approval". (Idaho Code §22-4906). I 
Specific Department of Agriculture regulations additionally provide for addressing odors 
generated in excess of odors normally associated with raising beef cattle in Idaho. (IDAP A 
02.04.15.030).2 
A Nutrient Management Plan is a plan for managing the amount, source, placement, form and 
timing of the land application of nutrients and soil amendments. (Idaho Code §22-4904(11)). 
Therefore, the ISDA's approval of the Nutrient Management Plan, aforementioned in part, 
above, was the assurance that the Board needed, consistent with the legislative enactment, regarding 
managing the LCO's waste, to ensure for protection to the environment, and in turn, protection of 
neighbors' properties and resources. 
Site assessment comments were obtained from the Hillsdale Highway District. In a letter 
dated March 16,2007, Berwyn Mussmann, Chairman of the Hillsdale Highway District, required a 
traffic impact study to be presented to the Board of Highway Commissioners regarding the 
application. (Phase I, Volume I, Page 231). 
Site assessment comment from the Jerome Highway District was submitted on March 8, 2007 
from Leroy Lewis, Road Supervisor for the Jerome Highway District. Mr. Lewis requested a traffic 
I See also Sanitary Products Act, I.C §37-401(4), ("All dairy farms shall have a Nutrient Management Plan 
approved by the Department [ISDA]"). 
2 See also the Agriculture Odor Management Act, I.e. §25-3801, et. seq. Pursuant to the AOMA, ISDA 
promulgated the rules governing agriculture odor management, IDAPA 02.04.16.100, et. seq. The rule provides that 
management practices which are undertaken in accordance with the rules governing dairy waste; the rules governing 
pesticide and chemigation use and application; rules concerning disposal of cull onion and potatoes; rules governing 
dead animal movement and disposal; the Idaho NRCS Nutrient Management Standard 590, June 1999; Best 
Management Practices listed in the "Idaho Agricultural Pollution Abatement Plan", August 2001; control of "manure 
odors"; ASAE Standard EP379.2, §§ 5 and 6 in their entirety, November 1999; and/or "composting facility", NRCS 
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impact study to determine the impact on the road system. (Phase I, Volume I, Page 235). 
On April 25, 2007, Mr. Lewis wrote an additional letter to Jerome County Planning & 
Zoning, indicating that the Jerome Highway District had received the traffic impact study for Big 
Sky. The letter made no specific recommendations. (Phase I, Volume I, Page 237). 
Site assessment comment was submitted by First Segregation Fire District to Art Brown, 
Planning & Zoning Administrator, on February 16,2007 by Donald Utt, Fire Chief. ChiefUtt's 
letter posed no impediment for the application to proceed. (Phase I, Volume I, Page 240). 
Site assessment comment was submitted by the Irrigation Delivery Depm1ment, in this matter 
the Northside Canal Company, by way of a March 26, 2007 letter to Art Brown, regarding the Big 
Sky Farms-Don McFarland CAFO application. No specific negative impacts were identified so long 
as the facility met specific Northside Canal Company requirements. (Phase I, Volume I, Page 242-
243). 
Site assessment comment was submitted by South Central District Health, by way of a letter 
dated March 8, 2007 from Dan King. South Central District Health interposed no objection to the 
LCO application proceeding. (Phase I, Volume I, Page 245). 
Site assessment comment, accompanied by an application for transfer of water right, was 
submitted to Jerome County Planning office by James E. Stanton, Senior Water Resource Agent, 
State of Idaho Department of Water Resources, indicating that the transfer was processed and is 
proceeding. (Phase I, Volume I, Page 247-264). 
Conservation Practice Standard 371, March 2001. 
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All setback compliance was established as set forth in the maps in Exhibits 7 and 8. (Phase I, 
Volume I, Page 266). 
The Idaho State Department of Agriculture, Siting Team suitability determination was 
submitted to Art Brown, Administrator, Jerome County Planning & Zoning Commission, on 
November 2,2006. The Siting Team, composed of representatives ofthe Department of Agriculture, 
Department of Environmental Quality, and the Department of Water Resources, listed the suitability 
determination as a "moderate risk" initially. (Phase I, Volume I, Page 268-270). 
On June 5,2007, in a letter to Art Brown, Administrator, Jerome County Planning & Zoning 
Commission, the Idaho State Department of Agriculture indicated that the Idaho State CAFO Siting 
Team had completed its review ofthe application. A voluminous list of technical factors contributed 
to the determination of the rating. In same letter, the Siting Team listed the suitability determination 
as "low risk". (Phase I, Volume I, Exhibit AG-I through AG-3). 
Additional letters from Highway District agencies were received and submitted with the 
application. (Hillsdale Highway District, (Phase I, Volume I, Exhibit AG-5 through AG-7); and 
Jerome Highway District, (Phase I, Volume I, Exhibit AG-IO). 
The public hearing on the application was held before the Board of County Commissioners 
on an extraordinary two day setting to allow for public comment on September 25 and 26, 2007. At 
the public hearing, a voluminous amount of written testimony was submitted by individuals 
predominantly in opposition to the application. The vast written testimony and exhibits were 
submitted by those in opposition, inclusive of Richard Carlson and Pat Brown, counsel for opponents 
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in the instant litigation. (Carlson-August 3, 2007 letter, Phase I, Volume II). 
One exhibit submitted for the Board of County Commissioners was a packet from Dean 
Dimond's attorney comprised of almost 500 pages. (Phase I, Volume II, R-2 packet, Pages 3-489). 
In a September 13, 2007 letter to the Board of Commissioners, Patrick Brown submitted 
information on behalf of Wayne and James Slone. Mr. Brown claims that the Slone's lacked notice 
but do not indicate that they own a primary residence on the land in question. From the information 
submitted, it is obvious that Mr. Brown had notice of the hearing, and an opportunity to be present 
representing his client at the public hearing. Additionally, his concerns are included in the official 
Agency Record. (Phase I, Volume III, Pages 854-856). 
The Board held a public meeting for purposes of deliberating on the evidence on October 9, 
2009. At the October 9,2009 meeting, the Board denied the application. 
On November 1, 2007, the Board issued its Memorandum Decision setting forth findings of 
fact and conclusions law denying the application. (Phase I, Volume III, Exhibits CC45-CC50). In its 
Memorandum Decision, findings and conclusions, the Board determined that the application was 
complete and wrote, 
"The Board finds the criteria relevant to this application, as set forth in 
Chapter 13 of the Ordinance, has been met and complied with by the 
applicant." 
The Board then denied the application based upon standards considered relevant in the 
County's Comprehensive Plan. (Phase I, Volume III, Exhibits CC45-CC50). 
Big Sky Farms Limited Partnership filed a petition for judicial review on November l3, 
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2007. (Phase I, Volume III, Exhibit API). 
On June 27, 2008, and July 1, 2008, the Honorable G. Richard Bevan, District Judge, issued 
his Memorandum Decision and amended Memorandum Decision reversing the Board's Decision 
denying Big Sky's LCO application and remanded the matter back to the Board of County 
Commissioners for further consideration. (Phase II, Agency Record, Pages 1-43). 
On August 4,2008, Petitioner Dean Dimond appeared before the Board and attempted to file 
documents and be heard on his motion to submit additional evidence. Good cause was not 
propounded by Dimond. His request was denied. (Supplemental Record, Volume I, Page 163, Phase 
II; Agency Record, Page 55). 
Numerous other meetings were held subsequent to the permit application on remand. 
On September 4, 2008, the Board discussed the Big Sky Decision and indicated potential 
conditions which would be placed upon the permit inclusive of concerns addressed in the Hillsdale 
Highway District letter and Valley School District's request for a turn-out. 
Additionally, Northside Canal Company concerns regarding leaching would be addressed. 
(Agency Record, Page 72). 
On September 9, 2008, a Board of County Commissioners hearing was held regarding an 
issue of the sale of the subject property to the successors in interest, South View Dairy. This was 
only addressed resulting from inappropriate comments made by Commission members to the local 
newspaper regarding the sale of the property and its potential impact upon the permit at issue. The 
permit being attached to the land and going to the successor in interest was verified by the Planning 
INTERVENORS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 10-
dee 
& Zoning Administrator. (Agency Record, Pages 90-91). 
On September 22, 2008, the Board of County Commissioners again addressed the Big Sky 
discussion and concerns raised regarding specific criteria, and were informed by their counsel that 
findings of fact would be prepared for their review. (Agency Record, Page 93). 
On September 23,2008, the Board issued its Memorandum Decision approving Big Sky's 
application subject to conditions of a "school bus stop and dike or wall, being provided by Big Sky". 
The comprehensive and reasoned Decision addressed the issues raised as to specific criteria of the 
relevant ordinance. (Agency Record, Pages 111-119). 
On October 21,2008, the Petitioners filed their petition for judicial review and declaratory 
judgment. (Agency Record, Page 121). Petitioners requested that the court enter declaratory 
judgment invalidating Idaho Code §67-5629 and the Jerome County Ordinance regarding the same 
one mile limitation. 
Intervenors filed a motion to dismiss Petitioners declaratory judgment action set forth in its 
original petition primarily based upon the authority set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court in Euclid 
Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P .3d 853 (2008). Rather than ruling upon the 
motion to dismiss, the Court allowed Petitioners to file their amended petition for judicial review 
dated March 6, 2009. However, the amended petition for judicial review does not contain a specific 
attack upon Idaho Code §67-5629 or the similar attack upon the Jerome County Zoning Ordinance 
regarding the one mile limitation. However, an argument is contained within Petitioners' 
memorandum in support of petition for judicial review which will be further addressed. 
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On June 3, 2009, the Court entered its order on motion to augment and supplement the 
record, correct transcript and motion to dismiss. (Supplemental Record, Volume I, Pages 1-8). The 
Court set forth specific parameters for the Petitioners to follow regarding the submission of 
documents to be considered to be augmented into the record. This was the second opportunity 
afforded by the Court to Petitioners to identify relevant documentation to augment the record. This 
was ordered subsequent to objections raised by Intervenor and Respondent regarding augmentation 
of the record. The subsequent submissions made by Petitioners of the documents sought to be 
augmented in the record did not comply with the Court's June 3, 2009 order. Irregardless, the Court 
allowed documents to be identified to be augmented in the record and directed counsel to attempt to 
stipulate to the augmentation of the record for purposes of judicial review. This was over an 
additional objection of Intervenor for augmentation of the record, allowing Petitioners three 
opportunities to augment the record. The parties eventually did stipulate to certain documents to be 
augmented into the record resulting in the Court's order on Petitioners renewed motion to augment 
the record and scheduling order dated November 24,2009. (Supplemental Record, Volume II, Pages 
234-250). 
At the hearing on September 29, 2009, counsel for the Intervenor objected to the Court 
considering any further efforts at augmentation. The procedural history portion of the Court's order, 
indicating that certain documents became the subject of stipulations only resulted after counsel for 
the Intervenor interposed its objection to the Court's consideration, which was denied. Thereafter, 
the stipulation for certain documents resulted due to the Court's directive. (Supplemental Record, 
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Volume II, Page 235). 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. 
A. The Board did not violate any procedural due process rights regarding individuals' ability to 
comment at the hearing or submit written evidence. 
B. Idaho Code §67-6529 and Jerome County Zoning Ordinance 13-6.02, restricting written 
testimony from affected individuals who owned a primary residence upon real property 
within one (1) mile from the proposed facility is not in violation of state and federal 
constitutional due process rights. 
C. The Board's decision to grant the LCO application was based upon lawful procedure and an 
appropriate application of the Board's interpretation and application of its own zoning 
ordinances. 
D. The Board's decisions were not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 
E. The Board appropriately denied Dean Dimond's request to reopen the record and submit 
additional evidence pursuant to their own procedures. 
F. The decisions of the Board were consistent with the provisions of the Jerome County 
Ordinance relating to requirements for completeness of applications for livestock 
confinement operations, and the Board's Memorandum Decision addressed the application 
requirements in detail. 
G. The Board's decision was consistent with Idaho Code §67-6535 and the Board's decision 
constituted a reasoned statement. 
H. Intervenors are entitled to attorneys' fees on the basis that Petitioners have failed to base their 
claims upon a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Idaho Code §67 -6519 grants the governing boards of the county the discretion to grant or 
deny an application authorized or mandated by the Local Land Use Planning Act, Idaho Code §67-
6501, et. seq. (See McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657, 663, 851 P.2d 953,957 (1993)). 
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Although interpretation of an ordinance is a question of law over which the Supreme Court 
exercises free review, there is a strong presumption of favoring the validity of the actions of zoning 
boards, which includes the application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances. (Southfork 
Coalition v. Board of Commissioners of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857, 792 P.2d 882 (1990); 
Howardv. Canyon County Board of Commissioners, 128 Idaho 479,915 P.2d 709 (1996); Sanders 
Orchardv. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695, 52 P.3d 840 (2002); Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 
193,207 P.3d 169 (2009)). 
In reviewing a decision of a Local Land Use Board acting in a quasi judicial capacity, the 
courts will overturn a zoning decision only if it is: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory 
provisions; (b) in excess ofthe statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or(e) arbitrary, capricious or an 
abuse of discretion. (Idaho Code §67-5279(3)). 
In Terrazas, the court writes, 
"This court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence on questions fact. (Idaho Code §67-5279(1)). Rather, 
this court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they're clearly 
erroneous. (Castenada v. Brighton Corporation, 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 
P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998), citing Southfork Coalition v. Board of 
Commissioners of Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857,860, 792 P.2d 882, 885 
(1990)). 
In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the 
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, 
so long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent 
evidence in the record. (Price, 131 Idaho 429,958 P.2d 586). 
Al though interpretation of an ordinance is a question of law over which this 
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court exercises free review, (Lane Ranch Partnership v. City o/Sun Valley, 
145 Idaho 87,89,175 P.3d 776,778 (2007), there's a strong presumption of 
favoring the validity of the actions of zoning boards, which includes the 
application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances. (Payette River 
Property Association v. Board o/Commissioners o/Valley County, 132 Idaho 
551,554,976 P.2d 477, 480 (1999), citing Howardv. Canyon County Board 
o/Commissioners, 128 Idaho 479, 480, 915 P.2d 709, 710 (1996))." 
The party seeking to overturn the Board's decision bears the burden of proving the grounds 
for reversal under Idaho Code §67-5279. In addition, the party seeking to overturn a decision must 
show that "substantial rights ... have been prejudiced". (Idaho Code §67-5279(4): Payette River 
Property Association v. Board o/Commissioners o/Valley County, l32 Idaho 551, 554,976 P.2d 
477,480 (1999)). 
If the Board's action is not affirmed it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded 
for further proceedings as necessary. (Idaho Code §67-5279(3)). 
The court should not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence presented. (Idaho Code §67-5279(1)). 
V. ARGUMENT 
1. NUMEROUS PETITIONERS' LACK STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE BOARD'S 
APPROVAL OF THE BIG SKY PERMIT. 
Petitioners contend that Idaho Code §67 -6521 confers standing on most any individual who 
claims an interest in real property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a 
permit authorizing the development. When the statute is combined with Idaho and federal case law, 
such a reading is overly broad. The legislative intent of the statute for the issuance of Board 
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decisions requires that: 
"It is the intent ofthe legislature that decisions made pursuant to this chapter 
should be founded upon sound reason and practical application of recognized 
principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, the courts of this state are 
directed to consider the proceedings as a whole and evaluate the adequacy of 
proceedings and resultant decisions in light of practical considerations with 
an emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision 
making. Only those whose challenge to a decision demonstrates actual harm 
or violation of fundamental rights, not the mere possibility thereof, shall be 
entitled to a remedy or reversal of a decision." (Idaho Code§67-6535(c)). 
(Emphasis added). 
It is not sound or practical to interpret Idaho Code §67-6521 to allow for any person that asserts a 
possible, or theoretical, harm by a Board decision to have standing at a hearing where such persons 
have no hope of a remedy or a reversal of a Board decision based upon Idaho Code§67-6535. 
Clearly, Idaho Code §67-6521(1)(a) requires an affected person to have an interest in real 
property which may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing the 
development to claim and have standing. 
As a general rule in the ordinary case, 
"A party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons". (Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 US 490, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 45 LE 2nd 343 (1975)). 
Furthermore, 
"Even when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the "case or 
controversy requirement", this court has held that the plaintiff must generally 
assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on 
the legal rights or interests of third parties." (Ibid citing Tileston v. Ullman, 
318 US 44 (1943), see also USv. Raines, 362 US 17 (1960)). 
It is contended here, that many of the proposed Petitioners have tried to assert their claims on 
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the shoulders of the Dimond family. Pursuant to Warth, supra, such efforts are disallowed and no 
standing should be conferred upon such claimants whom do not own property affected by the permit. 
Petitioners cite Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation, 429 
US 252975 S. Ct. 555 (1977), to assert the courts need not consider standing as to every plaintiff 
and that its sufficient for one plaintiff to meet the standing requirement. In that case, matters 
concerning discrimination evoking the equal protection clause were addressed. While the court's 
ruling did state, as to standing, that it is enough that one plaintiff meet the standing requirement, the 
issue with respect to standing was whether the suit could be maintained at all. That differs from the 
instant case as the standing issue here is not whether any petitioner has standing, or whether all listed 
petitioners have standing. 
Petitioners citing of Arlington Heights is misplaced, as the issues of standing can be 
reconciled. There, the question is whether the suit could be maintained by virtue of one petitioner in 
a listed agency having standing, even though others in that group did not have standing alone. In that 
context, the court allowed the suit to go forward because one plaintiff of the listing agency met the 
recognized standing requirement. Here, it is undisputed that certain petitioners have standing as 
affected landowners, so the suit itself is not in jeopardy of going forward. Thus, the instant case 
differs from Arlington Heights. Because this suit can be maintained by the Dimond Petitioners' who 
have standing, other petitioners are estopped from bringing parties to the action based upon the 
language in Warth that a party is denied to assert the right of third persons. (Ibid). 
In support of this analysis, the court expounded in Warth that: 
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"As an aspect of justicability, the standing question is whether the plaintiff 
has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to 
warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of 
the court's remedial powers on his behalf." (Ibid, citing Baker v. Carr, 269 
US 186 (1962)). 
Additionally, the court has held that: 
"When the asserted harm is a generalized grievance shared in substantially 
equal measure by all or large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does 
note warrant exercise of jurisdiction." (Selsinger v. Reservists to Stop the 
War, 418 US 208 (1974)). 
This analysis finds support in Idaho courts as well. 
The Doctrine of Standing, according to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
"Focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to 
have adjudicated". (Noh v. Cenarussa, 137 Idaho 798, 53 P.3d 1217 (2002)). 
Petitioners invoking standing, are required to, 
"allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood that the 
judicial relief requested will prevent or address the claimed injury." (Ibid, 
Emphasis added). 
"Furthermore, a citizen and tax payer may not challenge a governmental 
enactment where the injury is one suffered alike by all citizens and tax payers 
of the jurisdiction. Petitioners must establish a peculiar or personal injury 
that is different than that suffered by any other member of the public." 
(Sellkirk-Priest Basin Association v. State, 128 Idaho 831,919 P.2d 1032, 
(1996)). 
In Noh, the petitioners argued against the passage of Proposition One, an Indian Gaming 
Initiative, proposing to grant certain privileges to Indians in the state to maintain and advance certain 
gambling rights. The court denied the petitioners in that case standing, indicating that they lacked 
proving up an injury in fact. Additionally, the court determined that any injury suffered is 
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speculative. (Ibid). 
Like in Noh, many of the Petitioners in the instant case, lack standing because their alleged 
injuries are nothing more than speculative. They have failed to allege or demonstrate an injury in 
fact as required under traditional notions of standing. Many of the Petitioners, base their concerns, 
upon the National Monument at the Minidoka Internment Site. It is 1.25 miles away. They cannot 
claim an injury in fact. Many are not affected persons or property owners. Any injury claim suffered 
is wholly speculative. 
Additionally, the challenge raised by the individual groups surrounding their concerns as to 
the LCO facilities speculative adverse effects and the Minidoka Internment Site, is a claimed injury 
suffered alike by all citizens and tax payers of the jurisdiction. They totally lack a peculiar or 
personal injury suffered that is different than that suffered by any other member of the pUblic. 
Therefore, Petitioners Idaho Area Concerned Residents for the Environment, Inc., The Japanese 
American Citizens League, Inc., The National Trust for Historic Preservation, Inc., Preservation 
Idaho, Inc., Friends of Minidoka, and the Idaho Rural Council all lack standing. For those reasons, 
the Court must remove them from the petition in this matter as lacking standing to proceed. 
2. JEROME COUNTY, THROUGH THE ACTIONS OF THE BOARD OF 
COMMISSIONERS OR PLANNING & ZONING STAFF, DID NOT VIOLATE ANY 
OF PETITIONERS' CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution does provide, in part, that: 
"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall...deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw." 
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The Idaho Constitution states in pertinent part, in Article I, Section 13, that, 
"N 0 person shall... be deprived oflife, liberty or property without due process 
oflaw." 
As aforementioned, many of the Petitioners lack an interest in property to be granted standing 
to assert a due process violation. While Petitioners maintain due process violations regarding the 
property rights of neighbors to the land sought to be permitted, we must not forget the focus upon the 
rights of the individual landowner, South View Dairy, successor in interest to Big Sky, and their 
property rights to develop their property. 
The right to develop one's property is a "substantial right" for purposes of review under the 
Administrative Procedures Act. (Terrazas v. Blaine County Board o/Commissioners, supra, citing 
Lane Ranch Partnership v. City o/Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 175 P.3d 776 (2007)). Here, procedural 
due process does require: 
"(a) Notice of proceedings; 
(b) A transcribable verbatim record of the proceeding; 
(c) Specific written findings of fact; and 
(d) An opportunity to present and rebut evidence." 
(Chambers v. Kootenai County Board o/Commissioners, 125 Idaho 115,867 
P.2d 989 (1994)). 
These requirements, however, hinge on Petitioners eligibility as persons entitled to notice in 
the first place. Idaho Code §67-6529(2) provides in pertinent part: 
"Only members of the public with their primary residence within a one (1) 
mile radius of a proposed site may provide comment at the hearing." 
A. JEROME COUNTY DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONERS' JAMES AND 
WAYNE SLONE'S PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
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What Petitioners' Slone ignore, is that according to the Idaho Statute, the Slone's who 
actually received mailed notice nearly two weeks before the subsequent hearing, would not be able to 
provide comment at the hearing in any event. They do not have a primary residence on their 
property. This is not asserted by Slone in any context. Petitioners' cite language in Jerome County 
Zoning Ordinance 13-6.01 as governing the notice requirement requiring notice to be given to all 
property owners within a one (1) mile radius of the proposed permit site. Petitioners' conveniently 
ignore that the same ordinance specifically references Idaho Code §67-6529, which alerts all readers 
of the ordinance that the content therein is derived pursuant to the standard set forth in Idaho Code 
§67-6529. Therefore, the primary residence within a one (1) mile radius of the proposed site is 
clearly incorporated from reference to the statute within the ordinance. 
Under the statute, it is clear that only those that have their primary residence within one (1) 
mile of the proposed permit site are entitled to comment at the hearing. Since the Slone's do not 
own a primary residence on their property near the site, they suffer no prejudice of their substantial 
rights in violation of due process. (See Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of Freemon! County, 
supra, 143 Idaho 501 (2006)). 
Substantial rights in terms of procedural due process are defined essentially as notice and 
opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to be heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner in order to satisfY due process requirements. (Ibid). ("Procedural due process 
requires some process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his rights in violation 
of the state or federal constitutions. This requirement is met when the defendant is provided with 
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notice and an opportunity to be heard. The opportunity to be heard must occur at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner in order to satisfy a due process requirement."). 
In Cowan, the court ruled that substantial rights in terms of procedural due process were not 
prejudiced where an opponent of a proposed subdivision had notice of meetings, attended meetings 
with counsel, and had the opportunity to speak against the subdivision application. There, the 
opponent, had counsel present at the initial hearing. Despite recognizing defective notice for 
hearings on two separate occasions, the Cowan court ruled that Cowan had "failed to demonstrate 
how those defects prejudiced his substantial rights since he clearly had notice of the meeting". 
(Ibid). 
Even though Cowan spoke at the initial hearing upon the application at the time, whether or 
not an opponent was present at the hearing seems immaterial. Where notice is present, the burden is 
on the party asserting due process violations to prove that their substantial rights-notice and 
opportunity to be heard-was violated. 
Here like Cowan, counsel made argument prior to the hearing upon notice, which evidences 
and demonstrates that the Slone's had notice of the meeting prior to the meeting. Further, the record 
is clear that the Slone's did receive mailed notice eleven (11) days prior to a subsequent hearing. 
Their allegation that they did not have a meaningful opportunity to raise objections is immaterial 
because, as noted, they do not have a substantial right to voice comment at hearing because they are 
not property owners within a primary residence within one (1) mile of a proposed permit site. (Idaho 
Code §67-6529, supra). 
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Thus, like the opponent in Cowan, Slone's have failed to demonstrate how the alleged notice, 
even if flawed, impacted substantial rights in violation of due process. Slone's had ample 
opportunity to obtain substitute counsel, or appear themselves, in the expanded hearing in September 
2007, and voice their objections. 
B. JEROME COUNTY DID NOT VIOLATE PETITIONERS' 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY LIMITING PUBLIC 
COMMENTS AND WRITTEN TESTIMONY PRIOR TO AND DURING 
THE SEPTEMBER 25-26, 2007 HEARING. 
For the same reasons noted herein above, the Petitioners procedural due process rights in the 
limiting public comment and written testimony prior to and during the September 25-26, 2007 
hearing, fails on the basis that the persons limited in their comment did not have their primary 
residence within a one (1) mile radius of the proposed site. Those with their primary residence 
within a one (1) mile radius of the proposed site were allowed to provide written comment prior to 
the hearing. As such, there is no allegation that those with their primary residence within a one (1) 
mile radius of the proposed site lacked sufficient notice to provide written testimony prior to the 
hearing, inclusive of Dimond family members. 
Petitioners cite language in Idaho Code §67 -6534, where a board of county commissioners" 
shall provide and opportunity for all affected persons to present and rebut evidence" to buttress their 
argument to Petitioners in this case did not receive an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner". (See Cowan, 143 Idaho 513). 
Petitioners assert that "affected person" include apparently anyone who might have an 
objection to the proposed site, whether they are property owner or simply an ordinary citizen 
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concerned about a specific site or piece of property. In a further effort to have their definition of 
"affected persons" adopted by the court, they cite Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84, 
(2003), where the court ruled in part that: 
"This court will not look to a predetermined distance in deciding whether a 
property owner has, or does not have, standing." 
And thus an opportunity to be heard: 
"To seek judicial review ofa LLUPA decision." 
In the same paragraph of that decision, however, the court noted that with respect to standing 
"proximity is a very important factor". (Ibid). 
In Evans, appellants were landowners that lived within 300 feet of a proposed PUD. Thus, 
the context of the court's decision, particularly with respect to predetermined distances for conferring 
standing and resultant due process rights, is imperative to consider. The Evans court asserted the 
standing status-and by implication, due process rights, 
" ... depends on where the person's own property that may be adversely 
affected by the PUDs construction, not because those persons can claim they 
own property with a specified distance." (ibid). 
There, the appellants in Evans were property owners that lived within 300 feet of a proposed 
PUD site. In Evans, the court determined that a PUD within 300 feet of a person's home could 
adversely affect that person. However, if it wasn't the 300 feet that swayed the court to grant 
standing to those people as revealed by its no predetermined distance standard, then what we are left 
with, is that the appellants had their homes near the proposed site. It should be emphasized, that 
having their homes near the proposed site, meant that they resided there. In further support of the 
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conclusion, the court noted that, 
"A property owner in Tetonia, Driggs, or even Victor may be less likely to 
qualify for standing to challenge the PUD because it is less likely they can 
show their property will be adversely affected." 
In light of the foregoing, Petitioners like the Slone's, the National Tmst for Historic 
Preservation, or ICARE, for example, have a very flimsy claim for standing to begin with, much less 
procedural due process rights relating to an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner. They 
don't live near the proposed site, and many of them don't even own property anywhere in the 
vicinity. 
Petitioners would thrust upon the court an opportunity to imply that limiting public comment 
to defined minutes or not allowing an individual's attorney an opportunity to be present and rebut 
evidence violates procedural due process. What is key, is the opportunity to be present and testify. 
Counsel had an "opportunity" to be present, or have substitute counsel present on behalf of their 
client. This satisfies procedural due process requirements 
Petitioners cite language in Cowan as well as Neighbors/or Healthy Gold/ork, 145 Idaho 
121, 176 P.3d 126 (2007) to highlight these suggestions and implications. What Petitioners do not 
reveal from the facts of those cases, is that they reference persons who lived near a proposed permit 
site. 
From the record, it is clear the proponents and opponents of the application for the LCO 
permit were afforded substantially equal time at the public hearing. Additionally, there is a vast 
amount of submitted written information in opposition to the permit that has been previously 
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referenced. 
The time limitation of four (4) minutes and one written document was reasonable. Limiting 
public comment to a specific time period has been upheld as reasonable and appropriate in other 
cases. (Bennett v. City Council of City of Las Cruces, 126 N.M. 619, 973 P.2d 871 (1999), 
upholding ten minute limit on testimony; Inganamortv. Borough ofFord Lee, 120 N.J. Super. 286, 
293 A.2nd 720 (1972), upholding a five minute limitation on speakers at public hearing; Timbertrails 
Associates v. Planning and Zoning Commission o/Town of Sherman, 99 Conn. App. 916 A.2nd 99 
(2007), three minute time limit imposed on speakers at commission's pubic hearing did not violate 
landowners right to fundamental fairness). 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §67 -6529(2), the board of county commissioners was not required to 
allow for public comment outside the one (1) mile radius but allowed to do so. Petitioners claim 
foul, but don't even recognize the fact that the Board had the authority and right to limit comment to 
those with a primary residence within a one (1) mile radius. 
Individuals testified from vast distances from the proposed site in opposition. Many in 
opposition had no interest in real property anywhere near the site. However, they had their 
opportunity to voice their concerns. Petitioners maintain those in opposition should not have been 
given unlimited time to present testimony, but should have had the opportunity to present 
"substantiated" oral and written evidence. However, who decides how much? The Board has this 
discretion. It was reasonable here and fulfilled due process requirements. 
Those with their primary residence within a one (1) mile radius submitted vast written 
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evidence. Those who did not own a primary residence within a one (1) mile radius were limited. 
However, many individuals had an opportunity to submit written evidence with no property interests 
in Jerome County whatsoever. 
Therefore, the claimed violation of rights of property, and procedural due process must fail in 
all respects. 
3. IDAHO CODE §67-6529 AND JEROME COUNTY ZONING ORDINANCE 13-
6.02, ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND DO NOT VIOLATE 
PETITIONERS' SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS. 
As aforementioned, Petitioners' original petition included a request for declaratory judgment 
invalidating Idaho Code §67-6529 and Jerome County Zoning Ordinance 13-6.02. In its amended 
petition, the Petitioners failed to include same claim. By raising it now in their opening brief, 
Petitioners are requesting the Court to declare by judgment the unconstitutionality of Idaho Code 
§67-6529. This is the improper forum for the Court to so rule. 
In Euclid Avenue Trust v. City a/Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853 (2008), actions seeking 
civil damages of declaratory relief may not be combined with petitions for judicial review under the 
Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAP A). In Euclid, the court writes, 
"We consider two questions on appeal. The first is whether an 
administrative appeal in a civil action may be combined in one proceeding. 
We hold that the two may not be combined and that this court will review 
the appeal in accordance with the standards applicable to the filing fee 
category designated on the initial filing in the trial court." 
The court continues, 
"There seems to be an increasing tendency, particularly in land use cases, for 
counsel to combine civil damage claims with their administrative appeal. 
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This court has yet to directly rule on the propriety of this practice, although in 
Cobbly v. City of Challis, 143 Idaho 130, 139 P.3d 732 (2006), we 
disapproved it was single filing in a somewhat related situation." 
The court continues, 
"The Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) provides that "an applicant 
denied a permit or aggrieved by a decision" may seek judicial review under 
the provisions of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IDAPA), Chapter 
52, Title 67, Idaho Code. (Idaho Code §67-6519(4). Unless otherwise 
provided by statute, judicial review of disputed issues of fact must be 
confined to the agency record. (Idaho Code §67-5277). IDAPA provides 
the scope of review and the type of relief available in Idaho Code §67 -5279-
"if the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, 
and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." By failing to mention 
any further remedial measures, it is reasonable to conclude that combining a 
claim for civil damages with a petition for judicial review is not a 
permissible course of action. (See Local 1494 of the International 
Association of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639, 586 
P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978), where a statute specifies certain things, the 
designation of such things excludes all others)." 
In addressing Rule 84( a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governing judicial review, 
the court writes, 
"Rule 84(a) specifically allows one to combine a petition for judicial review 
with a request for common law or equitable writs, but says nothing about 
seeking declaratory or monetary relief in ajudicial review proceeding. When 
combination of distinct types of proceedings is permitted, it is done pursuant 
to state or court rule." 
The court goes on to write, 
"The separation of civil actions and administrative appeals is supported by 
good policy underpinnings. After all, one proceeding is appellate in nature 
and the other is an original action. They are processed differently by our 
courts. Discovery is rarely available in judicial review proceeding. The 
review is to be conducted on the record, absent specific authorization. (Idaho 
Code §67-5276). The standards for determining an outcome are specified by 
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statute (Idaho Code §67-5279, whereas this is not the case with actions 
seeking declaratory or monetary relief)." 
"The confusion resulting from a conglomerated proceeding is apparent here. 
While Euclid primarily styled this as a proceeding seeking judicial review, 
the matter was determined upon three orders granting summary judgment, 
hardly what one would expect in a review on the record. Thus, we are 
constrained to hold that actions seeking civil damages or declaratory relief 
may not be combined with petitions for judicial review under IDAP A." 
Petitioners seek the court to declare Idaho Code §67 -6529(2) and its embodiment in Jerome 
County Zoning Ordinance 13-6.02 as unconstitutional in violation of substantive due process. (See 
Petitioners' brief page 32). Petitioners maintain that the one (1) mile radius is arbitrary and 
unreasonable having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare or 
other legislative purpose. 
In this case, Jerome County relaxed the standard to allow non-landowners within the one (1) 
mile radius to testify. This is unnecessary under the statute. Under the instant facts as applied, 
Jerome County exceeded the requirements for procedural and substantive due process. Petitioners 
maintain that this was an arbitrary distinction in the legislative enactment of the statute governing the 
one (1) mile radius and the Jerome County equivalent. Petitioners maintain that the one (1) mile 
radius promotes the endangerment of the public health, safety, morals and general welfare by 
limiting information the Board could consider, but offer no compromise or substitute in the standard. 
A one (1) mile radius is significant. It is legitimate. The legislature obviously enacted it, to allow 
for affected persons owning a primary residence within the one (1) mile radius to have an 
opportunity to provide comment and state their concerns. The one (1) mile radius is similar to an 
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extension of set backs as set forth in the governing zoning ordinance. 
In Jerome County Zoning Ordinance 13-4.04 property lines for instance, it indicates that 
lagoons, ponds, etc. shall be a minimum of fifty (50) feet away from the waters edge of any canal. 
Compo sting must be three hundred (300) feet from any residence not associated with the LCO. 
Additionally, compo sting shall be a minimum of fifty (50) feet from any highway district right-of-
way and fifty (50) feet from the waters edge of any canal. (Supplemental Record, Volume I, Page 
15). 
These set backs are instituted to observe the least minimal impact to neighboring properties. 
Obviously they serve no benefit to the permit applicant, in that those set backs prohibit the luxury of 
placing the different sites within the facility at the applicant's desires. The legitimacy of set backs, 
and legislative determinations of same, is universally accepted. (83 Am. Jur. 2nd Zoning & Planning 
§ 127(2009)). 
All of the set backs bear a rational relationship to public health, safety, morals and general 
welfare. It meets a legislative objective in protecting neighboring properties. It meets the goals of 
land use determinations. The one (1) mile radius is no different. It's not based on sole expediency 
as propounded by the Petitioners in this matter. 4 
Petitioners are making a claim attacking the constitutionality of the statute and ordinance 
regarding unaffected property owners outside the one (1) mile radius. The courts have upheld 
4 Federal statues are also consistent in allowing public involvement in land use planning process to be afforded to 
affected citizens being provided an opportunity to participate in rule making, decision making and planning with 
respect to public lands. (63C Am. Jur. 2nd Public Lands, §27, 43 USCA § 1702; Secretary of the Interior through the 
Bureau of Land Management). 
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territorial restrictions for the placement of structures within zoning ordinances affecting the property 
owner seeking a set back variance. 
In Whorle v. Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 207 P.2d 998 (2009), the court upheld the 
twenty-five (25) foot set back requirement from a structure on lake front property determining that 
upon denial of the variance request, owners were still able to use their property as permitted and 
therefore, the set backs did not prejudice owners' substantial rights. 
Therefore, the request to declare unconstitutional the statute and ordinance regarding the one 
(1) mile radius allowing affected property owners to publicly comment at the public hearing at issue 
is constitutional, and does not affect their substantial rights. In addition, it is improperly pled before 
the court. 
Finally, it almost seems absurd to be making this claim on the basis that the Board of County 
Commissioners in the instant action relaxed the one (1) mile radius for public testimony and afforded 
a vast opportunity for non-affected non-property owners to testify in opposition at this public 
hearing. Therefore, absolutely no substantial rights of any individual were prejudiced in the instant 
matter. 
4. THE BOARD APPLIED THE RELEVANT ORDINANCE, STANDARDS 
AND CRITERIA. 
The Board applied the ordinances deemed appropriate to the instant application and 
appropriately followed the Jerome County Zoning Ordinance in the instant facts. Petitioners contend 
that the Board failed to follow the Jerome County Zoning Ordinance through the Big Sky process, 
making its approval of the Big Sky permit tainted by unlawful procedure. 
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Petitioners contend that the Board should have considered additional ordinances in evaluating 
the Big Sky application and failing to reopen the record. Petitioners concede that the Jerome County 
Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 13 provides the "nuts & bolts of permitting LCO's in Jerome County". 
(Petitioners' Opening Brief, Page 35). As set forth in Jerome County Zoning Ordinance 13-3.01 it 
states: 
"New LCO's shall be allowed only in agricultural A-I zone, and only after 
compliance with the provisions ofthis chapter and the Jerome County Zoning 
Ordinance." (Supplemental Record, Volume I, Page 14). 
Petitioners contend thatJerome County Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 1-3.01 should have been 
evaluated by the Board of County Commissioners and discussed in reaching its ultimate conclusion 
in granting the application and allowing the permit. As Jerome County Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 
1-3.01 indicates, it was drafted in accordance with the Comprehensive Plan. It sets forth broad 
policy statements consistent with the Jerome County Comprehensive Plan. 
Petitioners also cite Jerome County Zoning Ordinance 1-6.01 entitled Preservation of Private 
Property Rights. It indicates that the Ordinance should be interpreted to protect each citizen from 
undue encroachment on their private property and allowing the citizenry the maximum use of 
their property without placing undue burden upon that of his neighbor. 
The entire purpose of Jerome County Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 13, is to ensure, by the 
exhaustive requirements, that when permitting LCO's, and providing for the maximum use of a 
persons property, the setbacks and other requirements are designed to avoid placing undue burden 
upon neighbors' properties and in turn protecting the neighbors' resources and environment. 
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Idaho Code §67-6519( 4) states, 
"Whenever a governing board or zoning or planning and zoning 
commission grants or denies a permit, it shall specify: 
(a) the ordinance and standards used in evaluating 
the application; 
(b) the reasons for approval or denial; and 
( c) the actions, if any, that the applicant could take to obtain a 
permit." (Emphasis added). 
Therefore, obviously, the Board has the discretion to determine the relevant ordinance to be 
applied and the standards used in evaluating an application. 
Idaho Code §67-6535, Approval or Denial of Any Application to Be Based Upon 
Standards and to Be in Writing, states, 
"(a) The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter 
shall be based upon standards and criteria which shall be set forth in the 
comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance or 
regulation of the city or county." 
"(b) The approval or denial of any application provided for in this chapter 
shall be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the 
criteria and standards "considered relevant", states the relevant contested 
facts relied upon and explains the rationale for the decision based upon the 
applicable provisions of the comprehensive plan, relevant ordinance and 
statutory provisions, pertinent constitutional principles and factual 
information contained in the record." (Emphasis added). 
Where the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative 
body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for the court to consider rules of statutory 
construction. (Payette River Property Association v. Board o/Commissioners o/Valley County, 132 
Idaho 551, 976 P .2d 477 (1999)). Further, if the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the 
court need merely apply the statute without engaging in any statutory construction. (State v. 
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Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 978 P.2d 214 (1999». 
Where a statute or constitutional provision is plain, clear, and unambiguous, it speaks for 
itself and must be given interpretation language clearly implies. (Moon v. Investment Board, 97 
Idaho 595, 548 P.2d 861 (1976». When the language ofastatute is clear and unambiguous, statutory 
construction is unnecessary, and the Supreme Court need only determine the application of the words 
to the facts of the case at hand. (Jen-Rath Company, Inc. v. Kilt Manufacturing Company, 137 Idaho 
330,48 P.3d 659 (2002». 
Here, the Board had the duty to submit a reasoned statement evaluating the criteria and 
standards considered relevant to the instant facts consistent with Idaho Code §67-6535(b). The 
Board, not Petitioners', exercise this discretion. 
In this case, the standards and criteria set forth in relevant zoning ordinance are contained 
within Chapter 13 of the Jerome County Zoning Ordinance governing LCO's. 
Idaho Code §67-6535(c) states, 
"It is the intent of the legislature that decisions made pursuant to this chapter 
shall be founded upon sound reason and practical application of recognized 
principles of law. In reviewing such decisions, the courts of the state are 
directed to consider the proceedings as a whole and to evaluate the adequacy 
of procedures and resultant decisions in light of practical considerations with 
an emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision 
making." 
A recognized principle oflaw is relevancy. (IRE 401). When reviewing Jerome County 
Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 1-3.01, which sets forth policy statements consistent with the 
Comprehensive Plan, it is not relevant to specifically be applied to the permitting of LeO's in that, 
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most of the provisions are irrelevant, and many of the statements could be interpreted in both favor 
of granting the application or denial of same. For instance, subsection (a) support of property values 
by preserving existing uses and guiding future development, would indicate and be easily applied to 
justify the development of an irrigated farmland to a heifer raising facility, which would support the 
property value by guiding its future development. 
In addition, subsection (e) supporting the economy of the county, by allowing a heifer raising 
facility, and developing the property towards that end, is entirely consistent with that policy 
statement. 
Subsection (f) protection for prime agricultural lands for production offood and fiber, would 
be interpreted as allowing for prime agricultural lands to be developed to produce food, i.e. milk, by 
allowing for a heifer raising facility for dairy replacement heifers. 
Subsection (g) support for agriculture and other industry together with related uses, is entirely 
consistent with the heifer raising facility on farmland, which would require agriculture commodities 
to feed same animals, and supporting the related dairy industry, an intrical party of agriculture in our 
state. However, none of the above are standards and criteria governing permitting LCO's. 
Jerome County Zoning Ordinance 1-6.01, Preservation of Private Property Rights, allows for 
the maximum use of property, i.e. developing the property for heifer raising facility, without placing 
undue burden upon that of his neighbor, by carefully following the aforementioned Nutrient 
Management Plan and other designed components and required state, federal and local regulations to 
ensure that the waste produced is properly handled so as to avoid undue burden upon neighbors. 
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Additionally, the Jerome County Zoning Ordinance 1-6.01, Preservation of Private Property 
Rights, in allowing for the maximum use of the property, is consistent with maintaining the 
individual integrity of the specific property owner who is subject to land use regulations. It must be 
remembered, and the courts have espoused the general rule that, zoning laws are in derogation of 
common law rights of free ownership and use of property, where more than one reasonable 
interpretation is possible, the interpretation that places the least restriction on use of property is 
favored. 
In addition, when choosing between alternative constructions of a statute, or ordinance, 
unnecessarily harsh consequences are to be avoided. Therefore, the Board under the instant 
application, was required to review the relevant ordinance specific to the relevant land use request 
and applying the County governing zoning ordinances that were the least restrictive on the property. 
(See also Best Hill Coalition v. Halko, LLC, 144 Idaho 813, 172 P .3d 1088 (2007); Smith v. US.R. V 
Properties, LC, 141 Idaho 795, 118 P.3d 127 (2005); and D & M Country Estates Homeowners 
Association v. Romriell, 138 Idaho 160, 59 P.3d 965 (2002). Further espousing the view that the 
court will not extend by implication any restriction upon real property not clearly expressed in 
restrictive covenants affecting real property because the same are in derogation of the common law 
right to use land for all lawful purposes). 
Jerome County Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 1-3.01, setting for the policy statements 
consistent with the Comprehensive Plan, is an extension of the policy determination in guiding 
principles of the Comprehensive Plan. As the court wrote in Cooper v. Board of County 
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Commissioners of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407, 614 P.2d 947 (1980), 
"The plan embodies the policy determination and guiding principles; the 
zoning ordinances provide the detailed means of giving effect to those 
principles. " 
To that end, the Board here, in a careful analysis of the standards and criteria relevant to 
permitting new LCO facilities, focused upon Chapter 13 of the Jerome County Zoning Ordinance. 
Petitioners would assert that Jerome County Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 1-3.0 I, would allow for the 
Board to deny the LCO permit on the basis of generalized policy statements consistent with the 
Jerome County Comprehensive Plan. Without reconciling that Chapter with Chapter] 3 governing 
the permitting ofLCO's, it would allow for a Board to never allow for a pennit to issue for an LCO 
if the focus was solely upon Chapter 1-3.01. That certainly is unreasonable and violates the property 
rights of the permit seeker and his attendant development rights. The Board has the discretion to use 
the criteria considered relevant under their interpretation of their own governing zoning law. 
Therefore, without even referencing the above-referenced ordinances by Petitioners, the 
Board of Commissioners in this case in granting the permit application by the primary focus on 
Chapter 13, as the relevant Ordinance, in no way violated the rights of any individual and in fact was 
entirely consistent with the plainly stated intent of the legislature in both Idaho Code §67 -6519 and 
Idaho Code §67-6535. 
5. THE BOARD DID NOT FAIL TO FOLLOW ITS OWN PROCEDURES IN 
REFUSING TO ALLOW DEAN DIMOND TO REOPEN THE RECORD 
SUBSEQUENT TO THE COURT'S INITIAL REMAND UPON JUDICIAL REVIEW 
OF THE APPLICATION. 
Petitioners contend that the Board erred in failing to allow the record to be reopened with the 
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submission of additional evidence upon the motion made by Dean and Eden Dimond. 
On August 4,2008, Dean Dimond requested to submit additional evidence before the Board 
and reopen the record. In the Notice of Procedures for LCO Hearings before the Jerome County 
Board of Commissioners, reopening the record, it indicates that the Board may, for good cause 
demonstrated, reopen the record for purposes for receiving additional evidence. The procedure for 
reopening the record states: 
"The board shall decide a motion to reopen the record within a timely manner 
by way of oral or written decision." 
The procedure further indicates that: 
"The Board may, within time allowed herein, reopen the record for good 
cause on its own motion." (Supplemental Record, Volume II, pages 328-
329). 
In the minutes, the Board did consider Dimond's motion to reopen the record and submit 
additional evidence. The minutes do not reflect that Dimond established good cause for reopening 
the record. In fact, the discussion indicated that the Board had made its decision and was awaiting a 
written decision. The Board then voted to deny the motion to reopen the record by a vote of2 to 1. 
(Phase II, Agency Record, Page 56). 
Petitioners contend that the Board did not even "consider the motion". That is not the case. 
The Board considered the motion, and denied it because Dimond did not establish good cause to 
reopen the record. Dimond bore that burden. Petitioners do not cite any specific authority other than 
the Jerome County procedure to reopen the record in support of their contention. The Board did not 
act arbitrarily or capriciously in denying the motion to reopen the record. The Board followed its 
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own procedures, and in finding that good cause was not demonstrated, correctly denied the motion 
made by Dimond. 
6. THE BIG SKY APPLICATION WAS COMPLETE. 
Petitioners contend that the Big Sky LCO permit was incomplete. Three reasons are 
propounded in this regard, (1) all agencies had not completed their review and submitted letters; (2) 
application didn't include on its required map a well on Fred Stewart's property; and (3) lack of 
evidence in the application of a binding contractual agreement to export waste. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Board indicated that Jerome County Zoning Ordinance 
section 13-5.02(1), holds in relevant part that: 
"The board of county commissioners may place conditions on the livestock 
confinement operation as requested by the agencies." 
The Board determined that the applicant had submitted letters from all designated agencies 
listed in this section. (Phase II, Agency Record, Page 117). The Board then went on to list the 
specific comments of the Valley School District, the Northside Canal Company, two highway 
districts, Jerome and Hillsdale, and the Idaho Transportation Department which indicated it would 
approve the application submitted to it upon Big Sky meeting several conditions outlined by the 
Idaho Transportation Department. The Board concluded that the applicant has complied with these 
requirements. (Phase II, Agency Record, Page 119). 
The Board addressed the claim that the application did not include on its required map a well 
on Fred Stewart's property. In addressing this issue the Board wrote, 
"In disagreement to this "consistent conclusion" analysis is the Board's 
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dissenting voice, which is adamant that existing wells and sink holes are not 
shown on the site map as required by sections (e) and (t), respectively. 
However, despite the adamancy, no support of such assertions, to a degree 
that would allow the majority to feel validly persuaded, is offered. The 
dissent's assertions are based solely on the testimony ofMr. Fred StewaI1 and 
Mr. James Stewart. In our original decision, the Board did consider the 
testimony of the Stewart's. But that testimony was not only weighed by the 
Board against the evidence that contradicted it, but the Board also weighed 
the basis of the Stewart's knowledge as to the facts they were testifying to. 
At the conclusion of this process, and for the reasons stated in our original 
decision, the Board made findings of fact that all existing wells were shown 
on the parcel/vicinity map, and that the site map showed no sink holes 
because none existed." (Agency Record, Page 113). 
The Board went on to state: 
"The Board's reliance on section 13-5.02 in its original decision, along with 
its analysis of the facts pertinent to that section, was undisturbed by the 
District Court. Therefore, the discussion the Board had on the 13-5.02 
requirements, as wells the Board's findings and conclusions on those 
requirements stated in our original decision, is adopted and incorporated into 
this decision, as if asserted herein. Based on these findings and conclusions, 
the Board once again finds Big Sky's application to be complete and in 
compliance with Jerome County Zoning Ordinance, section 13-5.02." 
(Agency Record, Page 114). 
In the Board's original Decision, in addressing the Stewart's well, wrote, 
"Mr. Stewart also argued that the application was not complete on the bases 
that a domestic well was not shown on the vicinity map as required by 13-
5.02(e)(1). Mr. Stewart only stated that a domestic well did exist and that it 
was within a mile radius of the proposed facility. However, he did not 
identify this well or point to where it was located. He simply stated, "But you 
can ask my father. He's got a domestic well that's within that mile range that 
is not on that map, so that part is incomplete." Mr. Stewart presented no 
other evidence in regard to this issue. His father, Mr. Fred Stewart, did 
testify that map being used for reference purposes of the hearing did not show 
his culinary well (Hearing Tr. Page 46), although he did not state such well 
was in fact less than a mile from the proposed facility." 
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The Board went on to write, 
"However, Mr. James Stewart claims that a domestic well exists within the 
mile radius that is not shown on the map. This claim however, is all Mr. 
James Stewart offers. He does not point to where on map this "missing" well 
is located, or give any other type of evidence that would support its 
existence. " 
The Board continues in writing, 
"Somewhat contrary to this testimony is that of Mr. Matt Thompson's, Big 
Sky's consultant, who testified, 
"We've gone through a tremendous amount of effort to give 
you an application that is as detailed as possible. I would 
dare say this is probably the most detailed CAFO application 
that Jerome County's received." (Hearing Tr. Page 114). 
"In consideration of all of the above, the Board finds and concludes that the 
vicinity map submitted by the applicant does identify several domestic wells 
in the area of that property identified as Mr. Fred Stewart's. These wells are 
within a mile radius of the proposed facility and thus are correctly identified 
on the map. The evidence does not support that there is an additional 
domestic well that is not one of those already identified on the vicinity map. 
Therefore, the Board finds the application complete as to this issue." (Phase 
I, Volume III, Page CC-48, Page 4, Memorandum Decision). 
By the lengthy reasoning in both Memorandum Decisions, the Board weighed the claims 
made by the Stewart's, and additional evidence, and concluded, by exhaustive reasoning, that the 
application was complete as to the wells being included on the map. 
In the instant Memorandum Decision, the Board went into great detail regarding the claim 
that the application lacked an agreement to export waste. Petitioners cite Jerome County Zoning 
Ordinance 13-2.01(a) which indicates in part, 
"Animal waste products, including sprinkled waste, shall not leave the 
property of the operator, unless the operator has agreed with another party to 
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disburse animal waste products on that persons' property." 
Petitioners contend that this requires a binding contractual agreement. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Board specifically cited Jerome County Ordinance, Chapter 
13, section 13-2.01. The Board writes, 
"This section requires a waste distribution plan for all waste produced from 
Big Sky's operation, and which prevents any of the waste generated from that 
operation from leaving its facility unless there's a third party agreement for 
such waste to be sprinkled on the third party's property." (Phase II, Agency 
Record, Page 114). 
The Board, in interpreting its own zoning ordinance, continues in writing, 
"Upon examination, it does not appear that the agreement referred to has to 
be made prior to the permit being issued. That is to say, this section only 
requires an agreement be made before any waste leaves the LCO's property. 
It does not require that if there is going to be an agreement, such agreement 
be made prior to the issuance of the permit." (Phase II, Agency Record, Page 
115). 
However, even with that interpretation, the Board found that there was an agreement 
submitted and writes, 
"As indicated, it does not appear that such an agreement needs to exist before 
the application can be approved. In this regard, the agreement is not an 
element of the application process that needs to be satisfied at this time. 
Nevertheless, any disagreement to this conclusion would be satisfied by the 
fact that the record does show 'an agreement" that would satisfy 13-2.01. A 
waste distribution was placed into evidence. That plan does indicate that an 
agreement had been made between Big Sky and an individual named Mr. 
Gott, who agreed to accept 8,000 lbs of waste from Big Sky LCO. Big Sky's 
engineering consultant, Matt Thompson, further testified to this agreement at 
the hearing." (September 25 Hearing Tr. Pages 97-130). 
"The record is void [sic] as to any details that would qualify this agreement, 
but regardless, an agreement nonetheless, was made, is in evidence, and has 
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not been disputed in any significant manner by the record. Therefore, the 
ordinance, and specifically the provisions of 13-2.01, cannot be just 
substituted in our previous decision and used as a basis of support for that 
decision." (Phase II, Agency Record, Pages 116-117). 
This court must give deference to the Board of County Commissioners reasoning and 
application of their relevant zoning ordinance in reaching the decision for permit issuance in this 
case. There is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of actions of zoning boards, and such 
presumption can only be overcome by showing that the ordinance, as applied, is arbitrary, 
unreasonable, capricious and confiscatory. (Ready to Pour, Inc. v. lvfcCoy, 95 Idaho 510, 511 P.2d 
792 (1973)). This presumption extends to validity being favored of actions of zoning authorities 
when applying and interpreting their own zoning ordinances. (Howard v. Canyon County Board of 
Commissioners, 128 Idaho 479, 915 P.2d 709 (1996); Sanders Orchardv. Gem County, 137 Idaho 
695,52 P.3d 840 (2002); Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193,207 P.3d 169 (2009)). 
Through its quasi-judicial capacity, in weighing the evidence and credibility of same, the 
Board appropriately interpreted its ordinance and weighed the evidence in the record in finding that 
the parameters of a waste agreement had existed to satisfy that criteria. Therefore, the Board's 
conclusions that the application was complete, was made after a careful analysis of the record and 
contested facts. 
7. THE SEPTEMBER 23,2008 MEMORANDUM DECISION DOES CONSTITUTE 
A REASONED STATEMENT. 
Petitioners contend that the Board's September 23,2008 Memorandum Decision is deficient 
as a reasoned statement. The ten page Decision of the Board cogently addressed the mandate of the 
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District Court on remand. Pursuant to the court's directive, the factors the Board may consider in 
granting or denying an LCO permit application were stated as: 
(1) Whether the application is complete; 
(2) Whether the proposed site is located in the agricultural A-I zone; and 
(3) A vague and generalized requirement that the application comply with the provisions 
of Chapter 13 and the Jerome County Zoning Ordinance. (Agency Record, Page 112). 
These were the substantive factors the Board applied under their own interpretation of their own 
relevant zoning ordinance and in compliance with the court's order. 
From a review of the Board's Decision, the Board review relevant contested evidence and 
applied same to the ordinance criteria requirements. The Board reasoned that if all thirteen 
requirements, subsection (a) through (m), of section 13-5.02, have been complied with, the LCO 
application is complete. The Board reiterated, from its previous Decision, that the evidence 
supported their finding that all subsections were satisfied. The contested issues, subsections (e), (f) 
and (1) were discussed in lucid detail based upon the evidence. (Agency Record, Pages 112-114). 
The Board concluded, in weighing conflicting evidence that all existing wells were shown on 
the parcel/vicinity map. The Board engaged in a specific discussion weighing the evidence regarding 
the wells shown and contested and, once again, concluded that the criteria has been met and 
complied with. (Agency Record, Pages 113-114). 
The Board additionally addressed the waste distribution plan and appropriate criteria within 
its ordinance governing same. In its interpretation of its ordinance and the specific evidence 
regarding export agreements, the Board wrote a lengthy analysis of the relevant criteria and specific 
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evidence regarding application contents regarding a waste export agreement and concluded the 
criteria had been met. (Agency Record, Pages 114-116). 
The Board carefully enumerated specific agency concerns and ordered approval of the 
application subject to several conditions. (Agency Record, Page 119). The Petitioners argue that 
the Board failed to give adequate weight to the vast documentary evidence submitted by Dean 
Dimond, National Park Service, and other opponents. 5 
In the instant case, the Board articulmed a lengthy analysis weighing the standards and 
criteria of their relevant, zoning law and relevant contested facts. Here, the Memorandum Decision 
is supported by substantial, competent evidence. A court shall defer to findings of fact of County 
Board of Commissioners that are supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting evidence. 
(Davisco Foods, Inc. v. Gooding County, 141 Idaho 784, 118 P .3d 116 (2005); Cowan v. Board of 
Commissioners v. Freemont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006)). 
The court is constrained to examine the Board's findings to determine if they are supported 
by substantial, competent evidence. The court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board 
on questions of fact. (Galli v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155, 191 P.3d 233 (2008); Wohrle v. 
Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 267, 207 P.3d 998 (2009)). 
So long as the findings, conclusions and decision of the Board of County Commissioners are 
sufficiently detailed to demonstrate that it considered applicable standards and reached a reasoned 
decision, the court will find that the Decision was not arbitrary and capricious and was based upon 
5 Neil King, Superintendent for the National Park Service, testified at the hearing in opposition in addition to 
submitting written documentary evidence. (Phase I, Tr. Pages 26-29). 
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substantial evidence in the record. (Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193,207 P.3d 169 (2009)). 
Courts have further ruled that substantial and competent evidence is more than a scintilla of 
proof, but less than a preponderance; it is relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept to 
support a conclusion. (Afancilla v. Greg, 131 Idaho 685, 963 P .2d 368 (1998); Jarvis v. Rexburg 
Nursing Center, 136 Idaho 579, 38 P.3d 617 (2001); Lane Ranch Partnership v. City of Sun Valley, 
144 Idaho 584, 166 P.3d 374 (2007)). 
Petitioners maintain that the evidence referred to in the Board's Decision was a mere fraction 
of the contested facts in the record. However, the Board, as any tribunal rendering a decision based 
upon a large body of evidence, applied the relevant facts to the appropriate standards and criteria and 
I rendered a reasoned decision. In any contested case, the opposing sides may articulate, after the fact, 
relevant points to further advocate opposing views. 
Certainly, in this case, ample fodder exists for either side to further propound argument to the 
Board. Here, the Board far surpassed the threshold required for articulating a reasoned statement 
and, through a lengthy analysis, referenced substantial and competent, albeit conflicting, evidence to 
support its Memorandum Decision. It should therefore be upheld in all respects. 
8. ATTORNEYS' FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED TO INTERVENORS. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117, the Court shall award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorneys' fees .. .if the Court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The courts have further noted that they will award attorneys' fees on appeal under Idaho Code 
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§ 12-117 if it is found that the losing parting acted without a reasonable basis in law or in fact. 
(Marcia T Turner, LLC v. City a/Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P.3d 840 (2007); Giltner Dairy, 
LLCv. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630,181 P.3d 1238 (2008). 
The Intervenors ability to move forward on permit issuance has been egregiously delayed by 
the Petitioners in this matter. Petitioners have proceeded without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
For these reasons, fees should be awarded to Intervenors in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /e day of February, 2010. 
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP 
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Jerome County, a Political Sub-Division of the State ) 
ofIdaho, Joseph Davidson, Charles Howell, and ) 
Diana Obenauer, Members of the Jerome County ) 




South View Dairy, an Idaho General Partnership, ) 
Tony Visser, William DeJong and Ryan Visser, ) 
general partners, ) 
) 
) 
As an overall matter, Petitioners, Friends of Minidoka, et a!., continue to be greatly 
concerned with the way the County Respondents cavalierly disregard the seriousness of the due 
process violations set forth by Friends of Minidoka. Such disregard is first evidenced in the brief 
by the County's vague response to Friends of Minidoka's statement of facts. The remainder of the 
County's brief rhetorically disregards the cases and propositions articulated by Friends of 
Minidoka, but fails to cite cases to the contrary or analyze in any meaningful way the authorities 
cited by Friends. 
South View, on the other hand, takes an expectedly narrow view of the relevant ordinances, 
state law, and general due process requirements applicable to this case, in an apparent attempt to 
draw the Court away from the numerous constitutional and procedural irregularities present in this 
proceeding. 
I. POINTS ADDRESSING RESPONDENTS' AND INTERVENORS' STATEMENT OF 
FACTS. 
The Court should note at the outset that neither the County nor South View dispute the facts 




(3) Statement of the Case. 
A statement of the case to the extent that the respondent disagrees with the statement of the 
case set forth in appellant's brief. 
The County merely references the facts from Judge Bevan's original decision remanding the matter 
to the Board, even though most of the facts pertinent to this phase of the litigation were not even 
relevant in the judicial review request filed by Big Sky because the County originally denied Big 
Sky's permit application. Such a casual reference does not amount to a disagreement. 
Consequently, as the facts are not disputed, this Court may take Friends of Minidoka's facts as 
admitted. 
With respect to South View, Friends of Minidoka takes issue with many of South View's 
purported recitations of fact as they are provided without support in the record or constitute 
misplaced attorney argument. For example, South View recites the Beef Cattle Environmental 
Control Act (BCECA) in the fact section (Intervenors' Brief, p.5) when it should be argument. 
Nonetheless, the BCECA has been recently been found by the Idaho Supreme Court, nowhere 
mentioned by South View, not to preempt county ordinances. See Idaho Dairymen's Federation v. 
Gooding County, 2010 Supreme Court ofIdaho Op. No. 12 at *6 & *13, 2010 LEXIS 25 at *6 & 
* 13 (feb. 1, 20 10)(state did not mean to preempt local authority to regulate the siting and conditions 
of placement for CAFOs, including water quality). Similarly, South View incorrectly argues in the 
fact section (Intervenors' Brief, p. 6) that the ISDA' s approval of the Nutrient Management Plan 
somehow absolves Jerome County of its duty to protect its citizens from large animal feeding 
operation pollution. This statement is both factually and legally incorrect. Even the suspect Idaho 
statutory language concerning large confined animal feeding operations states that "A board of 
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county commissioners may reject a site regardless of the approval or rejection of the site by a state 
agency." IC 67-6529(2). 
South View then grossly misleads the Court when it states "vast written testimony and 
exhibits ... inclusive of [that submitted by] Pat Brown," yet does not cite to any record of documents 
submitted by Pat Brown. Intervenors' Brief, pp.8-9. In fact, there are no such documents because 
Pat Brown was never able to submit documents on behalf of his clients. See, e.g., Supp. Rec., Vol. 
II, pp. 303-05. 
In yet another instance when South View does cite to the record (Intervenors' Brief, p. 10), 
it does so incorrectly. South View implies that Dean Dimond's motion to reopen the record was 
fully heard and rejected. In fact, M:. Dimond's attempt to reopen the record was sLlmmarily denied 
without even reading it because the Board's counsel, based upon objection by South View's 
counsel, Supp. Rec., Vol. II, p. 324 (BOC refused to hear the motion "which they stated they had 
not read although they had read Mr. Lothspeich's objection"), gave the commissioners the incorrect 
advice that the Board could only consider "whether the application was complete because the 
county ordinance does not give the board any authority to reject or approve an application except on 
the basis of whether it is complete." Phase II, AR, p. 55. As set forth in Friends of Minidoka's 
Opening Brief (pp. 35-38), and as further discussed infra (pp. 11-13), this position is incorrect as a 
matter of Jerome County's own zoning ordinances. Judge Bevan's decision did not require that 
Jerome County approve the LCO application on remand, only that it determine if there were "some 
other valid basis upon which to deny the Big Sky's LCO permit application," Phase II, AR, p. 38 
(emphasis in original), besides relying "solely on factors set forth in the Comprehensive Plan." Id. 
at 35 (emphasis added). The Court went to state in a subheading of its decision that "The Matter is 
'Remanded for Further Proceedings as Necessary, ' but the Board is not Specifically Directed to 
Issue the Permit." Id. at 36 (emphasis in original). Jerome County clearly missed this direction. 
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South View then goes on to say that "inappropriate comments [were] made by Commission 
members to the local newspaper regarding the sale of the property ... ", again without any record 
citation to support its statement. Intervenors' Brief, p. 10. 
The above inaccuracies and failures to rely upon the record, along with South View's 
"statement of facts," belie its efforts to convince this Court of its position. 
II. PETITIONERS'STANDING. 
Friends of Minidoka provided the extensive standing infonnation to this Court to protect the 
record going forward. Now Friends of Minidoka feels constrained to spend far more time than 
desired to respond to the scattershot and unsupported, challenges to standing. The County appears 
to oppose everyone's standing, while Intervenors appear to at least concede the Dimond family's 
standing. Intervenors' Brief, pp. 16-17 (" ... Petitioners have tried to assert their claims on the 
shoulders of the Dimond family"). Certainly, the Dimond's have standing because they live and 
own property adjacent to the proposed facility. J Going to the petitioner organizations, first Idaho 
Rural Council has identified Dean, Eden, Harold and Carolyn Dimond as members. Carlson Aff., 
p. 1. While Dean and Eden Dimond were allowed to submit documents as part of the application 
process, Harold and Carolyn were not allowed to submit more than one page, and only then at the 
hearing, even though they own and operate a fann that borders nearly one mile of the proposed 
LCO. Supp. Rec., Vol. I, pp. 191-92. Harold and Carolyn Dimond's testimony at the hearing was 
replete with claims of injury-in-fact, such as waste draining onto their fa1111 (Phase I, Trans., p.222), 
yet they were prevented from entering evidence of such injury because of the unconstitutional 
restrictions on residency and testimony. Furthermore, Respondents and Intervenors apparently 
failed to even read Friends of Minidoka's brief, which sets forth some of the specific injuries to 
J See 4 Am. Law. Zoning 42:8 (1, 6) (5 th ed.) (affected landowners have standing as do 
organizations in representative capacity). 
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specific members. See, e.g., Petitioners' Opening Brief at 8-9 (IRC members Carolyn and Harold 
Dimond), 10 (ICARE Director Hasse mentioned members living in proximity to proposed LCO 
site; Hasse Aff., paras. 13-14 (Jim Ste\vart and Dick Helsley identified as ICARE members)). The 
record itself sets forth many more of the specific injuries which would be suffered by the operation 
of the proposed LCO. For instance, both Jim Stewart and Dick Helsley testified about the how their 
lives and property would be impacted by the proposed facility. See Phase I, Trans., pp. 308-318 
(Stewart), 240-242 (Helsley-worried, among other things, about propel1y devaluation from 
proximity to proposed facility). 
With respect to ICARE, Respondents ignore the record and state that Alma Hasse was at the 
hearing as an individual. Respondents' Brief, p. 18 ("when Ms. Hasse appeared at the Big Sky 
hearing and provided comment, she was doing such in her individual capacity."). This 
misrepresentation directly flies in the face of Ms. Hasse's testimony where she stated at variolls 
points: "I'm the executive director ofICARE," Phase I, Trans., p. 259; "Our [ICARE's] mission is 
pretty straightforward," id. at 261; and even more directly: "And I believe that gives me standing 
and the right to speak here at this meeting on behalf of ICARE and our affected members." Id. at 
262 (emphasis added). If this isn't enough to prove representational capacity, virtually every e-mail 
sent to the County by Ms. Hasse identifies her as "Alma Hasse, Executive Director ofICARE." 
See, e.g., Supp. Rec., Vol. II, pp. 289-299. 
The other organizations also have standing to pursue their interests to protect the Minidoka 
National Historic Site from odors, flies, impacts on aesthetic qualities, etc., and to ensure that they 
receive their procedural due process rights to attempt to protect the site, as set f0!1h below, infra at 
section lILA (immediately below). 
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III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. 
A. Petitioners have properly raised issues about the constitutionality of the process 
followed by the county. 
On page 11 of its brief, South View argues that Friends of Minidoka amended its petition 
pursuant to the ruling in Euclid Avenue Trust v. City of Boise, 146 Idaho 306, 193 P.3d 853 (2008) 
in order to abandon the declaratory judgment counts. This proposition is true in the sense that the 
amended petition no longer seeks a declaration of rights as a separate cause of action from the 
judicial review proceeding. But by amending the petition, Friends of Minidoka has not abandoned 
its contention that the County acted unconstitutionally by depriving the Slones and petitioner 
organizations and their members of meaningful notice and opportuni ty to participate. Simply put, 
the petitioners are entitled to due process, notwithstanding the County's attempt to persuade the 
Court that some combination ofIC 67-6529 and the Jerome County Zoning Ordinance provide 
otherwise. 
The petitioners are entitled to challenge the constitutionality via judicial review pursuant to 
IC 67-5279. Paragraph (3) of that statute empowers the courts to determine whether the County 
acted "(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of statutory authority; 
(c) upon lawful procedure; (d) without being supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole; or (e) arbitrarily, capriciously or by abusing discretion." Ie 67-5279(3)( emphasis added). If 
the court determines, on judicial review, that the County has violated any of those five criteria and 
substantial rights have been prejudiced, it must set aside the County's granting of the pennit. [d. 
Accordingly, the Court should decline to accept any proposition that it lacks power in the 
judicial review process to "declare" that the petitioners have been unconstitutionally denied due 
process. 
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Respondents also argue that Friends of Minidoka never raised constitutional issues at the 
hearings and thus did not exhaust its remedies. Respondents' Brief at 24. Once again, Respondents 
failed to read Friends of Minidoka's brief and its own record. While it is not necessary to raise 
constitutional claims before an agency, Friends of Minidoka specifically pointed out numerous 
instances, e.g., Petitioners' Opening Brief, pp. 6, 8-10, where due process concerns, including those 
specific "due process" words, were raised by Petitioner members. See also, e.g., Phase I, Trans., p. 
90, lines 10-11 (Lee Halper- ICARE member (Hasse Aff., para. 15)- "due process rights have been 
violated"); Phase I, Trans., p. 217, lines 7-12 (Carolyn Dimond- IRC member (Carlson Aff., p. 1)-
same); Phase I, Trans., p. 309, lines 13-22 (Jim Stewart- ICARE member (Hasse Aff., para. 13)-
same ). 
In addition, Friends of Minidoka, Japanese American Citizens League, National Trust for 
Historic Preservation and Preservation Idaho, all attested that they had members in Jerome County 
or documented their special interests in the Minidoka site and the effects that a l3,OOO head heifer 
operation would have on their members and the site. See, e.g., Momohara Aff., paras. 5-9; 
Yoshitomi Aff., paras. 5-8,11; Hartig Aff., paras. 5, 8-11; Everhart Aff., 4,7-9. The "Catch-22" 
presented by both Respondents' and Intervenors' standing arguments is that they say that the 
petitioners failed to present evidence of haml from the proposed LCO. But as representati ves of 
the petitioner organizations testified, both at the hearing and in their affidavits submitted for 
standing, they were prevented from submitting just the kind of documentation about "affects from 
large CAFOs [concentrated animal feeding operations]" (a synonym for Jerome County's LCO 
nomenclature) that would have further established their injury. See id.; see also, e.g., Phase I, 
Trans., pp. 88, 90, 217, 221, 263 (all indicating that limitations on presentation of evidence to the 
Board made it impossible to fully document their concerns and particularized injuries). While Dean 
Dimond did present substantive infonnation about the adverse health effects from large CAFOs, 
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see, e.g., Phase I, Vol. II, pp. 106-118, others were prevented from doing so. In any case, the Board 
arbitrarily and capriciously ignored documentation about off-site CAFO impacts in its decision on 
remand. 
B. All of the petitioners are entitled to due process protections. 
South View and the County argue that the Slones and other petitioners are not entitled to or 
"eligible" to receive due process. 2 The problem with these arguments is that they are based on 
nothing more than the misguided idea that eligibility for constitutional due process is somehow 
limited to those who reside within one mile of the proposed facility. It is, however, the state and 
federal constitutions that make the Slones eligible for due process because they have an undisputed 
property interest by virtue of their ownership ofland adjacent to the CAFO site. No attempt to 
invoke some "residency" requirement from a combination ofIC 67-6529 and the Jerome County 
Zoning Ordinance will defeat the constitutional protection afforded to those who have a "property 
interest" like the petitioners who own real estate next to the proposed site. Thus, for instance, the 
United States Supreme Court stated that it had "made clear that the property interests protected by 
procedural due process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate." Board of Regents of 
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972); see also River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland 
Park, 23 F.3d 164, 166 (Th Cir. 1994) (land owner had protectable interest in land that it owned in 
fee simple). 
In this case, the Slones' ownership of the property is enough to require individual notice, 
whether or not they reside on it. The County ordinance in effect as of May, 2007, unequivocally 
2 South View also errantly attempts to find a purpose in IC 67-6529's restriction on public 
participation, but in doing so conflates the principles of protections to the public in the fom1 of 
setbacks, a worthy requirement, with the outright limitations on public participation present in 
this case. The point missed by South View in its attempt to build a large CAFO to the detriment 
of others around the facility, is that the public participation requirements are intended to bring 
about better public protections, whereas the one mile residency restriction for providing 
testimony and documentary evidence can only result in lesser public protections. 
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required individual notice. Supp. Rec., Vol. 1, p. 20 ("The Administrator shall also send notice by 
mail to all property owners within one mile of the boundaries of the contiguous property owned by 
the applicant of the proposed LCO pursuant to Idaho Code 67-6529.")(emphases added). 
Furthermore, the JCZO provided, in pertinent part, that property interests were to be 
protected by way of application of Chapter 1-6.01 which stated that "every citizen of Jerome 
County shall at all times have the right to appear in person or through his attorney .. . before the ... 
Board ... to freely petition for the relief of an alleged burden created by this ordinance .... " Supp. 
Rec., Vol. II, p. 360 (emphases added). These procedural rights, affimled by ordinance, were 
ignored by the Board in this case to the prejUdice of the petitioners. MUltiple petitioners were 
denied the opportunity to be represented by counsel, while all were denied a meaningful 
opportunity to seek relief from the burdens that a large CAFO would cause. 
This Court should also know that in August, 2007, just over one month before the hearing in 
this matter (and reaffirmed in additional September 2008 amendments), the County liberalized its 
limitation on submission of documentary evidence. SUpp. Rec., Vol. I, pp. 105 (13-7.01), 130 (13-
6.02),134-35 (23-5.02(F». The new limitation, attempting to correct the earlier due process 
violations, removed entirely the primary residency requirement, excluded any reference to Idaho 
Code 67-6529, and allowed "all members of the public desiring to present oral or written comment, 
or documentary evidence, ... [to do so] as set forth in Chapter 23 .... " Jd. Chapter 23, in tum, 
provided for submission of potentially unlimited documentary evidence as long as it was provided 
no later than seven days prior to hearing. Jd. at 108 (23-6.02 (F». This amendment still restricted 
submission of documents at the hearing to one side of an 812 x 11 inch piece of paper. Jd. These 
amendments evidence the County's recognition that the one mile residency restriction at issue in 
this case was indeed an unconstitutional restriction on fundamental due process rights of members 
of the affected public. If this same hearing were held today, all of the petitioners in this case would 
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have been able to submit the kind of documentary evidence that they either tried to or desired to 
submit, but were prevented from doing so. 
The process due is not mere general notice of the application, as the County rationalizes, or 
of some availability of proceedings, as South View urges. Their positions cannot be squared with 
the notice requirements of the state and federal constitutions, Jerome County ordinance, and recent 
Idaho case law that drew into question the restrictions set forth in IC 67-6529. As a matter of law, 
procedural due process requires that notice be given so that the opportunity to be heard occurs at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Neighbors for a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 
145 Idaho 121, 176 P.3d 126, 132 (2007) (citations omitted). Procedural due process may be 
satisfied by following reasonable statutory and ordinance requirements, but those requirements 
must also satisfy the meaningfulness requirements. As further explained below, the County applied 
its view of those requirements not to confer meaningful opportunity to be heard to the petitioners, 
but rather to deprive them of that opportunity. 
C. The only notice that the Slones received provided no meaningful opportunity to 
be heard. 
Under the ordinances, actual notice is required to be achieved by providing written notice to 
property owners. Supp. Rec., Vol. I, p. 20. Curiously though, that notice requirement then 
indicates that only those with their primary residence within a one mile radius of the proposed site 
may provide written comments for the hearing. Furthermore, the requirement states that written 
comment must be submitted to the Administrator within 15 days after publication of the notice in a 
newspaper, and also presumably from the date individual notice was required to be sent to certain 
property owners. In this case, the required notice document was not mailed to the Slones until 
September 14, 2007, even though the public notice for the September 25-26 hearing was published 
in a newspaper on August 23, 2007. 
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In short, no one can dispute that the County first mailed notice to the Slones on September 
14, some seven days after the written comment period had closed on September 7. See Phase I, 
Vol. I, pp. 46-47 (County admits Slones "not notified with original thirty-seven (37) property 
owners"). No one can honestly say that the Slones had reasonable notice of an opportunity to 
submit written comments. 
Thus, the only notice that the Slones had was that they could present oral testimony (and a 
one-page written comment) on September 25 or 26. The Slones' counsel not only immediately 
notified the County of the due process problems and of his unavailability on those dates (Supp. 
Rec., Vol. II, p. 304), but also that counsel needed copies of other materials from the County 
immediately in order to prepare for and make a presentation at any hearing. Id. at pp. 304-05: see 
also Supp. Rec., Vol. II, p. 360 (JCZO 1-6.01- providing right to be represented by counsel). 
The County responded in two ways. First, it scheduled and held a hearing on September 24 
about whether to vacate the September 25 proceedings due to notice problems and counsel's 
unavailability. Phase I, Vol. III, Documentation marked as exhibits CC45-CC94, p. 58. But it did 
not inform the Slones or their counsel of that hearing, nor make a verbatim record of that hearing 
where it apparently decided not to give the Slones or their counsel an opportunity to present 
evidence or oral argument, except on the 25 th or 26th of September. See id. 
The second way the County responded is even more telling. The County infonned Mr. 
Brown that the records requested in his letter of September 13 would not be available for him to 
pick up until Monday, September 24,2007. Supp. Rec., Vol. II, p. 309 (September 21,2007 letter 
from Art Brown to Patrick Brown). And the County's billing shows the application file and related 
materials were so voluminous it took them 13 hours of staff time to produce and copy them. Id. 
In short, South View and the County would have the Court believe that the County may take 
from September 13 until September 24 to copy the pertinent files, produce that volume of material 
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the day before the hearing, and still argue with a straight face that it provided the Slones and their 
counsel a meaningful opportunity to prepare and present evidence the following day. 
D. The cases the County and South View rely on are not analogous to the Slones' 
circumstances. 
In Cowan v. Board o/Commissioners o/Fremont County, 143 Ida. 501,148 P.3d 1247 
(2006), the party complaining of a due process violation was not substantially prejudiced by a due 
process violation because the attorney for the party had spoken at length at a hearing and presented 
evidence both at the hearing on the preliminary plat and a hearing before the Board involved. 
Similarly, in Neighbors/or a Healthy Gold Fork v. Valley County, 145 Ida. 121, 176 P.3d 126, the 
party complaining was not substantially prejudiced by due process violations because that party's 
attorney availed himself of the opportuni ty to submit a binder of exhibits and written objections. 
The party had also availed itself of the opportunity at a hearing to offer oral testimony and written 
exhibits. 
In stark contrast, the Slones were not allowed verbal or written submissions at any point in 
time. In short, they were denied any reasonable opportunity to meaningfully participate. 
IV. FAILURE TO ISSUE A REASONED DECISION. 
In addition to the points raised in its opening brief, Friends of Minidoka further emphasizes 
the example of the disconnect between the first decision denying the permit application and the 
decision after remand that granted it. In the first decision, the Board based much of its denial on 
concerns over phosphorus contamination of soil at the site and its consequences for the overall 
well-being of the county. Phase I, Vol. III, Documentation marked as exhibits CC45-CC94, pp.51-
52. Yet the Board dropped this issue altogether in issuing its grant of the pennit application, 
without any change in factual circumstances, by relying on incorrect advice of counsel that it could 
only base its decision on whether the application was complete. See Phase II, AR, pp.3-4. What 
13 
the County failed to do was simply apply the ordinance that incorporated the Comprehensive Plan, 
namely JClO 1-3.01 and the standards set forth therein which were meant to provide, among other 
things, "[aJssurance that the important environmental features of the county are protected and 
enhanced." Supp. Rec., Vol. II, p.359 (l-3.01(h)). Such environmental features include assuring 
"that phosphate and other waste products will be disposed of properly [in a way that] will guarantee 
that Jerome County soils remain vibrant for future generations to come, and do not die from an 
ever-increasing accumulation of such waste." Phase I, Vol. III, Documentation marked as exhibits 
CC45-CC94, p. 52. The County decision to protect its agricultural soils was even based on 
underestimated phosphorus loads from manure. Alma Hasse attempted to submit evidence, denied 
by the County based on the one mile residency rule, that shows that the phosphorus numbers were 
perhaps as low as one-half of the true amounts of phosphorus present in the manure. SUpp. Rec., 
Vol. II, pp. 273-75. If the County applied all of its required ordinances, as Friends of Minidoka 
asks this Court to direct the County to do/ it could still protect the soils of Jerome County by 
applying lClO 1-3.01 to its decision along with the Comprehensive Plan. 
As Judge Bevan said in his order on remand, "there is a possibility that the Board may find 
some other valid basis upon which to deny Big Sky's LCO permit application."4 Phase II, AR, p. 
38 (emphasis in original). Both 1-3.01 and 1-6.01 of the JClO provide that valid basis. These 
sections of the ordinance constitute requirements for the County to follow to weigh substantive 
evidence, much of which was unconstitutionally precluded in this case, to comply with the purposes 
of its Comprehensive Plan and to protect the property rights of nearby residents. Part of the 
3 See Urrutia vs. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (2000), citing Price v. Payette 
County Bd. Of County Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 431,958 P.2d 583, 588 ("where an appellate 
court reverses or vacates a judgment upon an issue properly raised, and remands for further 
proceedings, it may give guidance for other issues on remand. It). 
4 Judge Bevan was fully apprised of Southview's argument to the effect that the Board must 
approve the application if it is complete, but was not persuaded by it. See id. 
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purpose of issuing a written decision is for the reviewing court to know what standards a county 
applied and whether it followed its own laws. The Board's decision cannot be considered 
"reasoned" when it fails to substantially comply with its own ordinances as required by law. I.C. 
67-6535(b); see also, e.g., Taylor v. Ed. GjCounty Comm 'rs, 124 Idaho 393, 401,860 P.2d 8,17 
(Ct. App. 1993) (county must comply with its own ordinances). 
V. INCOMPLETE APPLICATION. 
While Friends of Minidoka recognizes the high hurdle it must jump for this Court to 
overturn a finding of fact, there is no more compelling opportunity to overturn a finding of fact than 
the matter of whether Big Sky identified all wells within one mile of the proposed facility. The 
Board relied upon a paid consultant for the applicant instead a man who lived on his own property 
and the used the well at issue for much of his 90 years. Fred Stewart owns several farms directly 
cast of the proposed LCO. Phase I, Trans., pp. 46-50. At page 46, lines 24-25, he tells the Board 
(referring to the applicants' maps that are supposed to delineate all wells) "the plat there doesn't 
show my culinary well, but it's there." At page 49, line 2-3, responding to a request by Chainnan 
Howell to do so, Mr. Stewart pointed out on the applicant's map where his fan11S were and 
specifically where his domestic well is located- the one that was not delineated on applicant's map. 
Furthermore, Fred's son, Jim Stewart, referred to the undelineated well that his father owns in his 
closing statement to the Board: "Is-there is a domestic well missing on their map. It's on- if you 
like- well, I'djust as soon not point it out. I'm kind of tired of doing Matt's homework for him 
[referring to Matt Thompson, applicant's engineer who was responsible for preparing the inaccurate 
map of domestic wells]. But you can ask my father. He's got a domestic well that's within that 
mile range that is not on that map, so that part is incomplete." Phase I, Trans., pp. 314 (lines 22-
25) and. 315 (lines 1-3). 
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With respect to both Fred Stewart's well and another well on Harold Dimond's property, 
Dean Dimond tried to address the hearing discrepancies in his motion to reopen the record on 
August 4,2008 (post remand), but was denied an opportunity to do so. See SUpp. Rec., Vol. II, p. 
324. The failure to reopen the record constitutes a procedural irregularity while the failure to take 
the word of a life-long resident about his own property over that of a paid consultant who had no 
access to Mr. Stewart's land constitutes reversible error. 
VI. FRIENDS OF MINIDOKA IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES. 
Based on the multiple errors by the County, Friends of Minidoka is entitled to attorneys fees 
and costs. Neither the County nor South View has a colorable claim for fees against Friends of 
Minidoka as it is the County who violated the petitioners' rights to due process and a fair and 
reasoned decision. Furthennore, attorney fees are not to be awarded against petitioners where the 
losing party brought the appeal in good faith and where a genuine issue of law was presented, as it 
bas been in this case. Minich v. Gem State Developers, 99 Idaho 911,918,591 P.2d 1078, 1085 
(1979) (addressing IC §12-121). 
CONCLUSION 
Friends of Minidoka respectfully requests that this Court find that the County has violated 
the procedural due process rights of the petitioners and other procedural irregularities as set forth in 
the briefs and established throughout the record. Specifically, the violations by the County include 
lack of notice and opportunity to be heard as it regards the Slones, lack of opportunity for all 
petitioners to be allowed to meaningfully participate in the application review process because of 
the refusal by the County to allow submission of substantial documentation of affected parties' 
claims, failure of the County to follow its own ordinances, failure to allow reopening of the record 
pursuant to its own procedures, failure to issue a reasoned statement, and incorrectly finding the 
application complete. Each one of these violations by itselfis enough to vacate the County's permit 
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grant of September 23, 2008. Friends of Minidoka further respectfully requests that this Court 
remand the matter to the Board with specific instructions to require a new public hearing without 
restriction as to predetermined distances and for the Board to apply its entire set of ordinances to 
the application, which include by reference the Comprehensive Plan. In addition, the Court should 
award Friends of Mindoka its fees and costs. 
Dated: March 5, 2010. 
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On May 3,2007, Big Sky Famls' application for a Livestock Confinement Operation 
(LCO) permit was filed with the Jerome County Planning & Zoning Administrator. A public 
hearing on the application was held before the Jerome County Board of Commissioners (the 
"Board") on September 25-26,2007. The Board held a public meetipg for purposes of 
deliberating on the evidence on October 9,2007. At the meeting, the Board denied the 
application. On November 1,2007, the Board issued its Memorandum Decision setting forth 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw denying the application based largely on the failure to 
comply with the Jerome County comprehensive zoning plan. 
Big Sky Farms filed a petition for judicial review on November 13,2007. On June 27, 
2008, Judge Bevan issued a Memorandum Decision reversing the Board's decision and 
remanding the matter back to the Board for further consideration. 
On August 4, 2008, Petitioner Dean Dimond appeared before the Board and attempted to 
file and be heard on his motion to submit additional evidence, but the Board declined to hear or 
consider the motion. On August 11, September 2, September 4, September 9, and September 22, 
2008, the Board held several meetings to reconsider the LCO application and voted 2-1 to 
approve it on September 22,2008. On September 23,2008, the Board's written order approving 
Big Sky Farms' LCO permit was issued. 
Petitioners filed Petition for Judicial Review and Declaratory Judgment on October 21, 
2008 and a supporting memorandum on January 20, 2010. Respondents' filed Memorandum in 
Response on February 18,2010. Intevernors' Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Judicial 
Review was filed February 18, 2010. Petitioners' Reply Memorandum in Support of Petition for 
Review was filed March 08,2010. 
Petitioners' Petition for Judicial Review and Declaratory Judgment came before the court 
on April 23, 2010. Charles Tebbutt, Eugene, Oregon, Patrick Brown, Twin Falls, Idaho, and 
Richard Carlson, Filer, Idaho appeared for and on behalf of Petitioners. Michael Seib, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney appeared for and on behalf of Jerome County, and John Lothspeich, 
Jerome, Idaho, appeared for and on behalf of Intervenors. The Court took the matter under 
advisement on April 23, 2010. 
FACTS 
The site of the proposed LCO facility is approximately 1.25 miles upwind from the 
Minidoka National Historic Site ("Minidoka Site"). The Minidoka Site is where the Minidoka 
Relocation Center, a World War II-era internment camp for Japanese Americans and their 
immigrant ancestors, operated from August 1942 to October 1945, housing 13,000 internees 
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visited annually by thousands, was designated a National Monument in 2001 under the auspices 
of the National Park Service. In 2007, Congress passed legislation to expand Minidoka and call it 
a National Historic Site. 
The proposed LCO is surrounded on all sides by resident farm families. Big Sky's 
application immediately gained interest from these property owners. In addition, due to the 
proximity of the proposed LCO to the Minidoka Site, a large number of individuals and historic 
preservation and conservation organizations became interested with the LCO permitting process 
also. The Board received volumes ofletters and emails following the submission of the LCO 
application. 
The Board initially scheduled a public hearing on the proposed Big Sky LCO to be held 
on August 14-15, 2007. In accordance with the Jerome County Zoning Ordinance ("JCZO"), on 
July 17, 2007, the Board sent written notice ofthe public hearing to individuals owning property 
within one mile of the proposed LCO site. The Board also published an announcement of the 
hearing dates in the Jerome North Side News on July 19, 2007. Both of these notices established 
the procedures that would govern public participation before and during the August 14-15 public 
hearings. 
The procedures established by the Board imposed two limitations on public participation. 
First, the public notices indicated that only those property owners having a "primary residence" 
within a one mile radius of the proposed LCO would be allowed to submit written comments to 
the Board. Written comments from this group were required to be received within 15 days after 
publication of the announcement in order to be considered by the Board. The one mile limitation 
was based upon an ordinance within Chapter 13 ofthe JCZO dealing with the permitting and 
siting of LCOs. Second, public written and oral testimony during the hearing was to be limited: 
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written testimony was limited to one 8.5" by 11" sheet of paper, single-sided; oral testimony was 
limited to two minutes per person. Public comments began arriving at the county soon after 
publication in the paper. 
Planning and Zoning Director Art Brown refused to accept comments from several 
individuals. Petitioner Dean Dimond attempted to hand-deliver public comments to Jerome 
County staff on August 3, 2007, exactly 15 days after the July 19, 2007 public notice publication. 
The comments were from two of his immediate family members, his sisters Denette Ashcraft and 
Denise Steiner, and from Blaine Miller, a local dairyman and longtime resident of the area. Art 
Brown refused to accept the documents and returned them on August 3,2007. Mr. Brown 
explained that the deadline for receiving information from all primary residents within one mile 
of the proposed LCO was 5 p.m. on August 2,2007. Mr. Brown returned Mr. Miller's comments 
because Mr. Miller was not a resident within one mile of the proposed LCO. Planning and 
Zoning persOlmel also refused to accept the comments, submitted on August 3, 2007, of Harold 
and Carolyn Dimond. The Dimonds own property that is contiguous with nearly one mile of the 
proposed LCO site. Planning and Zoning staff informed the Dimonds that they were not allowed 
to submit written comments because they were not residents of that particular property. 
On August 6,2007, the Board cancelled the August 14-15 public hearing and rescheduled 
it for September 25-26,2007. The Board recognized that Mr. Brown had improperly interpreted 
JCZO 13-6.02's IS-day public comment period to include the date of publication in the 
newspaper. The Board stated cancellation was necessary because of the refusal to accept the 
submission of the written comments provided by Dean Dimond. 
On August 15,2007, property owners living within one mile of the proposed LCO 
received a mailed notice of the rescheduling. On August 23, 2007, public notice of the hearing 
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was published for one day. The public announcement made clear that the 15-day comment 
period closed on September 7, 15 days after the August 23 publication date. The hearing 
procedures listed in the public announcement and the notices mailed to property owners listed in 
the public announcement and the notices mailed to property owners contained identical 
limitations on public comments as the original August 14-15 procedures. 
The Board held a meeting on September 10,2007, in which it determined, based on 
comments from County Prosecutor Mike Seib, that the two minute testimony limitation it had 
imposed on oral testimony for the upcoming public hearing might be unconstitutional. The Board 
voted to increase the time for oral testimony to four minutes. If a person elected not to testify 
orally, they would be allowed to submit one additional 8.5" by 11" sheet of written testimony. 
During the meeting the Board considered delaying the hearing a second time as several attomeys 
for entities opposing the proposed LCO had indicated that they could not be present to represent 
their clients during the September 25-26 time frame. The Board voted 2-1 against another delay. 
The inability of various counsel for opponents to attend the public hearing was a recurring 
discussion at Board meetings, all resulting in a decision to not change the hearing dates. The new 
procedural limitations for the September 25-26 public hearing were mailed out to citizens 
owning property within one mile of the proposed LCO site on September 11,2007 and published 
in the newspaper on September 13. 
On September 13,2007, the Board received a letter from attomey Patrick Brown, who 
had been hired the previous day to represent Wayne Slone, guardian of James Slone. The Slones 
own property located approximately 300 yards southeast of the proposed LCO site. Under JCZO 
Chapter 13-6.01, the Slones were entitled to timely individual notice of both the August 14-15 
and September 25-26 hearings. The Slones, however, received no such notice from Jerome 
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County. In his letter, Patrick Brown requested that the hearing be delayed because his client 
required proper notice and because he (Patrick Brown) was unavailable on those dates and his 
client had the right to be represented by counsel and to prepare for the hearing. The Planning and 
Zoning department delivered notice to the Slones by mail on September 14,2007. By the time 
Mr. Slone received notice, the comment period for written testimony had already closed. On 
September 17, Art Brown explained to the Board that the Slones had not originally received 
notice from his office because there was no residence on the property. Art Brown interpreted 
JCZO 13-6.01 as requiring that notice be sent only to property owners who resided on their 
property. As a result ofthe improper notice, the Board considered delaying the hearing in its 
September 24 meeting. County Prosecutor Seib informed the Board that he did not see any 
deficiency in notifying Slone of the hearing and that nothing required them to delay the hearing 
any further. The Board decided not to delay the hearing. 
The LCO hearing commenced on September 25,2007. John Lothspeich, attorney for Big 
Sky Farms, opened the hearing by asking the commissioners to focus solely on whether the Big 
Sky application had met the requirements of JCZO Chapter 13. After reciting the requirements 
listed in Chapter 13, and how the Big Sky application purportedly met the requirements, Mr. 
Lothspeich reiterated that satisfaction of the Chapter 13 requirements mandates LCO permit 
issuance. Opponents of the proposal then expressed their chief concerns regarding the LCO. 
Concerns relayed at the hearing included, but were not limited to, environmental and aesthetic 
problems, protection of private property, undue burden on the local water table, proximity of the 
proposed LCO to the Minidoka Site, negative impacts on the integrity of the Minidoka site, 
negative effects on a nearby wildlife preserve, exacerbation of asthma and allergies, increased 
traffic, that Chapter 13 of the JCZO only set the minimum standards that the Big Sky application 
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was required to meet, and that the applicant's well map did not include a culinary well located on 
his property. 
On September 26,2007, Carolyn Dimond testified that her due process rights had been 
violated by the Board's failure to provide her with individual notice, the Board's refusal to 
accept her written testimony, and the fact that her attorney, Richard Carlson, could not be present 
for the public hearing. Harold Dimond expressed concern about the evidentiary limitations of the 
hearing and the lack of opportunity to have an attorney present. Harold Dimond testified that 
Commissioners Davidson and Howell had denied him the opportunity to have an attorney 
present, and that Art Brown had denied him an opportunity to submit evidence prior to the 
hearing. 
Commissioner Howell questioned Harold Dimond about whether the Board ever told 
Dimond that he could not bring an attorney. Harold Dimond explained that his attorney, Richard 
Carlson, had another prior commitment to attend, and when he and his attorney requested the 
hearing be moved, the Board said that lack of representation during the public hearing was not a 
factor to be considered and was irrelevant. Commissioner Howell then pointed to documents in 
the record that the Board had received from Richard Carlson, believing these letters 
demonstrated that Harold Dimond had been allowed to submit evidence. Harold Dimond 
disagreed, pointing out that the letters received by the Board were from Richard Carlson acting 
on behalf of Dean Dimond, not him. Harold Dimond also described how Art Brown had returned 
the evidence he tried to submit prior to the hearing date. Commissioner Howell asked County 
Prosecutor Seib to address the discussion of who was not allowed to bring an attorney. Mr. Seib 
noted that Mr. Carlson could not be present, but that Harold Dimond was not restricted to just 
that attorney. Mr. Seib also stated there was not necessarily a right to have an attorney. 
8 
530 
--------~ _ ... -
Then, Alma Hasse asked the Board to clarify some procedural questions. Commissioner 
Howell deferred to Mr. Seib, who indicated that Hasse had four minutes, regardless of the 
substance of her testimony. Ms. Hasse protested, pointing out that the County's notice said the 
public would have four minutes of substantive testimony. She requested that her procedural 
questions not be subject to the same time limit. The Board limited Ms. Hasse to a total of four 
minutes. Ms. Hasse objected to the limitations imposed by the Board on the public testimony, 
noting the tremendous amount of information needed to adequately evaluate the Big Sky 
application. She requested to submit six exhibits, many consisting of numerous pages, into the 
record, including eight audio CDs containing testimony from a different LCO-siting case that 
concerned state-wide nutrient management plans. The Board denied the submission of any of 
these exhibits. Ms. Hasse noted that the procedures established by the Board pertained only to 
written testimony, not to electronic media. The Board dismissed this notion. Commissioner 
Obenauer, however, wanted to have the information available if she needed to look at some other 
documents that had been withheld because of the Board's indecision concerning the 15 days and 
other issues. Art Brown interjected, telling the Board ifthey look at the audio CD's and other 
exhibits, then it becomes evidence. Commissioner Howell ended the discussion because he felt it 
conflicted with the advice obtained from Mr. Seib. 
Ms. Hasse then requested that she be allowed to question Big Sky's experts. 
Commissioner Howell interrupted her in the midst of this request, informing her that time had 
expired. Commissioner Obenauer then asked Ms. Hasse a set of questions relating to the Big Sky 
Nutrient Management Plan. Ms. Hasse explained that, in a LCO hearing in a different county, 
she had submitted information showing that the amount of phosphorous excreted per cow was 
approximately double what Big Sky had indicated in its application. 
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Next, Mr. Nelson, a member of the Jerome County Planning and Zoning Commission, 
requested that the Board listen to a tape recording of a Planning and Zoning hearing relating to 
the Minidoka Site. The information contained in the tapes suggested that Neil King, director of 
the Minidoka Site, knew about the possibility of an LCO being placed nearby the facility. The 
Board initially believed they had to disallow the tapes due to the procedures they established for 
accepting testimony. Mr. Lothspeich, however, informed the Board that they could take official 
notice of the Planning and Zoning tapes pursuant to Title 67 ofIDAPA. Mr. Seib believed the 
Board could also introduce the tapes into evidence based upon the Board's own procedures it 
established for the Big Sky public hearing. Ms. Hasse objected. The Board then considered 
holding the record open so that Ms. Hasse's exhibits and Mr. Nelson's tapes could be considered. 
The Board believed they could extend the public hearing for one hour the following Monday, but 
ultimately decided not to. 
Jim Stewart concluded the public testimony. Stewart was unable to have his attorney 
present at the public hearing, and he urged the Board to consider his rights and those of the 
parties who were not granted the ability to participate fully in the hearing. Stewart also told the 
Board to take a close look at J CZO Chapter 13 -1. 01, which required considering the entire 
ordinance when making an LCO permitting decision. Stewart pointed out numerous ways in 
which the application was incomplete. 
At the conclusion of the September 26 hearing, Mr. Lothspeich pointed out that the 
application was complete in all aspects. He urged the Board that they must approve the 
application if it met the requirements in Chapter 13 ofthe JCZO. He also told the Board that its 
sole inquiry was whether the applicant satisfied the criteria in Chapter 13, and if so, the Board 
was mandated to issue a permit in this case. Following Mr. Lothspeich's remarks, Mr. Seib 
10 
582 
reminded the Board that it had to determine whether or not it would accept the exhibits Ms. 
Hasse wished to provide. Commissioner Howell said he would let them be submitted in an 
envelope, given to Art Brown. In terms of examining the exhibits, Commissioner Howell stated 
they would not open the envelope and would not present it to the Board at that time. 
The Board concluded the hearing by announcing that it would reach a final decision at its 
October 9,2007 meeting. Commissioner Obenauer did not agree with the vote to close the 
record. She wished to visit the Big Sky site for herself, as well as to consider the various exhibits 
that had not been allowed into the fonnal record. At the October 9 meeting, Patrick Brown, 
attorney for the Slones, again told the Board that his client's rights had been violated by the lack 
of notice and opportunity to be heard in this matter. Mr. Brown requested that the Board vacate 
the September 25-26 hearings and schedule a new hearing so that the Slones could present their 
testimony. Mr. Seib informed the Board that Mr. Brown's comments were irrelevant, and that its 
decision to approve or deny the application must be based on the appropriate ordinances. 
Commissioner Obenauer expressed concern about well contamination, the health of the 
residents near the cow confinement facility, local wildlife, and the effect of the LCO on the 
Minidoka Site. Commissioner Davidson believed that approval of the LCO would increase the 
number of cows in Jerome County to a level that would exceed a "one-cow-per-acre" rule. 
Davidson then made a motion to deny the application, which was seconded by Commissioner 
Obenauer. The Big Sky LCO application was denied 2-1. 
The Board approved a memorandum decision discussing its rationale for denying the Big 
Sky LCO application on November 1, 2007. Commissioner Obenauer sent an October 31,2007 
memo to Commissioners Howell and Davidson objecting to their determination that November 
1, 2007 was the cut-off for finishing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Obenauer believed 
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more time was required to adequately complete the county's written decision on the Big Sky 
application. Commissioner Obenauer later noted that she had been excluded from the process of 
approving the Board's factual findings. 
The bulk of the Board's memorandum decision discussed the completeness of the 
application with regards to JCZO Chapter 13. The decision noted that, while the application 
satisfied the requirements of JCZO Chapter 13, it must also comply with the county's 
comprehensive plan, which set forth standards considered relevant by the Board to this particular 
application. Specifically, the decision noted that the LCO did not adequately address concerns 
about phosphate pollution and its impacts on the local soil. The application was therefore denied. 
Don McFarland and Big Sky Farms appealed the Board's decision to the Jerome County 
District Court. Specifically, Big Sky argued that the Board's sole reliance upon the County 
comprehensive plan in denying its application was an improper application of the County's 
ordinances. Big Sky argued that the ordinances merely required an applicant to meet the exact 
criteria listed in Chapter 13, and nothing more. The District Court issued its amended 
memorandum decision on July 8, 2008, holding that the Board could not solely rely upon the 
County comprehensive plan in denying the application. Judge Bevan did not accept Big Sky's 
position that Chapter 13 alone applied, but instead noted that the Board may find some other 
valid basis upon which to deny the LCO permit application. The court reversed the Board's 
decision and remanded the case back to Jerome County for further proceedings. 
The Board first addressed the District Court's remand on July 28,2008. Without making 
specific references to any part of the Court's decision, Mr. Seib informed the Board that the 
County's ordinances did not allow the Board to consider any information other than whether the 
Big Sky application was complete. 
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On August 4, 2008, Dean Dimond requested that the Board consider reopening the record 
for the Big Sky Permit. Dimond insisted that he had additional evidence for the Board to 
consider before it rewrote its decision on the application. Mr. Seib opined that the JCZO did not 
allow the Board to approve or deny an application except on the basis of whether it was 
complete. Commissioners Howell and Davidson then voted against reopening the Big Sky 
record, with Commissioner Obenauer voting for reopening. 
On August 11, 2008, the Board again discussed the Big Sky remand. Mr. Seib opined that 
the Board could only consider whether the application was complete, and nothing more. 
Commissioner Obenauer wished to discuss a memorandum she had prepared on the Big Sky 
application. Mr. Seib protested, advising the Board not to conduct independent research-stating 
his legal opinion that the judge on remand had instructed the Board to consider limited issues. 
Commissioner Obenauer disagreed with Mr. Seib's opinion. Richard Carlson, attorney for the 
Dimond families, asked that he, as well as Mr. Lothspeich, be granted 15 minute to present 
argument to the Board concerning the meaning of the Court's decision. Mr. Lothspeich 
responded, arguing that the Court said this LCO pennit should have been granted and that the 
application was egregiously overdue. There were no more arguments on the matter by counsel. 
After discussion about placing conditions on approval of the application and 
incompleteness of the application based on the failure to submit complete agency comment 
letters, sink holes, and well maps, the Board turned to what it could actually consider in rewriting 
its decision. Commissioners Davidson and Howell both insisted that the application was 
complete, and there was concern if they did not approve the application a court would again 
reverse the Board's decision. It was agreed that Mr. Seib would write a decision reflecting the 
majority view to approve the permit. 
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On September 2,2008, Richard Carlson, the Dimonds' attorney, requested that he be 
allowed to comment on the Big Sky discussion. Mr. Lothspeich objected to any commentary, 
stating it would impermissibly reopen the record. Mr. Lothspeich believed that, because the 
Board tentatively voted to approve the application at the August 11 hearing, all that was now 
permitted was having the decision handed to them. The Board, however, agreed to allow Carlson 
to speak, but did not record it. Mr. Carlson began by noting that the Board had previously stated 
it was searching for a reason to deny the application. He suggested that he could prepare a 
memorandum that would support a denial. He also suggested that counsel for Big Sky could do 
the same. The Board rejected this proposal, and Commissioner Howell stated, again unrecorded, 
that he believed the Board's legal counsel, Mr. Seib, had done a satisfactory job handling the 
legal issues. The Board tentatively stated that it had decided to approve the Big Sky application, 
but it was going to apply conditions to the approval. Those conclusions would be discussed at a 
later hearing. 
During some point in 2008, the Big Sky LCO property was sold to defendant South View 
Dairy, an Idaho general partnership. Mr. Lothspeich appeared before the Board on September 9, 
2008 to address an article that had been published in the local newspaper. He urged the Board 
not to delay the Big Sky application any further, pointing out that the permit ran to the land, not 
to the owner of the land. Dean Dimond, present at the meeting, objected to any discussion of the 
Big Sky matter, as it was not part of the Board's agenda for that day. The Board refused to allow 
Mr. Dimond to speak, reminding him that his attorney, Richard Carlson, had been told that 
neither attorney was permitted to add evidence to the record. Mr. Lothspeich was able to 
complete his remarks. 
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The final Big Sky hearing after remand took place on September 22, 2008. Commissioner 
Howell had prepared a statement on the matter in which he reminded the Board that it needed to 
be free of any bias in reaching a decision and stressed that the Board could only consider the 
completeness of the application, and nothing more. Eden Dimond objected to this statement, 
believing that Mr. Lothspeich had been granted an opportunity to present additional evidence 
into the record where others had not. She was refused the opportunity to speak. The Board then 
outlined the conditions it required for an approval of the application, including the Hillsdale 
Highway district letter and the requirement that a turnout be built for school bus access and that a 
leaching study be completed. After a brief recess, the Board reconvened to hear a statement by 
Alma Hasse. Conunissioner Obenauer believed the record required reopening, but the rest of the 
Board disagreed. The Board then voted 2-1 to approve the Big Sky application. 
In its written memorandum decision, dated September 23, 2008, the Board noted that it 
could only consider three factors in deciding the outcome of the application: (1) whether the 
application is complete; (2) whether the site is located in an Agricultural A-I Zone; and (3) 
whether the application complies with the provision of Chapter 13 and the JCZO. Because it 
believed the application satisfied the requirements of Chapter 13, the Board, by a 2-1 vote, 
decided that the permit was required to be issued. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1) Do petitioner organizations have standing? 
2) Did the Board's invocation ofIdaho Code § 67-6529 and Jerome County Zoning 
Ordinance 13-6.02 to restrict written testimony from affected individuals who lived more 
than one mile from the proposed facility violate state and federal constitutional due 
process rights to meaningfully present and rebut evidence? 
3) Did the failure to give notice and opportunity to comment to a landowner within one mile 
of the proposed facility, and the failure to continue the hearing to allow participation of 
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counsel, violate procedural due process requirements in violation of constitutional or 
statutory provisions and ordinances? 
4) Were the decisions of the Board consistent with the provisions of Jerome County 
ordinances relating to the requirements for completeness of applications for livestock 
confinement operations? 
5) Was the Board's decision to grant the LCO application based upon unlawful procedure 
because the Board failed to apply its own ordinances? Were the decisions of the Board 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion? Did the Board fail to follow the 
provisions of Jerome County Ordinance Chapter 19 relating to the requirement for 
appeals of decisions to reopen the record? 
6) Did the Board's decision violate Idaho Code § 67-6535 to the extent that it failed to 
provide a "reasoned statement" for its decision? 
7) Are petitioners entitled to attorney's fees incurred in bringing this petition pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-117; or, is Jerome County entitled to attorney's fees, pursuant to LC. § 
12-117, incurred in having to respond to Friends' petition? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho's Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA), Idaho Code § 67-6501, et seq., allows 
an affected person to seek judicial review of local government decisions concerning land use 
permits issued or denied pursuant to LLUP A. The district court conducts judicial review of the 
action oflocal government agencies. LR.C.P. 84(a)(1). For purposes of judicial review of 
LLUP A decisions, a local agency making a land use decision, such as the Board of 
Commissioners, is treated as a government agency under the Idaho Administrative Procedure 
Act (IDAPA). Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 74, 73 P.3d 84, 87 (2003); Urrutia v. Blaine 
County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000). The district court bases its judicial review 
on the record created before the local government agency. LR.C.P. 84(e)(1). 
Idaho Code § 67-5279 provides that a reviewing court shall not substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence. I.C. § 67-5279(1). The court shall affirm 
the agency's decision unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or 
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decisions were: in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; in excess of the statutory 
authority of the agency; made upon unlawful procedure; not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record as a whole; or arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). There 
is a strong presumption in favor of the validity of the action of zoning boards. Howard v. Canyon 
County Bd. O/Comm'rs, 128 Idaho 479, 480, 915 P.2d 709,711 (1996); Evans v. Bd. Of 
Comm'rs of Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428,50 P.3d 443 (2002). However, the discretion of the 
governing board of the county in zoning matters "is not unbounded." Sanders Orchard v. Gem 
County, ex. reI. Bd. Of County Comm 'rs, 137 Idaho 695, 698, 52 P.2d 840, 843 (2002) (citing 
Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 2 P.3d 738 (2000)). 
The court should defer to the Board's interpretation of its zoning ordinance unless that 
interpretation or application is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Rural Kootenai 
Organization, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs, 133 Idaho 833, 842, 993 P.2d 596, 605 (1999). The party 
appealing the Board of Commissioners' decision must first show the Board of Commissioners 
erred in a manner specified under I.C. § 67-5279(3), and second, that a substantial right has been 
prejudiced. I.e. § 67-5279(4); Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho at 75, 73 P.3d at 88; Price v. 
Payette County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998). Whether the 
Board of Commissioners violated a statutory provision is a matter of law over which this court 
exercises free review. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho at 75, 73 P.3d at 88; Friends of Farm to 
Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 196,46 P.3d 9, 13 (2002); Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 
303,308, 17 P.3d 247, 252 (2000). This court defers to the Board of Commissioners' findings of 
fact unless the findings of fact are clearly elToneous. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho at 75, 73 
P.3d at 88; Evans v. Bd ofComm'rs o/Cassia County, 137 Idaho at 431,50 P.3d at 446; Friends 
of Farm to Market, 137 Idaho at 196,46 P.3d at 13. The Board of Commissioners' factual 
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findings are not clearly erroneous so long as they are supported by substantial, competent, 
although conflicting, evidence. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho at 75, 73 P.3d at 88; Friends of 
Farm to Market, 137 Idaho at 196,46 P.3d at 13. 
A party is entitled to a reversal of a land use decision if it demonstrates that a land use 
decision will cause actual harm or ifthe process results in a violation of fundamental rights. I.e. 
§ 67-6535. If the Board's action is not affirmed, "it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary." I.C. § 67-5279(3). 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
1) Standing 
Respondent Jerome County raises a challenge to the organizational standing of Friends of 
Minidoka, Japanese American Citizens League, and the National Trust for Historic Preservation. 
Intervenor South View Dairy concedes that some of the Petitioners (Dimonds) have 
standing, and acknowledges that the case will go forward no matter what decision the court 
makes with regard to standing ofthe other petitioners. Intervenors contend, however, that some 
of the other petitioners do not have standing, notably the Idaho Concerned Area Residents for the 
Environment (ICARE), the Japanese American Citizens League, the National Trust for Historic 
Preservation, Preservation Idaho, Friends of Minidoka, and the Idaho Rural Council. 
The requirements for standing (being allowed to participate in the court/judicial review 
process) are different from the requirements for remedy from the court. To have standing, one 
must demonstrate that they may be adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit 
authorizing the development. Standing status depends on whether one owns property that may be 
adversely affected by the development, not because one owns property within a specified 
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distance. Proximity is a very important factor, but the court will not look to a predetennined 
distance in deciding whether a property owner has standing. Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 
71, 75,73 P.3d 84, 88 (2003). While the existence of real or potential hann is sufficient to 
challenge a land use decision (to have standing), in order to be entitled to a remedy, Idaho Code 
§ 67-6535(c) requires a demonstration of actual hann or violation of a fundamental right. Id. at 
76,73 P.3d at 89. These requirements are completely distinct from a detennination of who may 
have a right to comment or present evidence at a public hearing. 
To have standing as an organization, different standards apply. An organization may have 
standing solely as the representative of its members. The association must allege that its 
members, or anyone of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the 
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves 
brought suit. Selkirk-Priest Basin Assn., Inc. v. State, 127 Idaho 239, 899 P.2d 949 (1995). The 
injury must be distinct and palpable and not one suffered alike by all citizens in the jurisdiction. 
Selkirk-Priest Basin Assn., Inc. v. State, 128 Idaho 831,919 P.2d 1032 (1996). 
Petitioners allege that ICARE and the Idaho Rural Council have members who live 
within one mile ofthe proposed site. Pet'rs' Mem. 23 n.1l. The Idaho Rural Council alleges they 
have several members who own and fann real property adjacent to the proposed site and several 
who live on that property. Whether those members have their primary residence on that property, 
or even whether they actually live on it, as opposed to merely owning land near the proposed 
site, is irrelevant for purposes of standing. Those people may be adversely affected, and face 




The only other allegation from Petitioners regarding standing is that the other 
organizations have members that visit the Minidoka National Historic Site, and will continue to 
visit, regularly. Id.; Pet'rs' Reply Mem. 8. These allegations reference the affidavits of 
Momohara, Yoshitomi, Hartig, and Everhart. These four affidavits, therefore, are offered to 
support Petitioners' claims to standing for the Japanese American Citizens League, the National 
Trust for Historic Preservation, Preservation Idaho, and Friends of Minidoka. 
The court has examined those affidavits carefully. Though each provides a compelling 
recitation of the importance of the "Minidoka National Historic Site to their various organizations, 
none of them allege a distinct and palpable injury not suffered alike by all citizens in the 
jurisdiction. At least one ofthe affidavits notes the Historic Site is just over a mile away from the 
proposed LCO site. None of them purport to speak for, or on behalf of, the Minidoka National 
Historic Site itself. That is, none of them purport or claim to be on the board of directors of the 
Historic Site or to represent it. Rather, they all pay tribute to the importance of the site to their 
various organizations. Though several of the affidavits refer to the fact they have members who 
live in Jerome or Twin Falls or Minidoka counties, there is no specific allegation that any 
identified member of any of these organizations live in proximity to the proposed LCO site, or 
would be harmed by its presence. At best, these four affidavits voice concerns on behalf of 
unidentified members of their organizations, none of whom individually would have standing to 
participate in this appeal. 
The court concludes that Friends of Minidoka, the Japanese American Citizens League, 
the National Trust for Historic Preservation, and Preservation Idaho, all lack standing and all will 
be dismissed from further participation in this appeal. Counsel for Intervenors is requested to 
prepare an appropriate form of order for the court's signature reflecting this determination. 
20 
542 
2) Whether Idaho Code § 67-6529 is constitutional 
Petitioners contend that I.C. § 67-6529 is unconstitutional. Idaho Code § 67-6529 
provides that: "At a minimum, a county's ordinance or resolution shall provide that the board of 
commissioners shall hold at least one public hearing affording the public an opportunity to 
comment. .. Only members of the public with their primary residence within a one (l) mile 
radius of a proposed site may provide comment at the hearing. However, this distance may be 
increased by the board." 
Petitioners argue that both I.C. § 67-6529 and JCZO 13-6.02 violate substantive due 
process because the distinction made between those with their primary residence on either side of 
the one mile boundary is arbitrary and unreasonable. I Admittedly, the statute does not provide 
the right to comment at hearing to those who own land within the one mile limit but do not reside 
there. Here, however, in accordance with the statute, the Board expanded the right to comment to 
include those people (see below). JZCO 13-6.02 confonns to I.e. § 67-6529 by allowing any 
primary resident, as defined in the statute, to submit written comments or objections to the Board 
within 15 days after publication of the application in the paper and by allowing those comments 
or objections to become part of the record. 
Jerome County argues in its briefthat the court should not consider this argument, in that 
Petitioners failed to raise this issue before the Board of Commissioners. In their Reply Brief, at 
page 8, Petitioners assert it is not necessary to raise constitutional issues before an agency, but 
then they go on to point to references in the record where due process issues were raised. The 
court mentions this only to clarify the law on this point. Ordinarily, review on appeal is limited 
1 Petitioners' brief also suggests the statute is unconstitutional in that it distinguishes between those "owning and 
living" on property within a one mile radius, and those who reside outside the boundary, "or may not own land." 
The statute does not, on its face, distinguish between those who own their residence and those that do not. 
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to those issues raised before the administrative tribunal. Johnson v. Blaine County, 146 Idaho 
916,204 P.3d 1127 (2009). This rule would not apply to an issue the administrative tribunal 
lacked the authority to decide, such as the facial constitutionality of a statute. Id. at 920, 204 P Jd 
at 1131.2 
Petitioners' challenge appears to be a facial attack upon the statute. As noted below, 
however, the commissioners relaxed the standards as applied. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
given some guidance in this area. In analyzing a state statute, they have announced the following 
rules: legislative acts are generally presumed constitutional and any doubt concerning 
interpretation of a statute is to be resolved in favor of that which renders the statute 
constitutional; and the burden of overcoming the presumption ofthe statute's validity rests with 
the one raising the challenge. Robison v. Bateman-Hall, 139 Idaho 207, 76 P.3d 951 (2003); 
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 135 P.3d 756 (2006). It is a general rule 
that a legislative act should be held to be constitutional until it is shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt that it is not so, and that a law should not be held to be void for repugnancy to the 
Constitution in a doubtful case. State v. Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 125 P.3d 522 (2005). With 
respect to JZCO 13-6.02, there is a strong presumption that the actions of the Board of 
Commissioners, where it has interpreted and applied its own zoning ordinances, are valid. Evans 
v. Bd. o/Comm'rs o/Cassia County, 137 Idaho 428, 431,50 P.3d 443, 446 (2002). 
This court has no substantial basis upon which to rule that I.C. § 67-6529 or JCZO 13-
6.02 are unconstitutional. No persuasive authority has been cited in support of Petitioners' 
argument. Arguments can certainly be made that the one mile limit is arbitrarily drawn, and that 
2 Petitioner's disagreement with the statute may be more of an equal protection argument than a substantive due 
process argument, in that it raises a challenge to the classification or status of those within the one mile radius, and 
those outside it. The court will leave that argument to others. It has not been raised. 
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there are people further than a mile away from a LCO that might unquestionably be affected by 
such an operation. Arguments could also be made that the legislature has arbitrarily excluded 
from the right to comment at hearing those that farm land within a mile, or rent a residence 
within a mile, or have their primary residence elsewhere, though they rent out a residence on 
their land within a mile, or those that have not yet built upon property within a mile. However, 
those are judgments for the legislature to make, not this court. The court will not and cannot 
substitute its judgment for that of the legislature on this point. 
3) Procedural due process at the public hearing: the right to be heard and/or present 
documentary evidence. 
Chapter 23 of JCZO entitled Procedural Requirements for Meetings and Hearings is in 
the record at pages 22-24 of the Supplemental Record, Volume 1. According to the Certification 
of the Clerk of the Jerome County Board of Commissioners, at page 11 of the same volume, the 
versions of Chapter 13 and 23 that were in effect as of May 3,2007 are attached in the record at 
pages12 through 25. Chapter 23 of the May 2007 version of the JCZO provides for hearing 
procedures before the Planning and Zoning Commission. Paragraph 23-7.01 provides that all 
documents (there is no limitation on size or amount of the submittal) must be submitted seven 
days prior to the hearing. Persons who attended a hearing could submit a one page document. 
Pursuant to paragraph 23-7.02 witness testimony was limited to 2 minutes each, except that the 
"principal opposer" got 5 minutes. Those were Jerome County's rules governing hearings as the 




Later, on September 10, 2007, a little over two weeks before the rescheduled September 
25-26 public hearings, the Board amended several chapters of the Jerome County Zoning 
Ordinance text by adopting Jerome County Ordinance 2007-6. These amendments are in the 
record commencing at page 101 of Volume I of the Supplemental Record, and ending at page 
110. They were published September 20, 2007, just days before the county held its first and only 
public hearing in this matter. Supplemental R., Vol. I 137-138.S. 
According to Petitioners' opening brief at page 29, the Board of Commissioners 
established the following guidelines for the presentation and rebuttal of evidence at the 
September 25-26 hearing: 
Oral testimony for the Principal representatives for the applicant shall have 20 
minutes, the principal for the opposition shall have 15 minutes, and each 
interested party shall have 4 minutes. Only one-sided document no larger than 8 
W' x 11" that is sufficiently legible, handwritten or typed in any standard 
font. .. An individual may submit two page(s) document(s) no larger than 8 ;h"x 
11" that is sufficiently legible, handwritten or typed in any standard font. . .if they 
don't give any oral testimony the night of the hearing. 
Petitioners also admit that, 
... in August, 2007, just over one month before the hearing in this matter (and 
reaffirmed in additional September 2008 amendments), the County liberalized its 
limitation on submission of documentary evidence. SUpp. Rec., Vol. I, pp.l05 
(13-7.01), 130 (13-6.02), 134-135 (23-5.02F). The new limitation, attempting to 
correct the earlier due process violations, removed entirely the primary residence 
requirement, excluded any reference to Idaho Code § 67-6529, and allowed 'all 
members of the public desiring to present oral or written comment, or 
documentary evidence, .. . [to do so] as set forth in Chapter 23 ... ' !d. Chapter 23, in 
tum, provided for potentially unlimited documentary evidence as long as it was 
provided no later than seven days prior to hearing. Id. at 108 (23-6.02F). This 
amendment still restricted submission of documents at the hearing to one side of 
an 8 x 11 inch piece of paper. Id. 
Pet'rs' Reply Mem. 10. 
Thus, the county allowed for unlimited written comment and documentation from 
anyone so long as it was presented at least seven days prior to hearing, restricted the length of 
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time and the documents the county would accept at hearing, but heard oral testimony from 
anyone who wanted to give it, regardless of where they lived, provided they kept their comments 
limited to four minutes. 
Petitioners argument on this point is that although the Board allowed oral and written 
comment from individuals living outside the one mile radius during the public hearing, neither 
one or two pages of written testimony, nor four minutes of oral presentation without the ability to 
provide relevant written testimony, were adequate for meaningful participation. For authority, 
Petitioners point to the comment of the Idaho Supreme Court in Cowan v. Board of 
Commissioners of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,148 P.3d 1247 (2006). In Cowan, the 
Supreme Comi observed that although Cowan's rights were not violated, limiting public 
comment to two minutes is not consistent with affording an individual a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard. Id. at 512, 1258. Whether four minutes of oral testimony passes constitutional 
muster is unknown.3 
Idaho Code § 67-6529 is critical here, at least with respect to who gets to comment at the 
public hearing. The Legislature has determined and defined due process with regard to LCOs. 
Idaho Code § 67-6529 provides that: "At a minimum, a county's ordinance or resolution 
shall provide that the board of commissioners shall hold at least one public hearing 
affording the public an opportunity to comment ... Only members of the public with their 
primary residence within a one (1) mile radius of a proposed site may provide comment at 
the hearing. However, this distance may be increased by the board." 
3 Whether due process has been allowed petitioners in this case does not necessarily come down to a "two minute" 
vs. "four minute" analysis. Idaho Code § 67-6535(c) directs the courts of this state to "consider the proceedings as a 
whole and to evaluate the adequacy of procedures and resultant decisions in light of practical considerations with an 
emphasis on fundamental fairness and the essentials of reasoned decision-making." 
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As noted above, this court can find no substantial basis to detennine this statute is 
unconstitutional. Therefore, it sets the boundaries of who is entitled to comment at public 
hearing. 
Those that have their primary residence outside the one (1) mile radius cannot, as a 
matter oflaw, be denied due process because their time to present testimony was too short, or 
because their opportunity to submit documentation at the hearing was limited. This occurs 
because those outside the one mile limit do not have to be afforded the opportunity to present 
any testimony or documents at the hearing. Although the county did not have to, they granted 
people who lived outside the one mile radius an opportunity to provide comment at hearing. 
However, people that are given an opportunity to comment that do not have a right to comment 
cannot bootstrap that into a claim they have been denied procedural due process. Consequently, 
those that have not affinnatively demonstrated that their primary residence is within the one mile 
radius cam10t be denied due process, as a matter oflaw, for a failure to be heard or for denial of 
the ability to submit documents at hearing. A further logical consequence of the one mile rule is 
that those petitioners with their primary residence outside the one mile limit are unable to 
demonstrate, as a matter of law, that "a substantial right" of theirs has been prejudiced for any 
failure to be heard at hearing, or for their inability to submit documents (or lengthier documents) 
at the public hearing on September 25 and 26. Still another logical consequence of this rule is 
that each and every organization that had joined in this action in order to complain about an 
inability (or limited ability) to present their views at public hearing must have had at least one 
member that has a primary residence within one mile of the proposed site. If it did not, that 
organization could not possibly have met the requirement ofLC. § 67-5279(4) that a substantial 
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right oftheirs has been prejudiced by a limitation on their right to be heard or present documents 
at the public hearing-they had no such right. 4 
The net result of this one mile rule is that any claims of petitioners that do not have their 
primary residence, or that of at least one member, within one mile of the proposed site, that are 
based solely on an allegation they were denied due process at the public hearing, are barred. In 
short, the only petitioners that have any claim at all that their right to be heard was not 
"meaningful" are those that had their primary residence within the one mile radius, or represent 
an organization with a member who has a primary residence within the one mile radius. 
Petitioners have claimed in general that their due process rights have been violated. 
Jerome County maintains that is insufficient, directing the court's attention back to Cowan v. 
Board of Commissioners of Fremont County, supra. Jerome County maintains that each 
Petitioner must identify their own individual claims, point to the specific action of the County 
that each is attacking, and then illustrate that the Board erred in a specified manner, and then 
show that a substantial right of that particular petitioner has been prejudiced. Resp'ts' Mem. 30. 
The language of Cowan, at page 508, is very close to that. It does not recite that "each particular 
petitioner" must make the showing that a substantial right of that particular petitioner has been 
prejudiced, but that is the clear directive ofIdaho Code § 67 -5279(4), referred to above. It states: 
" ... agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have been 
prejudiced." Accordingly, somewhere, somehow, Petitioners such as ICARE and the Dimonds 
and the IRe must each show agency action that prejudiced a substantial right of each of them. 
4 Idaho Code § 67-5279(4) provides that " ... agency action shall be affIrmed unless substantial rights of the appellant 
have been prejudiced." Although the court noted in the "Standing" section of this decision that there is a difference 
between "potential harm", which allows one to participate in the court process, and having a substantial right 
prejudiced, failure to show prejudice to a substantial right at this point is fatal to one appealing an agency action. 
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At a minimum, there are Petitioners, ICARE, Dean and Eden Dimond, and IRC, that are 
able to demonstrate that they had a clear right to present comment at the hearing because they 
resided or had members that resided within one mile ofthe proposed site. See, Dean Dimond 
Aff., Supplemental R., Vol. II, 323; Alma Hasse Affidavit, Supplemental R., Vol. II, 271; Alma 
Hasse Aff., Pet'rs' Brief, Dec. 23, 2009. As "primary residents," or organizations with primary 
residents as members, these Petitioners have an unqualified right to complain that the Board's 
actions in limiting public comment at hearing to four (4) minutes prejudiced a substantial right, 
or that the Board's actions in limiting written comment at hearing prejudiced a substantial right. 
However, given the fact that Jerome County relaxed the rules for public comment in this case to 
allow for the submission of unlimited written materials prior to hearing, and one or two written 
pages at hearing, and to allow for four minutes of comment from any member of the public, the 
court cannot conclude that a due process right of any particular petitioner has been violated. 
a) Procedural Due Process Rights of James and Wayne Slone 
J ames and Wayne Slone raise their own claims that they l1ave been denied procedural due 
process. They own property within approximately 300 yards ofthe proposed site. Petitioners' 
brief, at p. 25, alleges that Slones received defective notice pursuant to the ordinance in effect at 
the time of the filing ofthe application, JCZO 13-6.01. This ordinance is set forth in the record. 
Supp.Rec., Vol I, p.20. It provides that: "The Administrator shall also send notice by mail to all 
property owners within one mile of the boundaries of the contiguous property owned by the 
applicant. .. " Although Petitioners suggest in their brief this ordinance refers to mailing of the 
notice of hearing regarding the application, a reading of the ordinance suggests it could be read 
one of two ways. The first sentence of the ordinance requires the Planning and Zoning 
Administrator to cause a "Notice of the filing of an application for a LCO permit" to be 
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published in the newspaper. This sentence is followed by the one above, requiring notice by mail 
to all property owners. The third sentence of the ordinance sets forth that "The property owner 
shall be responsible to forward Notice of Hearing to all primary residents on the property." 
Thus, it is unclear whether the mailed notice "to all property owners within one mile" 
refers to the notice ofjiling of an application as referenced in the first sentence, or whether it 
refers to a notice of the public hearing as mentioned in the third sentence. Both Idaho Code § 67-
6529 and JCZO 13-6.01 are silent as to any particular notice that must be provided. The statute 
requires only that the board of commissioners hold at least one public hearing affording the 
public an opportunity to comment. In Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 950 P.2d 
1262 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that the due process requirement of an opportunity 
to be heard is fulfilled if the opportunity occurs at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner. In Castenada, the Supreme Court found notice acceptable when the city posted a notice 
at the city hall 24 hours prior to the meeting approving the preliminary plat, it published notice in 
the newspaper concerning the public hearing on the annexation and rezone applications, and it 
mailed notices to property owners within 300 feet of the affected property. 
Here, the Board published an announcement of the hearing dates in the Jerome North 
Side News on July 19, 2007. The Board also sent written notice of the hearing to some of the 
property owners within one mile of the proposed site. Both of these notices established the 
procedures that would govern public participation before and during the August 14-15 public 
hearings. On August 6, 2007, the Board cancelled the August 14-15 public hearing and 
rescheduled it for September 25-26,2007. As noted, this hearing was rescheduled when the 
Board determined that notice of the August hearing was inadequate, and because some property 
owners (e.g.-Dean Dimond) had been refused the opportunity to submit written comments. On 
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August 23, 2007, public notice ofthe September 25-26 hearing was published for one day. The 
public announcement made clear that the IS-day comment period closed on September 7, 15 
days after the August 23 publication date. 
On September 13,2007, the Board received a letter from attorney Patrick Brown, who 
had been hired the previous day to represent Wayne Slone, guardian of James Slone. The Slones 
own property located approximately 300 yards southeast of the proposed LCO site. The Slones, 
therefore, had actual knowledge of the hearing set for September 25-26 by at least September 13 
because Patrick Brown's letter requested a continuation of that hearing so that he could be 
present. After receipt of this letter the Jerome Planning and Zoning Dept. delivered notice to the 
Slones by mail on September 14,2007. By the time Mr. Slone received notice the comment 
period for unlimited written testimony had already closed. However, under the procedures 
Jerome County had adopted, the opportunity to attend the hearing, with or without an attorney, 
and the opportunity to submit limited wlitten comments, was always available to Slones. 
Moreover, the County would have accepted their written comments prior to hearing if they 
would have offered, and the published notice advised them of the opportunity to comment and 
provide limited written comments at hearing. Phase I, Vol. I, Staff, 30,37. 
Finally, regardless of the notice they received, or the limited opportunity they had to 
make comment at hearing or be represented by counsel, Slones do not fall within that class of 
persons eligible to make comment at the public hearing. As set forth above, because they have 
not established that they had their primary residence within one mile ofthe proposed site, they 
had no demonstrated right to be present or comment at hearing. The court concludes Slones have 
failed to show that a substantial right of theirs has been prejudiced. 
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b) Right to counsel. 
Petitioners characterize the Board's actions prior to the September 25-26,2007 hearings 
as a denial of the opportunity to be represented by counsel. Jerome County submits the county 
did nothing to prevent an appearance by counsel at any hearing, except decline to postpone a 
scheduled public hearing. The court agrees that Petitioners have failed to show that the county 
impeded the ability of any party to be represented by counsel. Rather, it appears that several 
petitioners sought to be represented by counsel, but counsel were unable to attend the scheduled 
hearing for reasons personal to them or unidentified in the record. The Board did not "deny" 
anyone the opportunity to be represented, they simply declined to continue the scheduled hearing 
in order to accommodate counsel's schedules. There is no authority cited for the proposition that 
this works as any sort of "denial" by the county. Invariably, with a large public hearing, 
someone's attorney could not be present. Even if the hearing was scheduled far into the future, 
someone would wait until the last minute to try to hire an attorney. It should not be expected that 
a large public hearing could accommodate scheduling for multiple attorneys representing 
multiple parties. Attorneys have to make an effort to attend a scheduled public hearing or suggest 
alternate counsel. Any other procedure would make it impossible to schedule a large public 
hearing or result in interminable delays. 
There is no adequate showing that the inability of counsel to attend the public hearing in 
September 2007 affected a substantial right of any party. 
4) Completeness of the application. 
Petitioners contend the Board erred in finding that the application was complete for three 
reasons. First, all agencies had not completed their review and submitted letters before the 
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application was filed. Specifically, Petitioners point to letters from Hillsdale Highway District 
and the Valley School District as being inadequate. Second, the application did not include on 
its required map a well on Fred Stewart's property. Third, the application was approved without 
any record of a binding contractual agreement to export waste, as required by JCZO 13-2.01. 
As to the first issue, it is not clear where this issue was ever raised before the Board. 
Nevertheless, Section 5.02 of JCZO requires site assessment "comments" from certain agencies, 
and that they must be submitted along with the application. There is no requirement that these 
comments be complete at the time of the application. The fact is that the Hillsdale Highway 
District submitted a comment letter, which was included with the application. The letter suggests 
the need fur a traffic study before the application should be approved. This was done, and Jerome 
County found that the requirements ofthe ordinance had been met. No error has been 
demonstrated. 
As to the Valley School District, school districts are not one ofthe agencies enumerated 
in the ordinance requiring "comments." That is, JCZO 5.02 does not require site assessment 
comments from a school district at any point, either before or after the application is made. At 
any rate, it appears the Board obtained and reviewed comments from the school district. The 
court can find no error in this regard. 
There was conflicting evidence on the issue of the "missing well" on Fred Stewart's 
property, or at least some uncertainty as to the exact location of the well, or whether it had 
already been identified on the vicinity map. The Board weighed the evidence and arrived at a 
decision after deliberation that concluded the application was complete, and the well was not 
missing. The court is not at liberty to overturn this finding unless it is arbitrary or capricious, or 
not supported by substantial evidence. I.C.§ 67-5279(3)(d) and (e). Factual determinations are 
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binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so 
long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. 
Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357 (2000). Moreover, even if this well existed, agency 
action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the Petitioners have been prejudiced. I.C. § 
67-5279(4). Petitioners bear this burden. No showing has been made how the inclusion of this 
well in the application, or a failure to include it, and the resulting decision of the agency bears on 
any substantial right of Petitioners that has been prejudiced. 
The third allegation is that the application was approved without any evidence in the 
record of a binding contractual agreement to export waste. Petitioners assert that this is required 
by JCZO 13-2.01(a). The court agrees with both Jerome County and Intervenor that the 
applicable zoning ordinance does not prohibit approval ofthe application pending an agreement 
with another party to disperse animal waste products on that person's property. Instead, the 
ordinance requires that "animal waste products shall not leave the property of the operator" 
unless such an agreement has been reached. In addition, Jerome County found that even if such 
an agreement was needed, there was such an agreement in evidence, even though the record was 
void of any details. Apparently they accepted the testimony of Big Sky's consultant Mike 
Thompson in that regard. Petitioners have failed to show the Board's finding to be clearly 
erroneous. 
5) Whether the Board failed to follow its own ordinances. 
Petitioners allege the Board failed to follow its own ordinances, and therefore the 
approval process was tainted by unlawful procedure. Idaho Code § 67-5279(3)(c) requires the 
court to affirm the agency action unless the court finds the agency's decision was made (among 
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other things) upon unlawful procedure, or was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
I.e. §67-5279(3)(e). Petitioners contend this occurred when Jerome County failed to allow 
reopening of the record following remand from Judge Bevan and followed wrong advice from its 
attorney, thereby improperly limiting its review to the sole question of whether the application 
was complete. They further contend the Board failed to comply with or give adequate 
consideration to JCZO 1-6.01, which requires the Board to protect each citizen from undue 
encroachment of his private property. 
Judge Bevan's previous decision did not require that the Board reopen the original record 
and/or accept new or additional testimony. Petitioners are unable to cite to any authority 
indicating the Board should have reopened the record, or that a failure to do so constitutes an 
abuse of discretion or an unlawful procedure. Quite simply, it appears that whether to reopen the 
record was a discretionary decision of the Board. Supplemental R., Vol. II, 328-329. The Board 
exercised their discretion in favor of a denial. Although good arguments exist on both sides of 
this issue, there is no evidence the Board made a decision in this regard upon unlawful 
procedure, and Petitioners have failed to meet their burden to show an abuse of discretion. 
In Judge Bevan's Amended Memorandum Decision on Appeal to the District Court, filed 
July 3,2008, he noted the substantive factors the Board was required to consider in granting or 
denying an LCO permit application. These included whether the application was complete, 
whether the proposed site was located within the Agricultural A-I zone, and a vague and 
generalized requirement that the application comply with the provisions of Chapter 13 and the 
JCZO. Supplemental R., Vol. II. 31. On remand, Judge Bevan also addressed the argument as to 
whether the application had to be approved "if complete." See, Supplemental R., Vol. II. 37-38. 
The judge made clear in his decision that the Board upon remand could find some other valid 
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basis upon which to deny the permit application. Id. at 38. Thus, regardless of the advice the 
Board received, they knew from the judge's decision they were free to review their own 
ordinances and find a valid basis to deny the application. They apparently chose not to. Of 
significance is Judge Bevan's further observation that the Board might construe their own 
ordinance to require approval of a complete application "because the Board drafted the ordinance 
that way." Id. at 38. Rather than constitute an abuse of discretion, it could be argued the Board 
found itself with limited ways to construe its own LCO ordinances and chose a reasonable course 
of construction that required it to issue the permit upon a finding the application was complete. 
There is a strong presumption of validity of the actions of zoning boards when applying and 
interpreting their own zoning ordinances. Howard v. Canyon County Board ofComm 'rs, 128 
Idaho 479,915 Pl2d 709 (1996), Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193,207 P.3d 169 
(2009). The court is unable to conclude that Jerome Count misinterpreted its own ordinance. 
Petitioners have failed to carry their required burden to demonstrate Jerome County 
utilized an unlawful procedure or abused their discretion. 
6) Whether the Board failed to provide a "reasoned statement" for its decision. 
Petitioners main contention here is that the Board's written decision failed to give 
reasonable weight to the documentary evidence presented by Dean and Eden Dimond, the 
National Park Service, the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Idaho State Historical 
Society, and the James and Janiel Stewart Family. As a result, they argue that the Board's written 
decision fell short of the requirements of Idaho Code § 67-6535 to the extent it did not include a 
discussion of what amounted to more than an entire volume and one-half of relevant evidence in 
the record. 
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The court sees this issue as similar to the claim that the Board only looked at whether the 
application was complete or not. As pointed out by Judge Bevan, part of this may be due to the 
way the Board has written its ordinances. Do they require the Board to consider and weigh health 
effects, water quality standards, the effect of odor, the attraction of insects, noise, environmental 
standards, traffic, impact on neighbors, etc.? Or do they leave those decisions and standards to 
other (state and federal) agencies? Andlor do Jerome County's ordinances give the Board 
discretion to consider the type of evidence presented by the neighbors and others that may be 
affected by an LCO? This court arrives at the same conclusions Judge Bevan did. Jerome County 
ordinance13-1.03, a part of Jerome County's Livestock Confinement Ordinance, states: "The 
provisions of this chapter are minimum standards ... " even though it also provides that any more 
restrictive standards contained in other laws must be complied with. Judge Bevan also noted: "If 
the Board enacted the JCZO to indeed mandate that an LCO application must be approved upon 
a finding that it is complete, it would not be legitimate for the Board to later tum around and 
deny a complete application based on other discretionary factors." Agency R. 38. It is an entirely 
legitimate argument that the Board has left itself without much room to move. If that is the case, 
the solution is political and not judicial. The Board could change the ordinance, or the voting 
public could change the Board. The court cannot mandate what the ordinance does not. "Idaho 
law is well established that an applicant's rights are determined by the ordinance in existence at 
the time of filing an application for the permit." South/ork Coalition v. Board of Commissioners 
0/ Bonneville County, 117 Idaho 857, 860-861, 792 P.2d 882, 885-86 (1990). 
Idaho Code § 67-6535 requires the Board to base their approval or denial of any 
application upon standards and criteria set forth in the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinances, or 
other appropriate ordinance or regulation of the city or county. It further requires the approval or 
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denial to be in writing and accompanied by a reasoned statement that explains the criteria and 
standards considered relevant, states the relevant contested facts relied upon, and explains the 
rationale for the decision. Thus, although Idaho law requires a statement explaining the criteria 
and standards considered relevant, it does not, conversely, require a statement explaining criteria 
or evidence the Board disregarded or considered irrelevant. The court is mindful of the amount 
and degree of evidence submitted in opposition to this application. However, it is up to the 
Board, not the court, to weigh and consider the evidence presented and determine what evidence 
it relied upon and what evidence it considered irrelevant. "The court shall not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Idaho 
Code § 67-5279. 
Here, although the Board did not set forth and evaluate evidence it did not rely upon, it 
did give a reasoned explaining what criteria and standards it considered relevant, stated the 
relevant facts relied upon when faced with contested issues of fact, and explained the rationale 
for its decision. The law requires no more. 
The court is unable to conclude the Board erred by failing to provide a reasoned 
statement for its decision. 
7) Attorney Fees 
All parties claim attorney fees in their opening briefs pursuant to I. C. § 12-117. That 
section requires the court to award attorney fees to a prevailing party in any civil or 
administrati ve proceeding if the court finds the party against whom judgment is rendered acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Petitioners are not the prevailing party and are not 
entitled to fees or costs. 
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Intervenors are not entitled to claim attorney fees against Petitioners pursuant to I.C. § 
12-117 either. "The statute has never been amended, however, to provide for an award to a 
person who is not adverse to the governmental entity. We decline to infer that the Legislature 
intended that one person might recover from another person under I.C. § 12-117 solely because of 
the presence of a governmental entity in the litigation." Neighbors for Responsible Growth v. 
Kootenai County, 147 Idaho 173,207 P.3d 149 (2009). Nor may attorney fees be awarded 
pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 in connection with a petition for judicial review. !d. at 177. 
It is an open question in Idaho whether four minutes of public comment satisfies due 
process. It is an open question whether, overall, Jerome County or the Idaho Code provide due 
process when public comment is limited to a one mile radius. There are many other issues 
addressed by this appeal. The court is unable to conclude that Petitioners acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law in bringing this petition for judicial review. Neither Jerome 
County nor Petitioners are entitled to attorney fees on this appeal. 
Two other very recent decisions ofthe Idaho Supreme Court bear on this issue as well: 
Lake CDA Investments, LLC v. Idaho Department of Land, 2010 Opinion No. 63, June 2,2010, 
and KGF Development, LLC v. City of Ketchum, 2010 Opinion No. 92, July 28, 2010. Lake CDA 
Investments observed on page 16, footnote 6, that the Legislature amended Idaho Code § 12-117, 
effective March 4,2010, retroactive to May 31,2009. It further noted that because the Supreme 
Court has already defined the term "civil judicial proceeding" to mean civil lawsuits and to 
exclude appeals of administrative proceedings to a court, Idaho Code § 12-117 as now amended 
may not now apply to such appeals. The Supreme Court also accepted without citation of 
authority in Lake CDA Investments the proposition that the version of the statute that governs is 
the one in effect at the time the district court awards costs and fees. Id. at 14. 
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Both of these principles were reaffinned in KGF Development, LLC. v. City 0/ Ketchum. 
The Supreme Court stated there that even if the City had acted without a basis in fact or law, the 
current version ofIdaho Code § 12-117 may not allow for an award of fees. KGF Development, 
LLCv. City a/Ketchum, p. 9 n.9. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Judicial Review is DENIED. The agency action of Jerome County is 
hereby AFFIRMED. Each party shall bear their own costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 3 dayO~O 
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Robert J. Elgee 
District Judge 
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2. Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, 
and the judgment described in ~1 above is appealable under and 
pursuant to Rule 11 (a) (1) I.A.R. 
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C. the rejection of the claim that Respondents violated 
one of the Appellants (Wayne Sloan, guardian of James Sloan) 
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D. the rejection of Appellants' claim that Respondents 
followed an unlawful procedure by failing to follow its own 
ordinances and construing its own ordinances in a way that limited 
its ability to consider other potentially conflicting ordinance 
requirements. 
4. There has not been an order sealing the record in this case. 
5. Appellants do not request a reporter's transcript. 
6. Appellants do not request any additional documents be 
included in the clerk's record, other than those automatically included. 
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